Denise Jefferson Casper
How Judge Casper rules, drawn from 30 signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
About Judge Casper
Denise Jefferson Casper is a judge of the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts. Appointed by President Barack Obama, Judge Casper received a commission on December 20, 2010.
Judge Casper's practices and standing orders
Rules for cases before Judge Casper, as published on the court's website (checked October 9, 2026). Judges revise these often, so confirm the current version on the court's site before you file.
- Judicial Forum Survey ↗
- Standing Order - Courtroom Opportunities for Relatively Inexperienced Attorneys ↗
- Standing Order - Default Standing Order ↗
- Standing Order - Appearance Of Counsel Via Telephone and/or Video ↗
- Form Of Default Judgment ↗
- Scheduling Order ↗
- Standing Order Re Courtroom Opportunities ↗
Key rules
Motions
Reply briefs require a motion for leave; surreplies are not typically allowed.
“I typically allow reply briefs, but only with a motion for leave to file same. I do not typically allow surreply briefs.”
Discovery
Include any particular ESI proposal in the joint statement.
“If the parties have any particular proposal as to ESI, they should include it in their joint statement.”
Trial
Counsel should confer about a trial date before the conference.
“Yes. Counsel for the parties should have conferred about a trial date before the conference.”
Standing orders for every case in this court
Orders the court applies to all of its cases, whichever judge has them, as published on the court's website (checked October 9, 2026).
How Judge Casper decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
In Corrigan v. Covidien, she granted dismissal of defective-design and manufacture theories while allowing failure-to-warn, negligent-misrepresentation, consumer-protection, and related consortium claims to proceed.
“For the foregoing reasons, the Court ALLOWS in part and DENIES in part Defendants’ motion to dismiss, D. 9.”
In a dispute over a siphon-pipe design, she granted an engineering firm summary judgment because the opposing expert report did not identify the reasonable engineer’s standard of care or explain how the firm breached it.
“The report does not lay out the standard of care of a reasonable engineer designing the siphon pipe or explain how CDM Smith failed to meet that standard in making its design recommendation.”
Procedural preferences
In Lee’s suit, she dismissed one claim with prejudice and the rest without prejudice, then told him to plead factual allegations separately against each defendant in any amended complaint.
“Lee should not assert claims collectively against the defendants, but rather should separately parcel out the claims against each defendant and should not include any allegations that are relevant to the asserted claims.”
Cautions
In a suit over officers’ assistance during a civil standby, she granted the officers summary judgment on qualified immunity because the cited cases did not clearly establish a violation in the circumstances shown by the record.
“Additional cases cited by the Nasirs fail to address the circumstances at issue here and, therefore, do not alter the Court’s conclusion that qualified immunity applies to the Officers as to the remaining claim.”
In a slip-and-fall suit, she excluded a causation expert whose opinion about a staircase lacked a documented methodology, then granted the defendant summary judgment.
“Because Holt does not document any methodology he used to reach his conclusion, Fogarty seems to be suggesting that the Court can rely solely upon his training and experience.”
In an FTCA negligent-counseling suit, she left causation for the jury because the record permitted a rational inference connecting the alleged negligence and harm.
“It is appropriate for the issue of causation in this case to be resolved by the jury. Questions of causation are generally reserved for the factfinder.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“For the reasons stated above, the Court ALLOWS the motion to dismiss. D. 8.”
“the Court ALLOWS Defendants' motion to dismiss, D. 33. The Court dismisses Lee's amended complaint, D. 6, without prejudice, except for Count I which is dismissed with prejudice.”
“the Court DENIES Defendants' motion for sanctions, D. 45, without prejudice.”
“the Court ALLOWS Cape Air's motions to dismiss, D. 19-D. 30, as to Count VI (breach of contract) only with respect to the declaratory judgment that First Officer Plaintiffs seek that they did not breach their employment contracts with Cape Air because these contracts were illusory ... Cape Air's motions to dismiss, D. 19-D. 30, are otherwise DENIED.”
“the Court ALLOWS in part and DENIES in part Defendants' motion to dismiss, D. 9. Specifically, the Court allows the motion as to Count I (breach of warranty for defective manufacture and design) and as much of Count III (negligence) that alleges negligent design and manufacture and denies the motion as to Counts II (breach of warranty claim only as to failure to warn), III (negligence claim only as to the negligent failure to warn), IV (negligent misrepresentation), V (loss of consortium claim ...) and VI (c. 93A claim).”
