John Andrew Ross
How Judge Ross decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
He enforces Missouri's borrowing statute to bar claims that accrued in another state and are time-barred there, reading it as an anti-forum-shopping rule; a derivative loss-of-consortium claim falls with the time-barred primary claim.
“The purpose of the borrowing statute is “primarily to prevent a plaintiff from forum shopping for a statute of limitations” and “gaining more time to bring an action merely by suing in a forum other than where the cause of action accrued.””
He holds that the FCRA affords no private right to injunctive relief and will strike such a request; only the FTC may pursue FCRA injunctions.
“The Court agrees with the reasoning of the Courts in this District and holds that the FCRA does not permit injunctive relief. The Court strikes Plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief.”
Procedural preferences
He applies Rule 15(a) liberality to leave-to-amend, denying only for compelling reasons such as futility; futility means the amended pleading could not survive a Rule 12 motion, and mere unlikelihood of success is not enough.
“For these reasons, the Court finds the claim Plaintiff seeks to add is not clearly frivolous.”
A thinly pleaded but non-frivolous claim is met with a Rule 12(e) more-definite-statement / repleading opportunity rather than outright dismissal.
“The Court, therefore, grants Defendant’s request for a more definite statement and affords Plaintiff seven (7) days to file an amended complaint that complies with this Court’s Order.”
Cautions
Dismissal as a discovery sanction is reserved for willful refusal; a pro se litigant who belatedly but substantially complies in good faith will avoid the 'harshest of sanctions,' though narrower sanctions remain available.
“Upon careful review of Plaintiff’s discovery submissions, this Court finds that the harsh sanction of dismissal is not warranted. ... Plaintiff, a pro se litigant, has now made a good faith effort to respond to Defendant’s interrogatories and requests for production. Overall, Plaintiff has substantially complied with Defendant’s discovery requests.”
A litigant cannot manufacture recusal by naming the presiding judge as a defendant; adverse rulings are not a basis for recusal, and such motions are denied as frivolous judge-shopping.
“Courts have repeatedly and understandably held, however, that litigants may not “judge-shop” by naming the presiding judge as a defendant and seeking recusal.”
Motion outcomes
Counted from classified signed orders only. Percentages are shown only where the sample is large enough to be meaningful; smaller samples are reported as raw counts.
| Motions to dismiss N = 3 |
Granted in part: 2Denied: 1 | counts only |
| Motion for reconsideration N = 2 |
Denied: 1Moot / procedural: 1 | counts only |
| Summary judgment N = 1 |
Granted: 1 | counts only |
| Motion to defer summary judgment N = 1 |
Moot / procedural: 1 | counts only |
| Motion for extension of time N = 1 |
Granted: 1 | counts only |
| Motion for leave to file N = 1 |
Granted: 1 | counts only |
| Motion for leave to amend N = 1 |
Granted: 1 | counts only |
| Motion to join party N = 1 |
Granted: 1 | counts only |
| Motion to amend case management order N = 1 |
Granted in part: 1 | counts only |
| Default judgment N = 1 |
Denied: 1 | counts only |
| Motion for recusal N = 1 |
Denied: 1 | counts only |
| Motions to strike N = 1 |
Moot / procedural: 1 | counts only |
A "1 of 1" is one ruling, not a tendency. Treat small samples as illustrative, not predictive.
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that that Plaintiff’s Motion for Two Day Extension [73] and Motion for Leave to File in Excess of Fifteen Pages [75] are GRANTED.”
“IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that that Plaintiff’s Motion for Two Day Extension [73] and Motion for Leave to File in Excess of Fifteen Pages [75] are GRANTED.”
“IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Memorandum, docketed as a motion for Reconsideration [77] is DENIED as moot.”
“IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Reply to Defendant’s Response in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment, construed as a motion for reconsideration is DENIED.”
“IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File Amended Petition [25] and Motion for Leave to Add Party Defendant [26] are GRANTED.”
“IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File Amended Petition [25] and Motion for Leave to Add Party Defendant [26] are GRANTED.”
“IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Counts II and III of the Complaint and to Strike Plaintiff’s Request for Injunctive Relief [6] is GRANTED, in part, and DENIED, in part. Plaintiff is granted seven (7) days from the date of this Order to file an amended complaint. The Court strikes Plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief.”
“IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Rule 56(d) Motion to Defer Ruling on Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment and Permit Limited Discovery [13] is DENIED as moot.”
“IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Case for Failure to Cooperate in Discovery and Obey the Court’s Discovery Order (Doc. 34) is DENIED.”
“IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion to Reset the Dispositive Motion Deadline and Vacate Trial Setting (Doc. 45) is GRANTED in part. The trial setting of November 9, 2020 and all trial-related deadlines are hereby VACATED. The dispositive motion deadline shall be extended to November 13, 2020.”
“This matter is before the Court on Defendant Cottrell, Inc.’s (“Cottrell”) Motion for Summary Judgment on Missouri’s Borrowing Statute and Statute of Limitations. (Doc. 66). ... For the reasons discussed below, the motion will be granted and judgment entered in favor of Cottrell.”
“IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Government Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 3) is GRANTED in part. Plaintiff’s claims for damages against Government Defendants are dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1).”
“IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Default Judgment Against Chief Justice John Roberts (Doc. 15) and Motion for Recusal (Doc. 23) are DENIED.”
“IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Default Judgment Against Chief Justice John Roberts (Doc. 15) and Motion for Recusal (Doc. 23) are DENIED.”
“IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Government Defendants’ Motions to Strike (Docs. 9, 25, 29) are DENIED as moot.”