Patti Barbara Saris

How Judge Saris rules, drawn from 32 signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.

Court
U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts
Position
District judge
Status
Senior status
Appointed by
Bill Clinton (Democratic)
Commissioned
November 24, 1993
Education
Radcliffe College, B.A., 1973; Harvard Law School, J.D., 1976
Signed orders read
32

About Judge Saris

Patti B. Saris is a judge of the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts. Appointed by President William J. Clinton, Judge Saris received a commission on November 24, 1993. Judge Saris assumed senior status on December 2, 2024.

Judge Saris's practices and standing orders

Rules for cases before Judge Saris, as published on the court's website (checked October 9, 2026). Judges revise these often, so confirm the current version on the court's site before you file.

Key rules

Motions

File Daubert motions on the scheduling-conference timetable, rather than as motions in limine just before trial.

“Schedule for filing of Daubert motions and other necessary expert discovery deadlines are set at the initial scheduling conference. Daubert motions should not be filed as motions in limine just before trial.”

Discovery

Notify the court if a protective-order dispute is likely.

“The parties shall inform the Court if there is likely to be a dispute regarding a protective order.”

Trial

File a courtesy copy of any video tutorial three business days before the hearing.

“I encourage video tutorials which will be filed and made part of the record. File a courtesy copy of the video tutorial three business days in advance of the hearing.”

Standing orders for every case in this court

Orders the court applies to all of its cases, whichever judge has them, as published on the court's website (checked October 9, 2026).

Key rules from these orders · The court's local rules ↗

How Judge Saris decides

Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.

What persuades

In Williams-Sonoma v. Wayfair, Saris dismissed a Lanham Act claim alleging misrepresentation of a design's origin under Dastar, while allowing a Massachusetts Chapter 93A claim based on the same alleged copying to proceed.

“I ALLOW the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. 10) as to the Lanham Act claim (Count X) and the California state law claims (Count XII and XIII) and DENY the partial motion to dismiss as to the Mass. G. L. ch. 93A claim (Count XI).”

In Reem Property v. Engleby, Saris granted summary judgment against an unjust-enrichment claim despite acknowledging the buyer's short payment delay seemed unfair. She held that the parties' express agreement precluded the claim.

“While this does seem unjust because the delay was minimal and not Reem's fault, the express agreement between the parties precludes the unjust enrichment claim.”

In Birkenstock v. White Mountain, Saris allowed a design-patent claim to proceed because a side-by-side comparison did not show the patented and accused clog designs were plainly dissimilar.

“the Court finds that the overall appearance of the design in the D257 Patent and the overall appearance of the Bueno clog are not plainly dissimilar, as demonstrated by a side-by-side comparison”

In United States ex rel. Langer v. Zimmer Biomet Holdings, Inc., Saris denied dismissal of a qui tam claim based on the company's commission-only independent-contractor sales arrangement, finding the pleaded facts plausibly alleged an Anti-Kickback Statute violation.

“Given the breadth of the AKS and the characteristics of the independent contractor arrangement alleged here ... the Court concludes that Relator has alleged a plausible AKS claim.”

Procedural preferences

In Strangis v. First Horizon Bank, Saris remanded a foreclosure suit because the removing bank had not shown that restoring the borrower's equitable title put more than $75,000 at issue.

“First Horizon has therefore failed to meet its burden of demonstrating by a preponderance of the evidence that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000.”

In Viken Detection v. Videray Technologies, Saris held that the parties' general release barred claims based on acts before their settlement even when the claims accrued later.

“the release encompasses claims that are based on pre-Settlement Agreement acts, even if those claims accrued only after execution of the Settlement Agreement.”

In Doe v. Hreib, she vacated an $18.4 million negligence judgment after a court-encouraged post-trial settlement because leaving the judgment in place could give the plaintiff a windfall as the base for multiple damages in separate claims.

“the Court need not decide the precise standard for district court vacatur of a final judgment upon settlement because exceptional circumstances justify vacatur here.”

Cautions

In Erban v. Tufts Medical Center Physicians Organization, Saris held that ERISA Section 502(a)(3) allowed the participant to seek surcharge against a fiduciary and denied the defendants' summary-judgment motion on that issue.

“the Court holds that 502(a)(3) permits a participant to seek surcharge against a fiduciary and denies Defendants' motion for summary judgment on that point.”