“For the foregoing reasons, the Court ALLOWS CDM Smith's motion for summary judgment, D. 45.”
“the Court DENIES Gottlieb's motion for summary judgment, D. 68, and ALLOWS Amica's motion for summary judgment, D. 72.”
“For the foregoing reasons, the Court ALLOWS the Officers' motion for summary judgment, D. 50.”
“For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Guilfoile's motion to dismiss Shields' counterclaim, D. 91.”
“For the reasons discussed above, Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED.”
“the Court ALLOWS the BCH Defendants' motion to dismiss in part, D. 25, and dismisses Counts I (breach of contract claim) as Hartz and Palfrey, Counts II and V (as to the BCH Defendants) of the amended complaint, D. 24. It DENIES the motion as to Count I (breach of contract claim) against BCH and, accordingly, this claim remains.”
“the Court ALLOWS the motion to strike Holt's proffered opinion, D. 38, ALLOWS the motion to strike evidence of subsequent remedial measures, D. 40, and ALLOWS Whole Foods' motion for summary judgment, D. 24.”
“Accordingly, the Court allows Whole Foods' motion for summary judgment, D. 24.”
“For the reasons set forth herein, the United States' motion for summary judgment, D. 43, is DENIED. Codman's motion for summary judgment, D. 41, is also DENIED.”
“Codman's motion for summary judgment, D. 41, is also DENIED.”
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
Median case duration in the sampled dockets: 142 days (N = 8).
Median motion-to-ruling time: 165.5 days (N = 4).
Casper's sampled docket includes a substantial group of pending immigration-habeas petitions, together with employment, consumer-credit, whistleblower, insurance, product-liability, public-contract, and prisoner civil-rights matters. The listed examples describe the range of cases reviewed; they are not a quantitative measure of her full caseload.
Pending matters in the official report
Reported by the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts under the Civil Justice Reform Act, as of March 31, 2026.
| Motions pending more than six months | 0 |
| Bench trials submitted more than six months | 0 |
| Bankruptcy appeals pending more than six months | 0 |
| Social Security appeals pending more than six months | 0 |
| Civil cases pending more than three years | 8 |
| Report | Motions over six months | Cases over three years |
|---|---|---|
| Mar 2026 | 0 | 8 |
| Sep 2025 | 0 | 3 |
| Mar 2025 | 0 | 6 |
| Sep 2024 | 0 | 4 |
| Mar 2024 | 0 | 7 |
| Sep 2023 | 0 | 5 |
| Mar 2023 | 0 | 6 |
| Sep 2022 | 0 | 7 |
| Mar 2022 | 0 | 9 |
| Sep 2021 | 0 | 7 |
| Mar 2021 | 0 | 7 |
| Sep 2020 | 0 | 5 |
A snapshot on that date: matters listed may since have been decided or reassigned. A motion referred to a magistrate judge is counted for both judges. Motions in multidistrict litigation, section 2255 cases and Social Security appeals are not counted, and a very large three-year count is generally a multidistrict docket. Source: Appendix A of the report (PDF); about the report.
How long civil cases take in this court
For the whole of U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts, not for Judge Casper: median time from filing to disposition of the civil cases the court closed in the 12 months ending September 30, 2025, as reported by the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts.
| Cases | Median time | |
|---|---|---|
| All civil cases closed | 2,682 | 7.3 months |
| Closed with no court action | 1,095 | 3.8 months |
| Closed before pretrial | 881 | 7.1 months |
| Closed during or after pretrial | 676 | 17.4 months |
| Closed during trial | 30 | 34.8 months |
| 12 months ending | Cases closed | Median time |
|---|---|---|
| Sep 2025 | 2,682 | 7.3 months |
| Sep 2024 | 2,439 | 7.2 months |
| Sep 2023 | 2,756 | 9.1 months |
| Sep 2022 | 2,222 | 10.2 months |
| Sep 2021 | 2,582 | 12.2 months |
| Sep 2020 | 2,391 | 11.2 months |
| Sep 2019 | 4,438 | 23 months |
The table leaves out prisoner petitions, land condemnations, deportation reviews, recovery of overpayments and enforcement of judgments, and reports no median for fewer than 10 cases. A district that closed a large multidistrict litigation in the period shows very large counts and long medians for that year. Source: Table C-5, U.S. District Courts (spreadsheet).
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