Douglas Preston Woodlock

U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts Appointed by Ronald Reagan (Republican) 6 signed orders read

How Judge Woodlock decides

Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.

What persuades

He reaches the dispositive threshold issue and decides on it. A facially time-barred suit is dismissed on the statute of limitations even where the pleadings have other defects.

“Although the defendants' motion raises shortcomings in the pleading of plaintiff's complaint, the most fundamental problem concerns the threshold question of statute of limitations.”

On ERISA denial-of-benefits, unambiguous plan language governs and is enforced even when the result is harsh; informal communications and estoppel cannot override clear plan terms.

“As unfortunate as it has turned out to be for a formality to bear such outsized financial consequences, no legal doctrine allows Mr. Kurma to avoid the unambiguous operation of the Plan in this case.”

He penalizes self-contradictory advocacy: a defendant cannot argue failure-to-mitigate damages while simultaneously denying any breach that would trigger a duty to mitigate.

“This is not mere alternative pleading but rather constitutes fundamental contradiction.”

Procedural preferences

Counsel (and pro se litigants) must spell out developed legal arguments; a skeletal motion that merely recites the standard will be denied, and the court will not construct the argument for them.

“It is not [the court's] job to put flesh on the bare bones of an underdeveloped argument.”

He requires full exhaustion of administrative remedies before judicial review in IDEA matters, and treats premature or collateral litigation initiatives as a waste of party and court resources.

“The parties and their counsel here have consumed their own resources and imposed on their adversaries the obligation to do likewise in the pursuit of needless litigation”

Cautions

A fee claimant must show a judicially-sanctioned material alteration of the legal relationship (Buckhannon); administrative findings of fact with no ordered relief do not make a party 'prevailing.'

“Administrative findings of fact - even findings of fact entitled to substantial deference - in the absence of any form of legal relief, do not constitute binding directives resulting in a material change in the legal relationship between the parties sufficient to make the Does prevailing parties under Buckhannon.”

For a hostile-environment claim, a handful of incidents over a long period -- especially where the plaintiff participated in the joking -- will not clear the 'severe or pervasive' bar, and prompt employer remedial action defeats ch. 151B liability.

“three instances of mocking by subordinates in almost a year of employment does not rise to the level of pervasiveness required to create an objectively hostile or abusive environment.”

Motion outcomes

Counted from classified signed orders only. Percentages are shown only where the sample is large enough to be meaningful; smaller samples are reported as raw counts.

Motions to dismiss
N = 4
Granted: 3Denied: 1 counts only
Summary judgment
N = 4
Granted: 2Denied: 2 counts only
Preliminary injunction
N = 1
Granted: 1 counts only
Motions to strike
N = 1
Granted in part: 1 counts only

A "1 of 1" is one ruling, not a tendency. Treat small samples as illustrative, not predictive.

Signed rulings

A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.

Lowery v. Town of Westwood
1:09-cv-12024 · 2010-07-14
Motions to dismiss (defendant) Granted

“Accordingly, the defendants' motion to dismiss is GRANTED.”

F.H. Cann & Associates, Inc. v. Moorman
1:20-cv-11251 · 2022-05-24
Motions to dismiss (defendant) Denied

“I DENY the defendant's motion [Dkt. No. 9] to dismiss for failure to state a claim.”

Motions to strike (plaintiff) Granted in part

“After DENYING in part and GRANTING in part the plaintiffs' motion [Dkt. No. 15] to strike, I GRANT the plaintiffs' motion [Dkt. No. 11] for preliminary injunctive relief.”

Preliminary injunction (plaintiff) Granted

“I GRANT the plaintiffs' motion [Dkt. No. 11] for preliminary injunctive relief.”

CBDE Public Schools v. Massachusetts Bureau of Special Education Appeals / Doe v. CBDE Public Schools
1:11-cv-10874 / 1:12-cv-11082 · 2012-09-27
Motions to dismiss (defendant) Granted

“in Civil Action No. 11-10874, I GRANT the Defendants' motions to dismiss (Dkt. Nos. 18 & 19)”

Motions to dismiss (defendant) Granted

“in Civil Action No. 12-11082, I GRANT CBDE's motion to dismiss (Dkt. No. 4).”

Kurma v. Starmark, Inc.
1:12-cv-11810 · 2016-02-09
Summary judgment (defendant) Granted

“Accordingly, I must GRANT Starmark's motion for summary judgment.”

Tinory v. AutoZoners, LLC
1:13-cv-11477 · 2016-01-26
Summary judgment (defendant) Granted

“I GRANT the defendants' motion for summary judgment as to all Claims for Relief, DENY the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and direct the clerk to enter judgment for the defendants.”

Summary judgment (plaintiff) Denied

“I GRANT the defendants' motion for summary judgment as to all Claims for Relief, DENY the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and direct the clerk to enter judgment for the defendants.”

Performance Indicator, LLC v. Once Innovations, Inc.
1:12-cv-12230 · 2014-11-04
Summary judgment (defendant) Denied

“I DENY Defendant Once Innovations' motion for partial summary judgment (Dkt. No. 29) in its entirety.”