Patti Barbara Saris
How Judge Saris decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
She enforces the boundaries of the Lanham Act under Dastar: a false-advertising claim premised on who originated a DESIGN or idea (as opposed to who physically manufactured the product) is not cognizable under 15 U.S.C. 1125(a)(1)(B). But a Massachusetts ch. 93A unfair-competition claim can survive even where Dastar bars the parallel Lanham Act claim. Plead design-copying as 93A unfair competition, not as Lanham Act false advertising about 'origin.'
“I ALLOW the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. 10) as to the Lanham Act claim (Count X) and the California state law claims (Count XII and XIII) and DENY the partial motion to dismiss as to the Mass. G. L. ch. 93A claim (Count XI).”
On contract claims she enforces the express-agreement/quasi-contract bar strictly: Massachusetts law does not allow a litigant to override an express contract with an unjust-enrichment theory, and a 'time is of the essence' clause is enforced even where the breach (a few days' late wire) seems minor and was not the breaching party's fault. Do not expect equity to rescue a missed contractual deadline in her court.
“While this does seem unjust because the delay was minimal and not Reem's fault, the express agreement between the parties precludes the unjust enrichment claim.”
At the motion-to-dismiss stage in IP/design cases she credits a complaint that pairs an IMAGE with a paragraph-long description: a design-patent claim survives where the patented and accused designs are not 'plainly dissimilar' to an ordinary observer (minor stitching/strap/tread differences don't defeat the claim), and trade-dress distinctiveness is judged on the 'total appearance' (secondary meaning, not element-by-element functionality). Plead trade dress with a precise description plus side-by-side images, and argue secondary meaning of the overall look.
“the Court finds that the overall appearance of the design in the D257 Patent and the overall appearance of the Bueno clog are not plainly dissimilar, as demonstrated by a side-by-side comparison”
In FCA/Anti-Kickback qui tam cases she reads the AKS as broad but not boundless: a commission-only independent-contractor sales arrangement is NOT a per se AKS violation, yet the statute's 'ominous breadth' means well-pleaded facts (sales-based commissions, close surgeon relationships, prior litigation putting the defendant on notice) plausibly state a claim. She will let a relator past the public-disclosure bar where his firsthand, insider knowledge 'materially adds' to public disclosures (original-source exception). Relators should plead specific insider facts (compensation mechanics, internal warnings) that go beyond 10-Ks and news articles.
“Given the breadth of the AKS and the characteristics of the independent contractor arrangement alleged here ... the Court concludes that Relator has alleged a plausible AKS claim.”
Procedural preferences
She construes removal statutes strictly against removal and remands when federal jurisdiction is doubtful: for a suit that seeks only to void a specific foreclosure sale (not to invalidate the mortgage), the amount in controversy is the value of restoring the borrower's equitable title, and the removing party bears the burden to quantify it. A removing defendant who defaults to the loan's face value without valuing the actual object of the litigation risks remand.
“First Horizon has therefore failed to meet its burden of demonstrating by a preponderance of the evidence that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000.”
She gives broad effect to general releases: a release that 'forever discharge[s]' all 'claims' and 'acts' 'from the beginning of the world to the date of this Agreement' bars later-asserted claims based on pre-settlement conduct, even claims that accrued only after the release was signed (giving the word 'acts' independent meaning). Drafters who want to preserve future or as-yet-unaccrued claims must carve them out explicitly; do not assume a later-issued patent or later-accrued claim escapes a sweeping general release.
“the release encompasses claims that are based on pre-Settlement Agreement acts, even if those claims accrued only after execution of the Settlement Agreement.”
On Rule 60(b)(6) motions to vacate a judgment after a post-trial settlement, she will vacate where the court itself instigated the settlement (here, after signaling it would likely remit a large verdict) and where refusing vacatur would hand the plaintiff a windfall (using the vacated judgment as a damages-multiplication base in a separate suit). She treats vacatur as an equitable remedy turning on whether the equities tilt in the movant's favor.
“the Court need not decide the precise standard for district court vacatur of a final judgment upon settlement because exceptional circumstances justify vacatur here.”
Cautions
In ERISA benefits litigation she reads 502(a)(3) generously as to remedies, holding that a plan participant may seek surcharge against a fiduciary as an equitable remedy -- a route to make-whole money relief beyond mere benefit denial. ERISA fiduciary-breach plaintiffs in her court should plead surcharge as an equitable remedy.
“the Court holds that 502(a)(3) permits a participant to seek surcharge against a fiduciary and denies Defendants' motion for summary judgment on that point.”
On summary judgment in civil-rights cases she will hold a movant to the videotape: where objective video evidence exists, she follows Scott v. Harris and grants summary judgment if no reasonable juror could find for the non-movant on that record (here, no deliberate indifference by a prison nurse). A non-movant whose narrative is contradicted by the video should expect summary judgment against them.
“the Court concludes that no reasonable juror could find that Nurse Gagliani was deliberately indifferent to Washington's serious medical needs.”