In Washington v. Gagliani, she granted a prison nurse summary judgment on a deliberate-indifference claim after reviewing video and medical records and finding no evidence that the nurse knowingly ignored a serious medical need.

“the Court concludes that no reasonable juror could find that Nurse Gagliani was deliberately indifferent to Washington's serious medical needs.”

Signed rulings

A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.

Strangis v. First Horizon Bank
1:24-cv-10343 · 2024-11-22
Motions to remand (plaintiff) Granted in part

“Strangis’s motion to remand (Dkt. 10) is ALLOWED as to the request to remand the case and DENIED as to the request for attorney’s fees and costs.”

Motions to dismiss (defendant) Moot / procedural

“First Horizon's motion to dismiss (Dkt. 16) is DENIED as moot.”

Williams-Sonoma, Inc. v. Wayfair, Inc.
1:21-cv-12063 · 2023-01-24
Motions to dismiss (defendant) Granted in part

“I ALLOW the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. 10) as to the Lanham Act claim (Count X) and the California state law claims (Count XII and XIII) and DENY the partial motion to dismiss as to the Mass. G. L. ch. 93A claim (Count XI).”

Erban v. Tufts Medical Center Physicians Organization, Inc.
1:22-cv-11193 · 2025-08-12
Summary judgment (defendant) Granted in part

“the Court ALLOWS Defendants' motion for summary judgment (Dkt. 85) with respect to Lisa Erban's basic life insurance conversion claim and otherwise DENIES the motion.”

Summary judgment (plaintiff) Granted

“The Court ALLOWS Lisa Erban's motion for summary judgment (Dkt. 89) with respect to her continuation claim and supplemental claim.”

Reem Property, LLC v. Engleby
1:15-cv-40127 · 2017-04-21
Summary judgment (defendant) Granted

“The Court ALLOWS Engleby's motion for summary judgment with regard to Counts II through V. Docket No. 62. With respect to Engleby's counterclaim and motion for fees under Massachusetts General Laws ch. 184 15(c), the Court ALLOWS the motion for summary judgment and for attorney's fees and costs.”

Summary judgment (plaintiff) Denied

“The Court DENIES Reem's motion for summary judgment. Docket No. 65.”

Watkins v. Musk
1:24-cv-11384 · 2025-06-12
Motions to dismiss (defendant) Granted in part

“Musk's motions to dismiss for lack of standing (Dkt. 44 and 46) are ALLOWED as to the claims brought by Plaintiff Varsha Luthra and otherwise DENIED.”

Motion to compel arbitration (defendant) Granted

“Musk's motion to compel arbitration of the claims against him individually (Dkt. 48) is ALLOWED, and those claims are STAYED.”

Motions to dismiss (defendant) Granted

“Musk's motion to dismiss the claims against him as trustee of the Musk Trust for lack of personal jurisdiction (Dkt. 46) is ALLOWED.”

Motions to dismiss (defendant) Moot / procedural

“The Court DENIES as moot Musk's motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim (Dkts. 44 and 46).”

United States ex rel. Langer v. Zimmer Biomet Holdings, Inc.
1:21-cv-11293 · 2024-08-02
Motions to dismiss (defendant) Denied

“For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Defendant's motion to dismiss (Dkt. 36).”

Birkenstock US BidCo, Inc. v. White Mountain International LLC
1:24-cv-10610 · 2024-09-04
Motions to dismiss (defendant) Granted in part

“White Mountain's motion to dismiss Birkenstock's statutory claim under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 110H is ALLOWED. The motion to dismiss is otherwise DENIED as to all other counts (Count I, Count III, the Massachusetts common law portion of Count IV, and Count V).”

Viken Detection Corporation v. Videray Technologies Inc.
1:24-cv-11375 · 2025-09-12
Motions to dismiss (defendant) Granted

“For the foregoing reasons, Defendants' motion to dismiss (Dkt. 26) is ALLOWED. Viken's claim for correction of inventorship (Count I) is dismissed without prejudice for lack of standing under Rule 12(b)(1). Viken's claims for a declaration of ownership of the '395 patent (Count II) and for rescission of the Settlement Agreement (Count III) are dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6).”

