William Glover Young
How Judge Young decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
In high-profile constitutional challenges to executive action Young reaches the merits before resolving prudential standing, and is willing to let First Amendment and APA theories proceed past a motion to dismiss while trimming weaker due-process-vagueness counts. Plaintiffs challenging government policy before him should anchor on First Amendment / APA theories rather than vagueness.
“As long as the constitutional standing requirements are satisfied, the court may evaluate the case's merits before resolving thorny prudential standing questions, and so this Court does here.”
A party moving for summary judgment who ALSO bears the burden of proof at trial faces a steep standard in his court -- it must produce 'incontrovertible prima facie evidence,' and under Reeves v. Sanderson the court will deny the motion if a reasonable jury could disbelieve even uncontradicted or interested evidence on authenticity/credibility grounds. If you bear the trial burden, expect SJ to be hard to win before him.
“When the moving party also bears the burden at trial, as is the case here, its burden of proof includes 'producing incontrovertible prima facie evidence of its claims.' ... The SEC's motion, ECF No. 266, is therefore denied in its entirety.”
He treats pure questions of statutory construction as 'ripe for resolution' as a matter of law, and will decide them on summary judgment even to the point of granting judgment for the non-movant under Rule 56(f) when the undisputed facts compel it. Frame a clean legal question with undisputed facts and he will resolve it rather than send it to a jury.
“this Court DENIES Archstone Reading's motion for summary judgment, ECF No. 153, in its entirety, and instead GRANTS summary judgment on liability under Massachusetts General Laws, chapter 93A, section 2 for the non-moving party, the Hermidas.”
Procedural preferences
Young is openly skeptical of the Twombly/Iqbal 'plausibility' pleading standard, calling it 'remarkably ill defined' and 'a poor guide to determining motions to dismiss.' He prefers to rule on the basis of undisputed factual allegations rather than abstract plausibility, and frequently considers attached public records (police reports, etc.) at the pleading stage. Ground motions in the concrete record, not plausibility rhetoric.
“the plausibility standard continues to be remarkably ill defined and this Court considers it a poor guide to determining motions to dismiss.”
Cautions
He enforces statutes of limitations and the limits of American Pipe class-action tolling strictly: a putative class member who relies on a class case after class certification is denied, and who is not diligent, will be time-barred. He adopts the Fourth Circuit's 'objectively reasonable reliance' cutoff for tolling. Do not sleep on individual claims while a class case lingers.
“Desmesmin had no objectively reasonable justification to rely upon the Smith plaintiffs to vindicate his rights after the motion for class certification was denied in 2014 ... 'diligent' he was not.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“For the foregoing reasons, the Court ALLOWS Boston's motion to dismiss, ECF No. 7, and the complaint is DISMISSED as untimely.”
“Ms. Winfield may proceed with her claim for excessive force against Keefe and Cooper. In all other respects, the motion for leave to file an amended complaint is denied as futile and the case is dismissed upon the remaining claims against the remaining defendants, with the exception of Richdale.”
“this Court on October 18, 2016, GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART the Defendants' motion for summary judgment, ECF No. 41. Summary judgment is GRANTED as to the claims of negligent design and testing; it is DENIED as to the adequacy of Pradaxa's label and proximate cause.”
“this Court DENIES Archstone Reading's motion for summary judgment, ECF No. 153, in its entirety, and instead GRANTS summary judgment on liability under Massachusetts General Laws, chapter 93A, section 2 for the non-moving party, the Hermidas.”
“this Court DENIES Archstone Reading's motion for summary judgment, ECF No. 153, in its entirety, and instead GRANTS summary judgment on liability under Massachusetts General Laws, chapter 93A, section 2 for the non-moving party, the Hermidas. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f)(1).”
“This aspect of the case, in the context of the evidence undergirding it, is simply not suitable for summary judgment. The SEC's motion, ECF No. 266, is therefore denied in its entirety.”
“For the reasons stated above, the Motion to Dismiss is ALLOWED in part as to count three and DENIED in part as to counts one, two, and four.”
“For the foregoing reasons, this Court denied the motion for summary judgment on September 19, 2012”
In a pro se prisoner civil-rights and declaratory action against the Massachusetts Governor, Young dismissed the complaint sua sponte on Section 1915A screening for failure to state a claim, with 35 days to file a 25-page amended complaint. He also denied motions to waive Rule 8, obtain early discovery and service, hold oral argument, grant permanent injunctive relief, vacate Gaskins v. Clarke, and take judicial notice. Quote: 'Following screening under 28 U.S.C. 1915A, the complaint is dismissed for failing to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.'
In a pro se action brought by a minor through a guardian, a 79-page, 48-count complaint named a former landlord, property managers, attorneys, and firms. On sua sponte screening, Young denied the pending motions, found misjoinder under Rule 20(a)(2), and granted leave to amend, warning that failure to do so would result in dismissal. Quote: 'In accordance with the foregoing, the pending motions are denied without prejudice.'
“Accordingly, ECF No. 29 is ALLOWED and the default judgment entered against Banerjee is VACATED.”
“The motions to dismiss count I, ECF No. 14, are DENIED.”
“For the reasons stated above, the motion to dismiss, ECF No. 3, is DENIED on all counts.”
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
Median case duration in the sampled dockets: 99 days (N = 7).
Young's docket has included the sentencing of Richard Reid, the JetBlue-Spirit antitrust case, and constitutional and administrative-law challenges involving federal grant policy and noncitizen speech. Other sampled matters involve employee benefits, product liability, employment, insurance, interpleader, and post-conviction relief. He also sits by designation in other federal districts. These examples illustrate the range of matters reviewed and are not a quantitative measure of his full caseload.
Put Judge Young's record to work
Ezel drafts and answers grounded in this exact profile: how Judge Young actually rules, not a generic AI guess.
Opens in Ezel Pro. Every answer is grounded in Judge Young's own signed orders and cites them.