Denise Jefferson Casper
How Judge Casper decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
On a motion to dismiss she parses a multi-count complaint theory-by-theory rather than all-or-nothing: in Corrigan v. Covidien she dismissed the defective-design/manufacture warranty and negligence theories but let the failure-to-warn, negligent-misrepresentation, c. 93A, and derivative loss-of-consortium claims proceed. Plead each theory distinctly; a weak count will not sink the rest.
“the Court ALLOWS in part and DENIES in part Defendants' motion to dismiss, D. 9. Specifically, the Court allows the motion as to Count I ... and denies the motion as to Counts II ... IV (negligent misrepresentation), V (loss of consortium ...) and VI (c. 93A claim).”
Professional-negligence claims fail at summary judgment in her court without expert standard-of-care evidence: labeling a design 'deficient' is not the same as establishing what a reasonable engineer's standard of care was and how it was breached. Retain and disclose a standard-of-care expert.
“The report does not lay out the standard of care of a reasonable engineer designing the siphon pipe or explain how CDM Smith failed to meet that standard ... the Court ALLOWS CDM Smith's motion for summary judgment, D. 45.”
Procedural preferences
She enforces Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a) against shotgun/collective pleading, especially from pro se litigants, but on a first failure she dismisses without prejudice and gives detailed, itemized re-pleading instructions (who did what to whom, when, where, why; one defendant per claim; no unrelated exhibits) plus an explicit warning that the next failure means dismissal with prejudice and possible sanctions.
“Lee should, in numbered paragraphs, lay out the alleged factual basis for the legal claims against each defendant ... he should set forth minimal facts as to who did what to whom, when, where, and why. Lee should not assert claims collectively against the defendants”
Cautions
On qualified immunity she runs a strict 'clearly established law' analysis and grants summary judgment to officers absent controlling authority or a robust consensus of persuasive cases putting the specific conduct beyond debate -- distinguishing the plaintiff's cited cases on their facts. To defeat QI, cite factually on-point precedent, not general principles.
“these cases fail to indicate the existence of "controlling authority or a robust consensus of cases of persuasive authority" that could have directed the Officers' conduct ... the Court ALLOWS the Officers' motion for summary judgment, D. 50.”
She is an active Daubert/Rule 702 gatekeeper and will strike a causation expert whose opinion lacks a documented, reliable methodology -- an expert who infers a past condition from a much-later inspection without measurements or scientific basis is offering ipse dixit. In an expert-dependent tort case, striking the expert can be outcome-determinative (it cleared the path to summary judgment in Fogarty). Make the expert show the methodology, not just the credentials and conclusion.
“Because Holt does not document any methodology he used to reach his conclusion ... The opinion appears to be 'connected to existing data only by the ipse dixit of the expert,' and should be excluded by Federal Rule of Evidence 702.”
Where the dispositive issue is causation or foreseeability and the record supports competing rational inferences, she reserves it for the jury rather than deciding it as a matter of law at summary judgment -- denying defense MSJs in both an FTCA negligent-counseling case (Jacques) and a 'featherweight'-causation Jones Act asbestos case (Ciolino). A defendant moving on causation needs the absence of ANY rational supporting inference, not merely the stronger argument.
“It is appropriate for the issue of causation in this case to be resolved by the jury. Questions of causation are generally reserved for the factfinder.”
Motion outcomes
Counted from classified signed orders only. Percentages are shown only where the sample is large enough to be meaningful; smaller samples are reported as raw counts.
| Summary judgment N = 12 |
Granted: 5Denied: 5Moot / procedural: 2 | 42% granted |
| Motions to dismiss N = 9 |
Granted: 2Granted in part: 3Denied: 4 | counts only |
| Motion for sanctions N = 1 |
Denied: 1 | counts only |
| Daubert N = 1 |
Granted: 1 | counts only |
| Motion for temporary restraining order N = 1 |
Denied: 1 | counts only |
| Motion to vacate sentence N = 1 |
Granted: 1 | counts only |
| Motion to exclude time N = 1 |
Granted: 1 | counts only |
| Motion to suppress N = 1 |
Denied: 1 | counts only |
A "1 of 1" is one ruling, not a tendency. Treat small samples as illustrative, not predictive.
