Bailey Aldrich
Judge Aldrich no longer hears cases. This profile is preserved as a historical record of how they ruled.
How Judge Aldrich decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
In a malicious-prosecution suit he refused to treat a since-reversed criminal conviction as conclusive proof of probable cause where the underlying charge was legally untenable, declining to extend a conclusive presumption to a prosecution founded on a mistake of law.
“I see no reason of public policy for extending the protection of this conclusive presumption of probable cause to a prosecution which is legally untenable because founded upon a mistake of law.”
He declined to invent a new category of tort liability for fishermen simply because seamen are traditionally favored in admiralty, holding that the ordinary principles of liability apply regardless of a plaintiff's occupation.
“I do not believe that to say ‘seamen are the favorites of admiralty’ should be to create a corresponding class of villains on whom to impose a new type of liability.”
Procedural preferences
In a contempt-of-Congress prosecution he resolved every ambiguity in the phrasing and scope of the subcommittee's questions in the defendant's favor, refusing to allow separate convictions on counts that sought the same fact.
“All doubts as to the coincidence of the questions should be resolved in the defendant’s favor.”
He required litigants to exhaust the appropriate administrative remedy before he would decide a fee dispute turning on an agency's action, deferring his ruling until the party first applied to the regulator.
“Until then I will not pass on that, or on the question of liability.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“the defendant’s motion for summary judgment on prayer 1 is granted.”
“Defendants’ motions denied.”
“it does not, and it is allowed.”
“It follows that the action must be dismissed against the defendant executors,”
“The defendant’s motion to dismiss or for summary judgment as to prayer 1 will, be granted.”
“Defendants’ motion allowed, and complaint dismissed.”
“defendant’s motion for summary judgment is granted.”
“The motion for judgment n. o. v. is denied.”
“The verdict and the judgment entered thereon are set aside and a new trial ordered.”
“I believe that it is greatly excessive, and I shall allow the defendant’s motion for a new trial unless the plaintiff files a remittitur of all damages above $20,000.”
“The defendant’s motion for entry of judgment for the defendant is denied.”
“I see no reason for declining jurisdiction.”
“Treating defendants’ demand for jury trial as a request for an advisory jury under Rule 39(c), 28 U.S.C.A., it is denied.”
A historical record
Judge Aldrich no longer hears cases. This profile stays available as a record of how they ruled. If you're preparing for a matter, start from the court's current bench.