Paul Lewis Maloney
How Judge Maloney decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
In a farmworker forced-labor and wage suit, the judge applies the FLSA economic-realities and AWPA joint-employer factors entity-by-entity rather than treating a corporate family as a single employer, dismissing related entities individually where the complaint does not plausibly allege each one directed the work.
“Considering both the FLSA test and the AWPA regulations regarding joint employment together, Plaintiffs have alleged sufficient facts to show that Defendants were their joint employers for the sake of the AWPA.”
Procedural preferences
On objected-to Reports and Recommendations, he performs genuine de novo review rather than rubber-stamping: in one case he independently found the state had deliberately waived a limitations defense and rejected a magistrate's sua sponte recommendation to dismiss on timeliness grounds; in another he found a party's uncorroborated late-produced evidence not credible before overruling an objection.
“Because the State deliberately waived any statute of limitations defense, the Court need not address Defendants' remaining arguments... Petitioner's objection is hereby SUSTAINED IN PART; the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation is hereby REJECTED.”
He requires that an objection to a magistrate's Report and Recommendation identify a specific factual or legal error, not merely restate arguments already made; a general disagreement is treated as no objection at all and reviewed only for clear error.
“Rather, Plaintiff's objection constitutes a general disagreement with the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge rather than a disagreement about specific finding of fact or conclusion of law.”
Cautions
He enforces prison administrative-convenience precedent against pro se litigants seeking to change how the case caption or MDOC records reflect their name, even for a stated religious-conversion reason, following circuit precedent that the burden on the prisoner is outweighed by recordkeeping order.
“Administrative convenience provides a compelling reason for this Court to follow suit.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“the court GRANTS in part and DENIES WITHOUT PREJUDICE in part the defendant's motion for summary judgment [# 15]. Count one, the FMLA claim, is DISMISSED with prejudice. Count two, the MPDCRA claim, is DISMISSED without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).”
“The 28 U.S.C. § 2255 petition for a writ of habeas corpus [document #1] is DENIED. This case is TERMINATED and CLOSED.”
“THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the defendant's motion for summary judgment (Dkt. #4) is GRANTED for the reasons stated in the Report and Recommendation. This action is terminated.”
“Accordingly, because Plaintiff is an incarcerated, pro se litigant, the Court finds that he is not an appropriate representative of a class. Therefore, the Court will deny Plaintiff's request for class certification.”
“IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendant Steed's motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 44) is GRANTED.”
A rare order in which the judge REJECTED a magistrate's sua sponte recommendation to dismiss a habeas petition as untimely, after independently determining the state had deliberately waived any statute-of-limitations defense in its answer rather than raising it through inadvertence, which under controlling Supreme Court precedent barred sua sponte dismissal on timeliness grounds. No motion ruling recorded here (a procedural R&R rejection, not a ruling on a party's motion), but it evidences genuinely independent de novo review rather than rubber-stamping recommendations.
“IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants' motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 43) is GRANTED.”
“IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff's motion for reconsideration (ECF No. 105) is DENIED.”
“IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant's motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 139) is GRANTED.”
“IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant Spoelman's motion for summary judgment (Case No. 1:15-cv-1172, ECF No. 34) is GRANTED and Plaintiff's claims against him are DISMISSED.”
“IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff's motion for judgment on the pleadings, or in the alternative, for summary judgment (Case No.1:15-cv-388, ECF No. 46) is DENIED.”
PLRA screening opinion dismissing a prisoner's RLUIPA/First Amendment claim seeking possession of banned religious literature, holding a prior circuit-level RLUIPA ruling had already resolved that the literature ban served a compelling security interest. Certified that any appeal would not be in good faith.
“the Court will deny class certification and will dismiss, for failure to state a claim, Defendants Washington, Gasper, and Rajala”
“Plaintiff's motions seeking injunctive relief (ECF Nos. 5, 17, 18) will be denied.”
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
Sampled cases span consumer/ADA and civil-rights litigation removed or filed in federal court, prisoner civil-rights and habeas suits, Social Security disability appeals, and commercial insurance/contract disputes including a multi-year arbitration fight over a crop-insurance policy. One pending contract case (transferred in from New Jersey) remains in active discovery with no dispositive ruling yet; a second pending case (an H-2A farmworker suit) already has a published, independently grounded ruling in the published-opinion set above.
Put Judge Maloney's record to work
Ezel drafts and answers grounded in this exact profile: how Judge Maloney actually rules, not a generic AI guess.
Opens in Ezel Pro. Every answer is grounded in Judge Maloney's own signed orders and cites them.