Motion outcomes
Counted from classified signed orders only. Percentages are shown only where the sample is large enough to be meaningful; smaller samples are reported as raw counts.
| Motions to dismiss N = 11 |
Granted: 4Granted in part: 4Denied: 1Moot / procedural: 2 | 73% granted |
| Summary judgment N = 9 |
Granted: 4Granted in part: 2Denied: 3 | counts only |
| Motions to remand N = 1 |
Granted: 1 | counts only |
| Motion to compel arbitration N = 1 |
Granted: 1 | counts only |
| Motions to strike N = 1 |
Moot / procedural: 1 | counts only |
| Motion to vacate judgment N = 1 |
Granted: 1 | counts only |
| Motion for reconsideration N = 1 |
Granted: 1 | counts only |
A "1 of 1" is one ruling, not a tendency. Treat small samples as illustrative, not predictive.
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“Strangis's motion to remand (Dkt. 10) is ALLOWED as to the request to remand the case and DENIED as to the request for attorney's fees and costs. This case is REMANDED to the Massachusetts Land Court.”
“First Horizon's motion to dismiss (Dkt. 16) is DENIED as moot.”
“I ALLOW the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. 10) as to the Lanham Act claim (Count X) and the California state law claims (Count XII and XIII) and DENY the partial motion to dismiss as to the Mass. G. L. ch. 93A claim (Count XI).”
“the Court ALLOWS Defendants' motion for summary judgment (Dkt. 85) with respect to Lisa Erban's basic life insurance conversion claim and otherwise DENIES the motion.”
“The Court ALLOWS Lisa Erban's motion for summary judgment (Dkt. 89) with respect to her continuation claim and supplemental claim.”
“The Court ALLOWS Engleby's motion for summary judgment with regard to Counts II through V. Docket No. 62. With respect to Engleby's counterclaim and motion for fees under Massachusetts General Laws ch. 184 15(c), the Court ALLOWS the motion for summary judgment and for attorney's fees and costs.”
“The Court DENIES Reem's motion for summary judgment. Docket No. 65.”
“Musk's motions to dismiss for lack of standing (Dkt. 44 and 46) are ALLOWED as to the claims brought by Plaintiff Varsha Luthra and otherwise DENIED.”
“Musk's motion to compel arbitration of the claims against him individually (Dkt. 48) is ALLOWED, and those claims are STAYED.”
“Musk's motion to dismiss the claims against him as trustee of the Musk Trust for lack of personal jurisdiction (Dkt. 46) is ALLOWED.”
“The Court DENIES as moot Musk's motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim (Dkts. 44 and 46).”
“For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Defendant's motion to dismiss (Dkt. 36).”
“White Mountain's motion to dismiss Birkenstock's statutory claim under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 110H is ALLOWED. The motion to dismiss is otherwise DENIED as to all other counts (Count I, Count III, the Massachusetts common law portion of Count IV, and Count V).”
“For the foregoing reasons, Defendants' motion to dismiss (Dkt. 26) is ALLOWED. Viken's claim for correction of inventorship (Count I) is dismissed without prejudice for lack of standing under Rule 12(b)(1). Viken's claims for a declaration of ownership of the '395 patent (Count II) and for rescission of the Settlement Agreement (Count III) are dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6).”
“the Court DENIES Defendants' motion for summary judgment (Docket No. 108).”
“The Court also ALLOWS IN PART Plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment on liability (Docket No. 122) as to class members subject to the first CCA and DENIES IN PART the motion as to class members subject to the second CCA and as to Defendant Patrick McCluskey's individual liability.”
“Finally, the Court DENIES as moot Plaintiffs' motions to strike the testimony of Thomas N. Hubbard (Docket No. 115 and Docket No. 145).”
“The Court ALLOWS Nurse Gagliani's motion for summary judgment (Docket #276).”
“Dr. Hreib and Dr. Southard's motion to vacate the judgment (Docket No. 240) is ALLOWED. The Court dismisses Doe's claims against Dr. Hreib and Dr. Southard with prejudice.”
“For the foregoing reasons, Guerrero Orellana's motion for partial summary judgment (Dkt. 90) is ALLOWED, and the government's cross-motion for partial summary judgment (Dkt. 94) is DENIED.”
“the Court ALLOWS Guerrero Orellana's motion for partial summary judgment (Dkt. 90) and DENIES the government's cross-motion for partial summary judgment (Dkt. 94).”
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
Median case duration in the sampled dockets: 143 days (N = 9).
Median motion-to-ruling time: 164 days (N = 3).
Senior U.S. District Judge (former Chief Judge), Boston (Division 1:). Notable dockets across her tenure include the In re Pharmaceutical Industry Average Wholesale Price (AWP) MDL (1:01-cv-12257) and major IP/patent matters (e.g. Williams-Sonoma v. Wayfair). Sampled 2020-filed dockets span trademark (Aggressor Adventures), patent (Drug Information Retrieval), FLSA (Aiman v. Boston Pie), ADA employment (Canty v. GE), contract (Worley v. Pierce Atwood), and a cluster of 28 U.S.C. 2255 prisoner petitions (Davis/Lopez/Nguyen/Baptiste v. USA). No quantitative nature-of-suit census computed this pass.