Katherine A. Robertson
How Judge Robertson decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
On a pretrial-detention motion she gives controlling weight to a defendant's demonstrated record of compliance during a prior release over the statutory presumption: a defendant who appeared as required for months on comparable state charges, with strong community ties and no prior record, can rebut the Bail Reform Act presumption even on a serious fentanyl/firearm indictment. To defeat detention before her, marshal concrete evidence of past compliance and community ties.
“Most persuasive to the court is that fact that Defendant has been on pretrial release on state court charges for some seven months, facing a sentence similar to the sentence he faces in this court. He did not leave the jurisdiction, and he has consistently appeared as required”
Procedural preferences
She enforces Local Rule 56.1: when the non-movant fails to file a counter-statement controverting the movant's statement of undisputed material facts, those facts are deemed admitted and summary judgment follows. File a record-cited LR 56.1 counter-statement to create a triable dispute.
“When moving parties submit statements of undisputed material facts and the nonmovant fails to file a counter statement identifying evidence of factual disputes, the facts set forth by the moving parties are deemed admitted. Local Rule 56.1.”
She will deny leave to amend on futility grounds rather than let a marginal new claim proceed, even where the opposing arguments against amendment otherwise fail. In one prisoner civil-rights case she rejected all of the defendants' objections to a proposed claim but denied amendment anyway because the new theory was not yet ripe. Anticipate a genuine futility analysis on any motion to amend, not just a rubber-stamp under the liberal Rule 15 standard.
“While none of Defendants' arguments are availing, the court nevertheless concludes that Plaintiff's proposed amendment is futile on another ground.”
Cautions
Section 1983 suits that effectively ask a federal court to revisit a final state-court ruling are dismissed with prejudice on Rooker-Feldman and judicial-immunity grounds; she does not treat a due-process framing as an escape hatch around those doctrines when the injury traces to the state judgment itself.
“The federal district court lacks jurisdiction to consider whether the Justices of the MAP violated Plaintiff's due process rights when they awarded Ms. Staub attorney's fees and costs.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“the court GRANTS Defendants' motion to strike (Dkt. No. 58)”
“GRANTS Defendants' motion for summary judgment (Dkt. No. 46) as to Counts I, II, and III. Defendants' motion for summary judgment is DENIED without prejudice as to Counts V through XI, which will be remanded to Superior Court”
“the court finds that there are conditions that will reasonably assure the safety of the community if Defendant is released pending trial.”
“Judge Robertson recommended the court grant the motions for summary judgment on the issue of Plaintiff's entitlement to equitable tolling filed by SPS and BSEA. ... the court hereby ADOPTS the Report and Recommendation.”
“Judge Robertson recommended the court grant the motions for summary judgment on the issue of Plaintiff's entitlement to equitable tolling filed by SPS and BSEA.”
“the court, upon de novo review, hereby ADOPTS the Report and Recommendation. ... Defendants' motions to dismiss (Dkt. Nos. 17, 31, 64, 66, and 74) are hereby GRANTED.”
28 U.S.C. 1915(e) in-forma-pauperis screening. Robertson denied the initial in-forma-pauperis motion, granted the renewed motion, and recommended dismissal for failure to state a claim and because the defendants (a state court and judge) are immune; the recommendation was adopted and the case dismissed without prejudice. It resolved no pending dispositive motion and is not counted toward motion statistics.
“Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. No. 6) is hereby DENIED without prejudice. The clerk is ordered to remand this case to the Hampden County Superior Court.”
“Accordingly, Defendants' motion to stay is GRANTED.”
“Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. No. 69) is hereby ALLOWED as to the Monell claim, based upon failure to train (as to which there has been no objection), and DENIED as to the claim based upon failure to adequately supervise and discipline.”
“Defendants 11 motion to dismiss is DENIED without prejudice. Furthermore, Plaintiff is hereby ORDERED to file an amended complaint within 45 days of this order”
“the court, upon de novo review, hereby ADOPTS the Report and Recommendation. (Dkt. No. 33.) Accordingly, Defendants motion to dismiss (Dkt. No. 18) is hereby ALLOWED, and Plaintiffs complaint is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.”
“Plaintiff's motion for attorney's fees and expenses (Dkt. No. 66) is DENIED. The clerk's office is directed to close the case.”
“Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings is DENIED, and the Defendant's Motion for Order Affirming the Decision of the Commissioner is GRANTED.”
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
Median motion-to-ruling time: 179 days (N = 2).
Robertson's sampled work includes final decisions in consent civil cases, recommendations on referred dispositive matters, Social Security appeals, prisoner screening, and criminal-duty proceedings such as initial appearances and detention hearings. The examples describe the range of matters reviewed and are not a quantitative measure of her full caseload.
Put Judge Robertson's record to work
Ezel drafts and answers grounded in this exact profile: how Judge Robertson actually rules, not a generic AI guess.
Opens in Ezel Pro. Every answer is grounded in Judge Robertson's own signed orders and cites them.