Nathaniel Matheson Gorton
How Judge Gorton decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
Enforces the Parratt/Hudson doctrine on procedural-due-process property claims: an unauthorized deprivation by a state official is not actionable under 1983 where an adequate post-deprivation state remedy (e.g., a conversion action) exists -- even a sympathetic, 'meritorious' claim fails on that ground.
“Plaintiff has, both pro se and with the benefit of appointed counsel, brought what on its face appears to be a meritorious action deserving of compensation but because 1) he could have brought a tort claim under Massachusetts law, such as an action for conversion, and 2) a state tort claim is an adequate post-deprivation remedy ... he does not have an actionable Sec. 1983 claim in this case.”
At the pleading stage he permits alternative/inconsistent theories (breach of contract and unjust enrichment) under Rule 8(d), declining to force an election of remedies before the contract's applicability is established.
“at this early juncture, plaintiff may plead both breach of contract and unjust enrichment in the alternative.”
Procedural preferences
Resolves justiciability/mootness before the merits: an intervening loss of personal stake (here, switching to a covered device) deprives the court of jurisdiction and the claims are dismissed as moot regardless of their apparent strength.
“Because plaintiff is not using the subject CGM equipment, she lacks a legal interest in the outcome of the case and, therefore, her claims will be dismissed as moot.”
On final judgment after a dispositive ruling he will dismiss withdrawn/conceded claims WITH prejudice and refuse hedging preclusion language where reaching the merits would be 'futile' (party admitted non-infringement).
“proceeding to the merits of Teva's summary judgment motion would be futile. Furthermore, plaintiffs have had an ample opportunity to brief this matter.”
Cautions
On a certificate of appealability for a procedurally-denied habeas petition he applies Slack v. McDaniel strictly and will not reopen via Rule 60(b)(3) an issue already decided by the First Circuit (law of the case).
“to decide this issue would be to re-litigate an issue already heard by the First Circuit, the Court finds that jurists of reason would not debate 'whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right'.”
Motion outcomes
Counted from classified signed orders only. Percentages are shown only where the sample is large enough to be meaningful; smaller samples are reported as raw counts.
| Summary judgment N = 10 |
Granted: 1Granted in part: 2Denied: 4Moot / procedural: 3 | 30% granted |
| Motion to suppress N = 5 |
Denied: 5 | counts only |
| Motions to dismiss N = 3 |
Granted: 1Denied: 2 | counts only |
| Certificate of appealability N = 2 |
Denied: 2 | counts only |
| Motions to strike N = 2 |
Denied: 2 | counts only |
| Motion for entry of judgment N = 1 |
Granted in part: 1 | counts only |
| Motion to vacate sentence N = 1 |
Denied: 1 | counts only |
| Motion for reconsideration N = 1 |
Denied: 1 | counts only |
A "1 of 1" is one ruling, not a tendency. Treat small samples as illustrative, not predictive.
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“For the foregoing reasons, defendant's motion for summary judgment (Docket No. 70) is ALLOWED.”
“plaintiff's motion for summary judgment(Docket No. 48) is DENIED,”
“defendant's motion for summary judgment (Docket No. 51) is DENIED as moot and”
“defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiff's claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction (Docket No. 57) is ALLOWED.”
“defendant's motion for entry of final judgment (Docket No. 209) is, with respect to defendant's First Counterclaim for a declaratory judgment of non-infringement of U.S. Patent No. 7,790,466, DENIED, but is, in all other respects, ALLOWED.”
“plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment on defendants' Chapter 93A, Sec. 3 affirmative defense (Docket No. 367, Part II) is ALLOWED. Otherwise, the cross motions for summary judgment (Docket Nos. 357, 367) are DENIED.”
“the cross motions for summary judgment (Docket Nos. 357, 367) are DENIED.”
“defendant LabQ's motion to dismiss (Docket No. 9) is DENIED.”
“In accordance with the foregoing, the certificate of appealability is DENIED.”
“For the foregoing reasons, defendant Carmenatty's motion to suppress (Docket No. 96) is DENIED.”
“defendant Alkayisi's motion to suppress (Docket No. 302), defendant Dzabiev's motion to suppress (Docket No. 294), defendant O'Hearn's motion to suppress evidence (Docket No. 295) and defendant O'Hearn's motion to suppress statements (Docket No. 298) are all DENIED, without hearings.”
“defendant Alkayisi's motion to suppress (Docket No. 302), defendant Dzabiev's motion to suppress (Docket No. 294), defendant O'Hearn's motion to suppress evidence (Docket No. 295) and defendant O'Hearn's motion to suppress statements (Docket No. 298) are all DENIED, without hearings.”
“defendant Alkayisi's motion to suppress (Docket No. 302), defendant Dzabiev's motion to suppress (Docket No. 294), defendant O'Hearn's motion to suppress evidence (Docket No. 295) and defendant O'Hearn's motion to suppress statements (Docket No. 298) are all DENIED, without hearings.”
“defendant Alkayisi's motion to suppress (Docket No. 302), defendant Dzabiev's motion to suppress (Docket No. 294), defendant O'Hearn's motion to suppress evidence (Docket No. 295) and defendant O'Hearn's motion to suppress statements (Docket No. 298) are all DENIED, without hearings.”
“the motion of defendant Antunes to dismiss the indictment (Docket No. 157) is DENIED.”
“In accordance with the foregoing, defendant's petition (Docket No. 49) is DISMISSED.”
“In accordance with the foregoing, petitioner's motion for a Certificate of Appealability is DENIED.”
“the defendants' motion for reconsideration (Docket No. 47) is DENIED.”