William Glover Young
How Judge Young decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
In high-profile constitutional challenges to executive action Young reaches the merits before resolving prudential standing, and is willing to let First Amendment and APA theories proceed past a motion to dismiss while trimming weaker due-process-vagueness counts. Plaintiffs challenging government policy before him should anchor on First Amendment / APA theories rather than vagueness.
“As long as the constitutional standing requirements are satisfied, the court may evaluate the case's merits before resolving thorny prudential standing questions, and so this Court does here.”
A party moving for summary judgment who ALSO bears the burden of proof at trial faces a steep standard in his court -- it must produce 'incontrovertible prima facie evidence,' and under Reeves v. Sanderson the court will deny the motion if a reasonable jury could disbelieve even uncontradicted or interested evidence on authenticity/credibility grounds. If you bear the trial burden, expect SJ to be hard to win before him.
“When the moving party also bears the burden at trial, as is the case here, its burden of proof includes 'producing incontrovertible prima facie evidence of its claims.' ... The SEC's motion, ECF No. 266, is therefore denied in its entirety.”
He treats pure questions of statutory construction as 'ripe for resolution' as a matter of law, and will decide them on summary judgment even to the point of granting judgment for the non-movant under Rule 56(f) when the undisputed facts compel it. Frame a clean legal question with undisputed facts and he will resolve it rather than send it to a jury.
“this Court DENIES Archstone Reading's motion for summary judgment, ECF No. 153, in its entirety, and instead GRANTS summary judgment on liability under Massachusetts General Laws, chapter 93A, section 2 for the non-moving party, the Hermidas.”
Procedural preferences
Young is openly skeptical of the Twombly/Iqbal 'plausibility' pleading standard, calling it 'remarkably ill defined' and 'a poor guide to determining motions to dismiss.' He prefers to rule on the basis of undisputed factual allegations rather than abstract plausibility, and frequently considers attached public records (police reports, etc.) at the pleading stage. Ground motions in the concrete record, not plausibility rhetoric.
“the plausibility standard continues to be remarkably ill defined and this Court considers it a poor guide to determining motions to dismiss.”
Cautions
He enforces statutes of limitations and the limits of American Pipe class-action tolling strictly: a putative class member who relies on a class case after class certification is denied, and who is not diligent, will be time-barred. He adopts the Fourth Circuit's 'objectively reasonable reliance' cutoff for tolling. Do not sleep on individual claims while a class case lingers.
“Desmesmin had no objectively reasonable justification to rely upon the Smith plaintiffs to vindicate his rights after the motion for class certification was denied in 2014 ... 'diligent' he was not.”
Motion outcomes
Counted from classified signed orders only. Percentages are shown only where the sample is large enough to be meaningful; smaller samples are reported as raw counts.
| Summary judgment N = 5 |
Granted: 1Granted in part: 1Denied: 3 | counts only |
| Motions to dismiss N = 2 |
Granted: 1Granted in part: 1 | counts only |
| Motion for leave to amend N = 1 |
Granted in part: 1 | counts only |
A "1 of 1" is one ruling, not a tendency. Treat small samples as illustrative, not predictive.
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“For the foregoing reasons, the Court ALLOWS Boston's motion to dismiss, ECF No. 7, and the complaint is DISMISSED as untimely.”
“Ms. Winfield may proceed with her claim for excessive force against Keefe and Cooper. In all other respects, the motion for leave to file an amended complaint is denied as futile and the case is dismissed upon the remaining claims against the remaining defendants, with the exception of Richdale.”
“this Court on October 18, 2016, GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART the Defendants' motion for summary judgment, ECF No. 41. Summary judgment is GRANTED as to the claims of negligent design and testing; it is DENIED as to the adequacy of Pradaxa's label and proximate cause.”
“this Court DENIES Archstone Reading's motion for summary judgment, ECF No. 153, in its entirety, and instead GRANTS summary judgment on liability under Massachusetts General Laws, chapter 93A, section 2 for the non-moving party, the Hermidas.”
“this Court DENIES Archstone Reading's motion for summary judgment, ECF No. 153, in its entirety, and instead GRANTS summary judgment on liability under Massachusetts General Laws, chapter 93A, section 2 for the non-moving party, the Hermidas. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f)(1).”
“This aspect of the case, in the context of the evidence undergirding it, is simply not suitable for summary judgment. The SEC's motion, ECF No. 266, is therefore denied in its entirety.”
“For the reasons stated above, the Motion to Dismiss is ALLOWED in part as to count three and DENIED in part as to counts one, two, and four.”
“For the foregoing reasons, this Court denied the motion for summary judgment on September 19, 2012”
Pro se prisoner civil-rights/declaratory action against the Massachusetts Governor. On 28 U.S.C. 1915A screening, the complaint was dismissed for failure to state a claim (with 35 days' leave to file a 25-page amended complaint); a battery of the plaintiff's own motions (waive Rule 8, early discovery, service, oral argument, permanent injunctive relief, vacate Gaskins v. Clarke, and four judicial-notice motions) were all DENIED. Excluded from motion stats as a screening order. Quote: 'Following screening under 28 U.S.C. 1915A, the complaint is dismissed for failing to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.'
Pro se action by a minor (through guardian) raising a 79-page, 48-count complaint against a former landlord, property managers, attorneys, and firms. On screening the Court denied the pending motions, found misjoinder under Rule 20(a)(2), and gave leave to amend (failure to do so to result in dismissal). Excluded from motion stats as a screening/misjoinder order. Quote: 'In accordance with the foregoing, the pending motions are denied without prejudice.'
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
Median case duration in the sampled dockets: 99 days (N = 7).
Senior U.S. District Judge, Boston (Division 1:), but among the most active and prolific judges in the district. High-profile docket: shoe-bomber Richard Reid sentencing, the JetBlue-Spirit merger block under the Clayton Act (2024), and the 2025 administration cases American Public Health Association v. National Institutes of Health (1:25-cv-10787, NIH grant terminations) and American Association of University Professors v. Rubio (1:25-cv-10685, noncitizen free-speech). Sampled 2020-filed civil dockets span ERISA collections (Mass Laborers v. Nunes), product liability (Cotter v. Monsanto), employment (Preiss; Kelley v. Manlo FLSA), insurance/interpleader (Allstate v. Horn; Primerica v. McDermott), and section 2255 (Rivera v. USA). He also sits by designation in other districts (e.g. D. Idaho). No quantitative nature-of-suit census computed this pass.