Judith Gail Dein
How Judge Dein decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
Statute-of-limitations defense at the pleading stage: Dein applied the Massachusetts SJC's COVID-19 tolling orders to Title IX claims brought in Massachusetts, following the reasoning that tolling extended to 42 U.S.C. 1983 claims. A defendant arguing a Title IX claim is time-barred must account for the SJC tolling window.
“the SJC’s COVID-19 tolling orders should apply to Title IX claims, like those at issue in this case, that have been brought in Massachusetts.”
On a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss counterclaims, Dein treats fact-specific intent challenges (e.g., inequitable-conduct intent) as matters for a fuller record, not the pleadings -- plausible inducement allegations survive even where the movant has strong rebuttal arguments.
“Dorel has alleged sufficient facts to withstand a motion to dismiss, and the merits of its counterclaims will have to be assessed on a fuller record. Cozy’s motion to dismiss is DENIED.”
Procedural preferences
Contract interpretation on summary judgment: where multiple agreements (a master agreement and a statement of work) are unambiguous, Dein reads them together as a whole and gives effect to each, rejecting readings that manufacture a conflict; a specific SOW clause supersedes only the parallel master-agreement clause, not adjacent provisions.
“The reading of these unambiguous agreements together mandates the conclusion that SOW § 20.2.1(a) supersedes only MPSA § 13(c), the MPSA’s parallel termination for convenience provision. MPSA § 13(d), providing for termination for cause, remains in effect.”
Cautions
FMLA interference claims: the threshold element is that the employer DENIED an FMLA benefit the employee was entitled to. An employee who received every leave she requested cannot make out interference, regardless of other workplace grievances -- this is fatal at summary judgment.
“To succeed on a claim of interference with FMLA rights, “a plaintiff must first show that her employer denied her FMLA benefits to which she was entitled.””
Massachusetts anti-SLAPP special motions to dismiss: the movant must show the claims are based SOLELY on its petitioning activity. Conduct like recruiting/soliciting clients is not protected petitioning, so the immunity does not attach and the special motion fails.
“they are not entitled to avail themselves of the immunity provided by the Massachusetts anti-SLAPP statute. Accordingly, this court recommends that their motion to dismiss be denied.”
Motion outcomes
Counted from classified signed orders only. Percentages are shown only where the sample is large enough to be meaningful; smaller samples are reported as raw counts.
| Summary judgment N = 5 |
Granted: 4Denied: 1 | counts only |
| Motions to dismiss N = 3 |
Granted: 1Granted in part: 1Denied: 1 | counts only |
| Special motion to dismiss anti slapp N = 1 |
Denied: 1 | counts only |
A "1 of 1" is one ruling, not a tendency. Treat small samples as illustrative, not predictive.
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“is ALLOWED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. Because the plaintiffs have failed to allege plausible claims against Harvard for gender discrimination under Title IX, Count Three of the Amended Complaint is dismissed. However, Harvard's motion is otherwise denied.”
““Plaintiff Cozy, Inc.’s Motion to Dismiss Defendant’s Counterclaims” (Docket No. 70) is DENIED.”
““Defendants Fitzgerald and Brigid Hart-Molloy’s Motion to Dismiss” (Docket No. 19) is ALLOWED. The Complaint is dismissed without prejudice.”
““Defendant Maryellen Shea’s Motion for Summary Judgment” (Docket No. 100) ... are ALLOWED.”
““Defendants Northeastern University and Paul Zernicke’s Motion for Summary Judgment” (Docket No. 102) are ALLOWED.”
““Analog Devices, Inc.’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Concerning Contract Interpretation” (Docket No. 40) is ALLOWED.”
““Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment” (Docket No. 73) is ALLOWED and the “Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment” (Docket No. 77) is DENIED.”
““Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment” (Docket No. 77) is DENIED.”
“this court recommends to the District Judge to whom this case is assigned that the “Motion by Jeffrey Glassman and Law Offices of Jeffrey S. Glassman LLC, Under the Massachusetts Anti-SLAPP Statute, to Dismiss All State Law Claims Against Them ...” (Docket No. 344) be DENIED.”
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
Median case duration in the sampled dockets: 1061 days (N = 1).
Median motion-to-ruling time: 197.5 days (N = 4).