Angel Kelley
How Judge Kelley decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
In ERISA class actions she applies the First Circuit's In re Asacol logic to standing: a named plaintiff who participated in one plan has constitutional AND statutory standing to bring representative claims attacking 'uniform practices across the Plans,' even for a plan he never joined -- requiring identical claims 'would render superfluous the Rule 23 commonality and predominance requirements.'
“Plaintiff alleges that Defendants engage in uniform practices across the Plans that violate ERISA. Plaintiff has standing to challenge these uniform practices, even though he was not a participant in the SRAP.”
On a contract-interpretation summary judgment she holds the movant to proving its reading is the ONLY reasonable one; ambiguity plus conflicting extrinsic evidence sends the parties' intent to the jury rather than resolving it as a matter of law.
“Viewing the extrinsic evidence in the light most favorable to Genesett, there exists a genuine dispute of material fact regarding the correct interpretation of the premium test. Accordingly, this Court cannot grant Sun Life's Motion for Summary Judgment.”
On a Sherman Act Section 1 claim she demands facts plausibly showing a concrete agreement; unilateral government inaction or a competitor's independent conduct, without allegations of when/how an agreement formed, is dismissed as conclusory conspiracy.
“none of Becky's allegations plausibly suggest an agreement between the Town and incumbent agencies. There is no allegation of when or how such an agreement formed, the circumstances surrounding it, or the Town's motive to collude.”
As Daubert/Rule 702 gatekeeper she excludes experts whose opinions rest on 'passive observations' rather than a reliable, case-specific methodology -- career experience (even decades of it) in an adjacent field is not specialized knowledge, and a thin Rule 16 disclosure lacking the data and analytical steps is independently fatal.
“Mr. Nicewicz's opinions rest on passive observations rather than on the application of reliable principles to case-specific facts. His curriculum vitae reflects career experience in court administration, not scientific or technical analysis of criminal networks.”
Procedural preferences
On a preliminary injunction, a failure to show likelihood of success effectively ends the analysis -- she does not labor through the remaining factors. She also reads irreparable harm narrowly: loss of a business or job is an 'external factor' that under Sampson v. Murray is not irreparable harm.
“Plaintiffs have failed to establish a likelihood of success on the merits, which essentially ends the inquiry.”
On personal jurisdiction she decides the case on the 'purposeful availment' prong and declines to reach the gestalt/reasonableness factors once it fails; jurisdictional discovery requires a 'colorable claim' for jurisdiction and an explanation of what discovery would show, not a fishing expedition.
“As we have found that jurisdiction over Monarch does not meet the 'purposeful availment' prong, the Court declines to address the reasonableness factors.”
She enforces L.R./Rule 7 motion formalities: a 'proposed' protective order with a signature line is not self-executing because Fed. R. Civ. P. 7(b)(1) requires a request for a court order to be made by motion stating the grounds.
“there is no motion explaining the parties' request or the reasons therefore. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 7(b)(1) (noting that a 'request for a court order must be made by motion' and must 'state with particu... [truncated]”
She resolves jurisdiction before the merits and will abstain: a federal suit that in substance attacks an ongoing state child-custody proceeding is barred by Younger (custody proceedings are 'akin to criminal prosecutions') or, in the alternative, Rooker-Feldman -- relabeling the relief sought does not avoid abstention.
“Because the Next Friends are challenging a state-initiated custody proceeding, they are challenging a proceeding that implicates Younger abstention.”
Cautions
In employment cases she will grant summary judgment where the employer documents legitimate performance problems the plaintiff cannot show were pretext; an FMLA retaliation theory also fails unless the decisionmakers knew of the protected activity -- a leave request withdrawn before management learned of it cannot support causation.
“Harris must demonstrate that those responsible for his termination were aware of his protected activity, as National Grid cannot be motivated to retaliate against an action of which it was unaware.”
She will impose the severest discovery sanction -- default judgment under Rule 37(b) -- on an 'obstructionist' party who serially blows deadlines and disobeys a compel order, and she rejects the notion that default is reserved for fraud on the court; conversely she enforces motion formalities and Rule 11's non-strict-liability standard, denying sanctions where the challenged statements are accurate.
“Short of simply ignoring all communications from Plaintiff's counsel and this Court, it is difficult to imagine a more 'obstructionist adversary' ... than the Defendants here.”
Motion outcomes
Counted from classified signed orders only. Percentages are shown only where the sample is large enough to be meaningful; smaller samples are reported as raw counts.
| Motions to dismiss N = 4 |
Granted: 3Denied: 1 | counts only |
| Preliminary injunction N = 4 |
Denied: 4 | counts only |
| Summary judgment N = 3 |
Granted: 2Denied: 1 | counts only |
| Motion for sanctions N = 2 |
Granted: 1Denied: 1 | counts only |
| Motion for more definite statement N = 1 |
Denied: 1 | counts only |
| Motion for jurisdictional discovery N = 1 |
Denied: 1 | counts only |
| Motion to amend N = 1 |
Denied: 1 | counts only |
| Motions to strike N = 1 |
Denied: 1 | counts only |
| Special motion to dismiss anti slapp N = 1 |
Denied: 1 | counts only |
| Motion for reconsideration N = 1 |
Moot / procedural: 1 | counts only |
| Motion in limine N = 1 |
Granted: 1 | counts only |
A "1 of 1" is one ruling, not a tendency. Treat small samples as illustrative, not predictive.
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and for More Definite Statement [Dkt. 11] is DENIED.”
“Therefore, Defendants' Motion for a More Definite Statement is denied.”
“For the foregoing reasons, Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment [Dkt. 74] is DENIED.”
“For the foregoing reasons, Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment [Dkt. 47] is GRANTED.”
“Plaintiffs' [Dkt. 9] Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction is DENIED.”
“For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Parexel's Motion for Preliminary Injunction. [Dkt. 13].”
“The Defendants' unopposed Motion for Summary Judgment [Dkt. 20] is GRANTED in full. Judgment shall enter for the defendants on all counts.”
“For the foregoing reasons, Defendant Monarch's Motion to Dismiss [Dkt. 68] is GRANTED.”
“Plaintiff has not made a colorable claim for jurisdiction or explained why jurisdiction would be found if discovery were permitted. ... Accordingly, jurisdictional discovery is unwarranted.”
“For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend their Complaints [Dkt. 184] is DENIED.”
“Defendants' Motion to Strike Exhibit 1 of the Amended Complaint [Dkt. 45] is DENIED”
“Defendants' Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim is [Dkt. 43] is GRANTED.”
“Allen's special motion to dismiss Fuller's counterclaims [Dkt. 16] is DENIED.”
“Mr. Gillan's Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction [Dkt. 15] is DENIED.”
“Defendants' Motion to Dismiss [Dkt. 52] is GRANTED”
“Plaintiff's Motion for Temporary Restraining Order [Dkt. 2] is DENIED”
“Defendants' Motion for Reconsideration [Dkt. 20] is DENIED as moot.”