Walter Jay Skinner

How Judge Skinner rules, drawn from 23 signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.

Judge Skinner no longer hears cases. This profile is preserved as a historical record of how they ruled here.

Court
United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts
Position
District judge
Status
Deceased
Served
1973–2005
Appointed by
Richard M. Nixon (Republican)
Commissioned
December 19, 1973
Education
Harvard University, A.B., 1948; Harvard Law School, J.D., 1952
Signed orders read
23

About Judge Skinner

Walter Jay Skinner was a judge of the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts. Appointed by President Richard M. Nixon, Judge Skinner received a commission on December 19, 1973. Judge Skinner assumed senior status on September 14, 1992 and served until death on May 8, 2005.

How Judge Skinner decides

Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.

What persuades

Skinner enforced an explicit discovery warning where the promised appraisal was incomplete and the expert responses omitted the required grounds.

“The plaintiff was explicitly notified that strict compliance with the scheduling order would be enforced.”

Skinner treated admitted receipt of the summons and complaint as curing a technical defect in proving service.

“Failure to comply with these provisions is cured by an admission that in fact the complaint and the summons were received.”

Procedural preferences

In a former employees' contract dispute, Skinner gave reduced weight to a Massachusetts forum clause in standard-form agreements presented after the employees had started work. He transferred the case to Illinois after considering the witnesses and the location of the disputed conduct.

“it does suggest that less weight should be given to the clause than would be given to a fully negotiated provision.”

Skinner required a clear congressional basis before treating state-law claims as removable through complete preemption.

“FPI’s right to sue under its chosen theories is protected by the plain meaning of the savings clause.”

Cautions

Skinner regarded dismissal for failure to prosecute as an exceptional sanction, especially where delay caused little actual prejudice.

“The sanction of dismissal is severe, however, and should be resorted to only in extreme circumstances.”

Skinner emphasized that transfer decisions depend closely on the record of the particular dispute.

“These decisions are preeminently fact sensitive, however, and each case must be dealt with on its own.”

Signed rulings

A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.

Buntzman v. Springfield Redevelopment Authority, Inc.
Motions to dismiss (defendants) Granted

“Accordingly, the defendants’ motion to dismiss is allowed. The clerk shall enter judgment in favor of defendants forthwith.”

Sanders Associates, Inc. v. Summagraphics Corp.
Summary judgment (defendant) Denied

“The motion for summary judgment is DENIED.”

Motion to bifurcate (unspecified) Granted

“The motion to bifurcate the patent validity and infringement issues from the antitrust counterclaim is ALLOWED.”

Erickson v. Niles Co.
Motion to set aside default (defendant) Denied

“Accordingly the defendant’s Motion to Set Aside Default is denied.”

Financial Planning Institute, Inc. v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co.
Motions to remand (plaintiff) Granted

“Accordingly, the plaintiff’s motion for remand is allowed and the case is remanded to the Middlesex Superior Court.”

New Medico Associates, Inc. v. Kleinhenz
Motions to transfer (defendants) Granted

“Accordingly the motion to transfer is allowed, and the ease shall be transferred forthwith to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois.”

P.I.E. Nationwide, Inc. v. New England Tech Air, Inc.
Motions to dismiss (defendant) Granted

“Accordingly, the defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction is allowed without prejudice and with leave to amend the complaint within fourteen days.”

Kleinerman v. Snitzer
Motion for reconsideration (defendants) Denied

“Accordingly, defendants’ motion for reconsideration is denied.”

Motion to expedite remand (plaintiff) Granted

“Plaintiff’s motion for expediting remand is allowed.”

Akerman v. Bankworcester Corp.
Motions to dismiss (defendants) Granted

“Accordingly, defendants’ motion to dismiss is allowed.”

Cummings Properties Management, Inc. v. Federal Deposit Insurance
Preliminary injunction (plaintiff) Granted

“The FDIC is hereby enjoined from removing the automatic teller machine from the premises known as 400 West Cummings Park, Woburn, Massachusetts until further notice.”

United States v. Whiting
Motions to dismiss (defendant) Granted

“Accordingly the defendant Whiting’s motion to. dismiss Count IB of the indictment is allowed.”

Salomon S.A. v. Scott USA Ltd. Partnership
Motion to sever and stay (plaintiffs) Granted in part

“Accordingly, so much of the counterclaim as relates to U.S. Patent Nos. 3,885,329, 4,062,133 and 4,284,273 is SEVERED and STAYED pending disposition of these claims in the several cases to which they relate.”

Savoy v. White
Motion for substitution (National Credit Union Administration) Granted

“Accordingly, National Credit Union Administration’s motion for substitution as party is allowed.”

Motions to remand (plaintiff) Denied

“Plaintiff’s motion to remand is denied.”

Caseload & timing

From public federal docket records for this judge.

Median case duration in the sampled dockets: 2643.5 days (N = 20).

The twenty located historical dockets were all terminated. They included prisoner civil-rights, land-condemnation, contract, securities, statutory, marine, malpractice, property-damage, and benefits matters; the archive is a partial historical slice rather than a complete caseload.

A historical record

Judge Skinner no longer hears cases. This profile stays available as a record of how they ruled here. If you're preparing for a matter, start from the court's current bench.