Margaret R. Guzman
How Judge Guzman decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
In medical-malpractice cases she enforces the Massachusetts rule that expert testimony is required 'in almost every instance' to establish the standard of care and causation; absent a disclosed expert (and where the case is not the rare 'gross or obvious' one a lay jury could decide), the claims are dismissed as unprovable.
“because Plaintiff will be unable to prove the medical standard of care required for his claims, the claims must be dismissed.”
On insurance-coverage summary judgment she construes ambiguous policy provisions (here, 'abrupt collapse') against the insurer and in favor of the insured: internally inconsistent collapse language that would limit coverage to a building reduced to 'rubble' is ambiguous, so the coverage question goes to the jury and general exclusions do not apply.
“because 'ambiguities in the Policy result in coverage for the collapse,' the general exclusions for 'condensation of humidity, moisture, or vapor' are inapplicable.”
In products-liability cases she grants summary judgment where the plaintiff lacks admissible expert evidence of a defect and causation -- to prevail on either a negligence or a breach-of-warranty theory the plaintiff 'must present evidence of a defect' -- and she treats a late-disclosed expert opinion as excludable and an unbriefed claim as waived.
“Plaintiff lacks admissible evidence to show either a design defect or a manufacturing defect, and even if its late-disclosed evidence was admissible, it is insufficient.”
Procedural preferences
She resolves subject-matter jurisdiction before the merits and will not render any merits judgment once jurisdiction is wanting; a complaint that merely checks the 'federal question' box without pleading a federal statute/treaty/constitutional provision, and whose parties are non-diverse, is dismissed under Rule 12(b)(1)/12(h)(3).
“When a federal court concludes that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction over a case, it is precluded from rendering any judgments on the merits of the case.”
In Social Security suits she requires the claimant to have exhausted administrative remedies and obtained a 'final decision' under 42 U.S.C. 405(g) before judicial review; absent a waiver of exhaustion, the proper vehicle for dismissal is Rule 12(b)(6) because the court lacks the statutory power to grant relief (Smith v. Berryhill).
“without any such waiver the proper vehicle for dismissal is Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) because the court lacks the statutory power to grant relief.”
Cautions
Section 1983 substantive-due-process claims against municipalities face a very high bar in her courtroom: a land-use 'run of the mill dispute between a developer and a town planning agency' -- even alleging bad-faith permit delays or a discriminatory fee -- does not 'shock the conscience' without racial animus or fundamental procedural irregularity, and once the federal claims fail she declines supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims.
“the claim is 'too typical of the run of the mill dispute between a developer and a town planning agency,' and thus does not rise to the level of a due process violation.”
She enforces scheduling and expert-disclosure deadlines strictly: after granting several extensions she will deny further emergency extensions, bar a party who never disclosed an expert from doing so, and then dismiss claims that require that expert -- a serial-delay litigant can lose the case on the deadline, not the merits.
“the Court denied Plaintiff's third and fourth emergency motions for extension of time to disclose an expert, and noted plaintiff would be barred from disclosing an expert in this case.”
Motion outcomes
Counted from classified signed orders only. Percentages are shown only where the sample is large enough to be meaningful; smaller samples are reported as raw counts.
| Summary judgment N = 4 |
Granted: 3Granted in part: 1 | counts only |
| Motions to dismiss N = 3 |
Granted: 3 | counts only |
| Motions to strike N = 1 |
Denied: 1 | counts only |
| Motion to exclude expert N = 1 |
Moot / procedural: 1 | counts only |
| Motion to amend N = 1 |
Denied: 1 | counts only |
A "1 of 1" is one ruling, not a tendency. Treat small samples as illustrative, not predictive.
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“For the foregoing reasons, this case is DISMISSED for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.”
“1. The motion to dismiss is ALLOWED. 2. The remaining motions are DISMISSED AS MOOT. 3. The Clerk shall enter a separate order of dismissal.”
“For the foregoing reasons, the motion for to dismiss is GRANTED as to all claims.”
“For the forgoing reasons, Defendants' motion to for summary judgment, [ECF No. 23], was GRANTED as to all counts, [ECF No. 30].”
“Defendant's motion for summary judgment [ECF No. 48] is DENIED as to Count I (Breach of Contract) and GRANTED as to Count III (Bad Faith).”
“For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendants' motion for partial summary judgment [ECF No. 36] as to Counts I, III, and IV and dismisses Count II without prejudice.”
“Scopic's Motion for Summary Judgment [ECF No. 64] is GRANTED on all counts in accordance with this memorandum of decision”
“Scopic's Motion to Strike Paragraphs 3-4 and 11-16 of the Affidavit of Johannes Ellmeier [ECF No. 79] is DENIED”
“Because summary judgment is being granted as to all claims, the Court need not rule on the motion and will be denied as moot. ... Scopic's Motion to Exclude the Testimony of Glenn Ricciardelli [ECF No. 68] is DENIED AS MOOT.”
“Edv's request is therefore denied without prejudice.”
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
Median motion-to-ruling time: 90 days (N = 3).