DaSilva v. Border Transfer of MA, Inc.
1:16-cv-11205 · 2019-05-01
Summary judgment (defendant) Denied

“the Court DENIES Defendants' motion for summary judgment (Docket No. 108).”

Summary judgment (plaintiff) Granted in part

“The Court also ALLOWS IN PART Plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment on liability (Docket No. 122) as to class members subject to the first CCA and DENIES IN PART the motion as to class members subject to the second CCA and as to Defendant Patrick McCluskey's individual liability.”

Motions to strike (plaintiff) Moot / procedural

“Finally, the Court DENIES as moot Plaintiffs' motions to strike the testimony of Thomas N. Hubbard (Docket No. 115 and Docket No. 145).”

Washington v. Gagliani
1:11-cv-10771 · 2019-09-09
Summary judgment (defendant) Granted

“The Court ALLOWS Nurse Gagliani's motion for summary judgment (Docket #276).”

Doe v. Hreib
1:13-cv-10103 · 2019-06-05
Motion to vacate judgment (defendant) Granted

“Dr. Hreib and Dr. Southard's motion to vacate the judgment (Docket No. 240) is ALLOWED. The Court dismisses Doe's claims against Dr. Hreib and Dr. Southard with prejudice.”

Guerrero Orellana v. Moniz
1:25-cv-12664 · 2025-12-19
Summary judgment (plaintiff) Granted

“For the foregoing reasons, Guerrero Orellana's motion for partial summary judgment (Dkt. 90) is ALLOWED, and the government's cross-motion for partial summary judgment (Dkt. 94) is DENIED.”

Summary judgment (defendant) Denied

“the Court ALLOWS Guerrero Orellana's motion for partial summary judgment (Dkt. 90) and DENIES the government's cross-motion for partial summary judgment (Dkt. 94).”

Caseload & timing

From public federal docket records for this judge.

Median case duration in the sampled dockets: 143 days (N = 9).

Median motion-to-ruling time: 164 days (N = 3).

  • Saris's docket has included the Pharmaceutical Industry Average Wholesale Price multidistrict litigation and major intellectual-property disputes such as Williams-Sonoma v. Wayfair.
  • Other sampled matters involve trademarks, patents, wage-and-hour claims, disability discrimination, contracts, and post-conviction petitions.
  • These examples illustrate the range of matters reviewed and are not a quantitative measure of her full caseload.

Pending matters in the official report

Reported by the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts under the Civil Justice Reform Act, as of March 31, 2026.

Motions pending more than six months1
Bench trials submitted more than six months0
Bankruptcy appeals pending more than six months0
Social Security appeals pending more than six months0
Civil cases pending more than three years382
ReportMotions over six monthsCases over three years
Mar 20261382
Sep 20250175
Mar 2025174
Sep 202403
Mar 202402
Sep 202322
Mar 202301
Sep 202212
Mar 202200
Sep 202101
Mar 202167
Sep 202003

A snapshot on that date: matters listed may since have been decided or reassigned. A motion referred to a magistrate judge is counted for both judges. Motions in multidistrict litigation, section 2255 cases and Social Security appeals are not counted, and a very large three-year count is generally a multidistrict docket. Source: Appendix A of the report (PDF); about the report.

How long civil cases take in this court

For the whole of U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts, not for Judge Saris: median time from filing to disposition of the civil cases the court closed in the 12 months ending September 30, 2025, as reported by the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts.

CasesMedian time
All civil cases closed2,6827.3 months
Closed with no court action1,0953.8 months
Closed before pretrial8817.1 months
Closed during or after pretrial67617.4 months
Closed during trial3034.8 months
12 months endingCases closedMedian time
Sep 20252,6827.3 months
Sep 20242,4397.2 months
Sep 20232,7569.1 months
Sep 20222,22210.2 months
Sep 20212,58212.2 months
Sep 20202,39111.2 months
Sep 20194,43823 months

The table leaves out prisoner petitions, land condemnations, deportation reviews, recovery of overpayments and enforcement of judgments, and reports no median for fewer than 10 cases. A district that closed a large multidistrict litigation in the period shows very large counts and long medians for that year. Source: Table C-5, U.S. District Courts (spreadsheet).

Draft for Judge Saris with the record in hand

Ezel grounds your drafting and research in this profile: what has persuaded Judge Saris, and what has not, cited to the signed orders.

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