Marianne B. Bowler
How Judge Bowler decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
Title VII retaliation: temporal proximity of an adverse action to a protected complaint or EEOC charge is sufficient at the pleading stage. Bowler credited a 2.5-month gap between complaint and adverse review and a 3-month gap between EEOC charge and non-promotion as a prima facie showing.
“Such temporal proximity creates a prima facie showing that PwC retaliated against plaintiff for engaging in protected activity. Accordingly, Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal of Count Two is inappropriate.”
ADA reasonable-accommodation MSJ: a manager's failure to follow a written disability-accommodation policy (here, contacting 'partner resources') is itself evidence of pretext sufficient to defeat MSJ, even where the employer articulates a legitimate scheduling reason for termination.
“Starbucks had a policy that required a store manager to 'contact partner resources if an employee needs an accommodation due to a disability.' (Docket Entry # 28-4, p. 85). Tam did not contact partner resources. Instead, she terminated Cairo's employment before providing him adequate time to obtain a note demonstrating that the restriction was temporary.”
Procedural preferences
Default-judgment motions must follow the Rule 55 two-step (clerk's entry of default first, then judgment); filing a Rule 12 motion is itself a 'responsive pleading or otherwise defending,' so default is premature while a Rule 12 motion is pending.
“Allied has not sought or obtained an entry of a default under Rule 55(a). Accordingly, it is premature to request a default judgment under Rule 55(b).”
Massachusetts trustee process (Rule 69(a), Fed.R.Civ.P.) must comply with current Mass. Gen. L. ch. 246 sec. 28: post-2011, the wage exemption is the greater of 85% of gross wages or 50x the federal/state minimum wage -- the old $125/week figure is no longer valid and a summons stating it will be quashed.
“The March 12, 2012 trustee summons contained a wage exemption notification but incorrectly stated the wage exemption as '$125.00,' which was the language used in a previous iteration of section 28. The wage exemption clause in the trustee summons, therefore, does not meet the statutory requirements of section 28 and Rule 4.2(b).”
Cautions
Social Security appeals: a step-two severity finding does NOT automatically translate into RFC limitations at step four; arguing 'the impairment was found severe so the RFC must restrict X' will lose. Bowler also reads the Grid charitably to the Commissioner when nonexertional restrictions don't materially narrow the work range.
“An ALJ's finding that an impairment is severe does not necessarily translate into functional restrictions in the RFC.”
Motion outcomes
Counted from classified signed orders only. Percentages are shown only where the sample is large enough to be meaningful; smaller samples are reported as raw counts.
| Motions to dismiss N = 2 |
Granted: 1Granted in part: 1 | counts only |
| Social security motion to reverse N = 2 |
Denied: 2 | counts only |
| Social security motion to affirm N = 2 |
Granted: 2 | counts only |
| Summary judgment N = 1 |
Denied: 1 | counts only |
| Motion to amend N = 1 |
Granted: 1 | counts only |
| Default judgment N = 1 |
Denied: 1 | counts only |
A "1 of 1" is one ruling, not a tendency. Treat small samples as illustrative, not predictive.
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“this court RECOMMENDS19 that the motion for summary judgment (Docket Entry # 19) be DENIED.”
“this court RECOMMENDS7 that plaintiff's motion for an order reversing the decision of the Commissioner (Docket Entry # 16) be DENIED”
“that defendant's motion to affirm the Commissioner's decision (Docket Entry # 20) be ALLOWED.”
“Accordingly, the motion to amend (Docket Entry # 32) is ALLOWED.”
“This court RECOMMENDS14 that the motion to dismiss (Docket Entry # 4) be ALLOWED”
“and that the motion for default judgment (Docket Entry # 23) be DENIED.”
“the motion to reverse the decision of the Commissioner (Docket Entry # 16) is DENIED”
“and the Commissioner's motion to affirm the decision of the Commissioner (Docket Entry # 23) is ALLOWED.”
“this court RECOMMENDS14 that the motion to dismiss the amended complaint (Docket Entry # 5) be ALLOWED as to individual defendants Lennon, McEneaney and Lau and DENIED as to PwC.”
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
Median case duration in the sampled dockets: 273 days (N = 3).