Richard Gaylore Stearns
How Judge Stearns decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
On a 12(b)(6) motion he draws a sharp line between speech as a basis of liability and speech as evidence of misconduct; the Massachusetts litigation privilege bars only the former, so default letters pleaded as evidence of bad faith survive.
“The law draws a distinction between holding a speaker liable for the content of her speech, on the one hand, and using that speech as evidence of her misconduct, on the other. The litigation privilege applies in the former context, but not the latter.”
For LMRA section 301 complete preemption he requires actual interpretation of the CBA, not mere consultation -- a state-law claim that only references the agreement is not preempted and (absent diversity) leaves no federal jurisdiction.
“The line is drawn between mere consultation of the CBA, which does not require preemption, and active interpretation, which does.”
On a preliminary injunction he weighs irreparable harm and the public interest hard: a movant who cannot show it can scale production to fill the gap an injunction would create makes a 'near-fatal concession,' and an accused infringer need only raise a 'substantial question' of invalidity to defeat the injunction.
“plaintiffs' inability to convincingly demonstrate their capacity to scale up production to meet the vacuum that an injunction would create in the current market demand is a near-fatal concession on this prong of the injunctive standard.”
Procedural preferences
Faced with combined 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) motions he decides jurisdiction first, per First Circuit practice.
“When faced with motions to dismiss under both 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), a district court, absent good reason to do otherwise, should ordinarily decide the 12(b)(1) motion first.”
He treats affirmative defenses as not properly resolved on summary judgment -- the correct vehicle is a Rule 12(f) motion to strike; equitable affirmative defenses he leaves for the court on a full record.
“The proper vehicle by which to object to an affirmative defense is a motion to strike pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f) and not by way of a motion for summary judgment sounding in law.”
Enforces statutory exhaustion/arbitration channels strictly: under ERISA/MPPAA, failing to initiate arbitration waives 'any objection' to the withdrawal-liability assessment, leaving the demanded amount 'due and owing.'
“By failing to raise the applicability of the exemption in Sec. 1383(b) in an arbitration proceeding, NASDI has waived 'any objection to the withdrawal liability assessed by the plan.'”
Cautions
Cautious about summarily disposing of First Amendment claims; rather than dismiss outright he may deny without prejudice and structure a path (here, an election between remand and a fixed discovery period) to test whether a plausible federal claim exists.
“the court is, however, sensitive to the fact that summary dispositions are to be approached cautiously when a complaint involves an alleged violation of First Amendment rights.”
Motion outcomes
Counted from classified signed orders only. Percentages are shown only where the sample is large enough to be meaningful; smaller samples are reported as raw counts.
| Summary judgment N = 14 |
Granted: 6Granted in part: 2Denied: 4Moot / procedural: 2 | 57% granted |
| Motions to dismiss N = 7 |
Granted: 2Granted in part: 2Denied: 3 | counts only |
| Preliminary injunction N = 3 |
Granted: 2Denied: 1 | counts only |
| Motion to dissolve tro N = 1 |
Denied: 1 | counts only |
| Motion to exclude N = 1 |
Granted: 1 | counts only |
A "1 of 1" is one ruling, not a tendency. Treat small samples as illustrative, not predictive.
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“For the foregoing reasons, defendant's motion to dismiss is DENIED.”
“The court accordingly GRANTS the motion and DISMISSES the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.”
“plaintiff's motion for summary judgment is ALLOWED and defendant's motion for summary judgment is DENIED. The Clerk shall enter judgment against NASDI on all claims and close the case.”
“plaintiff's motion for summary judgment is ALLOWED and defendant's motion for summary judgment is DENIED. The Clerk shall enter judgment against NASDI on all claims and close the case.”
“summary judgment will be ALLOWED in favor of plaintiffs with respect to Count II and Counterclaim I. The court will DISMISS Counterclaim II for lack of jurisdiction. The parties' motions for summary judgment with respect to the remaining claims, counterclaims, and affirmative defenses are DENIED.”
“The parties' motions for summary judgment with respect to the remaining claims, counterclaims, and affirmative defenses are DENIED.”
“the motion to dismiss is ALLOWED IN PART and DENIED IN PART and the motion for a preliminary injunction is DENIED. Counts I, II, and III are dismissed, and Counts IV and VI shall, for time being, proceed to factual discovery.”
“the motion to dismiss is ALLOWED IN PART and DENIED IN PART and the motion for a preliminary injunction is DENIED.”
“defendants' motion for summary judgment is ALLOWED and plaintiffs' cross-motion is DENIED. The Clerk will enter judgment for defendants and close the case.”
“defendants' motion for summary judgment is ALLOWED and plaintiffs' cross-motion is DENIED.”
“defendants' Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint is DENIED without prejudice. Plaintiffs will file a notice of election with the court within fourteen (14) days of the date of this Order.”
“Novi's motion for a preliminary injunction is ALLOWED. Earth is restrained from disposing of goods manufactured by Novi. Novi is ordered to give security in the amount of $50,000.”
“The TRO will convert to a preliminary injunction, and defendants' motion to dissolve the TRO is DENIED.”
“the motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction is ALLOWED. Kittle is preliminarily enjoined until February 5, 2026, or until further order from the Court, from: 1. Directly or indirectly, rendering services to ... any entity that ... markets any genomic profiling testing services ... competitive with the products or services of FMI”
“BioPoint's motion for summary judgment is ALLOWED, and defendants' motion for summary judgment is DENIED.”
“BioPoint's motion for summary judgment is ALLOWED, and defendants' motion for summary judgment is DENIED.”
“For the foregoing reasons, the Motion to Dismiss is DENIED.”
“For the foregoing reasons, BSC's motion for summary judgment is DENIED without prejudice.”