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“For the reasons stated above, the Court ALLOWS the motion to dismiss. D. 8.”
“the Court ALLOWS Defendants' motion to dismiss, D. 33. The Court dismisses Lee's amended complaint, D. 6, without prejudice, except for Count I which is dismissed with prejudice.”
“the Court DENIES Defendants' motion for sanctions, D. 45, without prejudice.”
“the Court ALLOWS Cape Air's motions to dismiss, D. 19-D. 30, as to Count VI (breach of contract) only with respect to the declaratory judgment that First Officer Plaintiffs seek that they did not breach their employment contracts with Cape Air because these contracts were illusory ... Cape Air's motions to dismiss, D. 19-D. 30, are otherwise DENIED.”
“the Court ALLOWS in part and DENIES in part Defendants' motion to dismiss, D. 9. Specifically, the Court allows the motion as to Count I (breach of warranty for defective manufacture and design) and as much of Count III (negligence) that alleges negligent design and manufacture and denies the motion as to Counts II (breach of warranty claim only as to failure to warn), III (negligence claim only as to the negligent failure to warn), IV (negligent misrepresentation), V (loss of consortium claim ...) and VI (c. 93A claim).”
“For the foregoing reasons, the Court ALLOWS CDM Smith's motion for summary judgment, D. 45.”
“the Court DENIES Gottlieb's motion for summary judgment, D. 68, and ALLOWS Amica's motion for summary judgment, D. 72.”
“the Court DENIES Gottlieb's motion for summary judgment, D. 68, and ALLOWS Amica's motion for summary judgment, D. 72.”
“For the foregoing reasons, the Court ALLOWS the Officers' motion for summary judgment, D. 50.”
“For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Guilfoile's motion to dismiss Shields' counterclaim, D. 91.”
“For the reasons discussed above, Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED.”
“the Court ALLOWS the BCH Defendants' motion to dismiss in part, D. 25, and dismisses Counts I (breach of contract claim) as Hartz and Palfrey, Counts II and V (as to the BCH Defendants) of the amended complaint, D. 24. It DENIES the motion as to Count I (breach of contract claim) against BCH and, accordingly, this claim remains.”
“the Court ALLOWS the motion to strike Holt's proffered opinion, D. 38, ALLOWS the motion to strike evidence of subsequent remedial measures, D. 40, and ALLOWS Whole Foods' motion for summary judgment, D. 24.”
“Accordingly, the Court allows Whole Foods' motion for summary judgment, D. 24.”
“For the reasons set forth herein, the United States' motion for summary judgment, D. 43, is DENIED. Codman's motion for summary judgment, D. 41, is also DENIED.”
“Codman's motion for summary judgment, D. 41, is also DENIED.”
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
Median case duration in the sampled dockets: 142 days (N = 8).
Median motion-to-ruling time: 165.5 days (N = 4).
Chief U.S. District Judge, Boston (Division 1:) with some Worcester (4:) matters. June-2026 newly-assigned docket is heavily '463 Habeas Corpus - Alien Detainee' 2241 petitions (e.g. Da Silva Passos Junior v. Wesling 1:26-cv-12482, Nsabimana v. Venturella 1:26-cv-12473, Navarrete Pico v. Moniz 1:26-cv-12437), all pending, plus recent ADA-employment, FCRA, and qui tam filings. Sampled merits civil cases span insurance/c.93A (Gottlieb v. Amica 1:20-cv-10509), products liability (Corrigan v. Covidien 1:22-cv-10220), public-construction contract (New England Building & Bridge v. Cohasset 1:21-cv-11567), employment (McClain v. Cape Air 1:22-cv-10649), prisoner civil rights (Buculei 4:09-cv-40215), and qui tam (U.S. v. Merck KGaA 1:21-cv-10866). No quantitative nature-of-suit census computed this pass.