Allison Dale Burroughs
How Judge Burroughs decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
On a Rule 12(b)(6) motion she repeatedly declines to resolve fact-intensive merits questions and complex doctrines on the pleadings, letting plausibly-pled claims proceed and inviting the defendant to renew the argument at summary judgment after discovery. To win an early dismissal in her court, attack the legal sufficiency or pleading defects, not the strength of the evidence.
“Following discovery, which should shed light on how and why it was determined which insureds were placed into which pool, Defendants may ask the Court to revisit this issue.”
In the wave of ECPA 'Meta Pixel' / web-tracking privacy class actions against hospital systems, she reads the crime-tort exception (18 U.S.C. 2511(2)(d)) strictly: the complaint must plead that the defendant intercepted communications FOR THE PURPOSE of committing the underlying crime/tort (e.g. a HIPAA violation), a heightened intent distinct from mere knowingness, and a financial/marketing motive does not satisfy it. Plead purpose, not just that the disclosure happened knowingly.
“It is not enough that a crime or tort [may have been] a . . . side-effect of the interception. Because the Amended Complaint fails to assert that Defendants intercepted communications 'for the purpose of committing [a] criminal or tortious act,' 18 U.S.C. 2511(2)(d), the ECPA claim must fail.”
Procedural preferences
She strictly enforces Local Rule 56.1 on summary judgment: a movant who fails to file a 'concise statement of the material facts of record as to which [it] contends there is no genuine issue to be tried, with page references' can have the motion denied on that basis alone, even before the merits -- and the same defect sinks an opponent's cross-motion. File a properly supported, record-cited LR 56.1 statement.
“Elite's briefing lacks a 'concise statement of the material facts of record . . . with page references to affidavits, depositions, and other documentation.' . . . This alone is grounds for denial of the motion.”
Cautions
She applies equitable doctrines pragmatically in the plaintiff's favor where a deadline was missed for reasons outside the litigant's control: she equitably tolled a roughly two-week-late FTCA filing where prior counsel had a breakdown and the agency denial letter was lost, and allowed John Doe defendants to remain pending identity discovery. A short, well-explained delay with diligent follow-up is unlikely to be fatal in her court.
“Based on these facts, all five factors weigh in favor of equitably tolling Plaintiffs' FTCA claims. . . . it is unlikely that allowing these claims to proceed after only a two-week delay would prejudice the Government.”
Motion outcomes
Counted from classified signed orders only. Percentages are shown only where the sample is large enough to be meaningful; smaller samples are reported as raw counts.
| Summary judgment N = 12 |
Granted in part: 7Denied: 5 | 58% granted |
| Motions to dismiss N = 8 |
Granted: 1Granted in part: 2Denied: 5 | counts only |
| Motion to certify class N = 1 |
Granted in part: 1 | counts only |
| Motion to bifurcate N = 1 |
Denied: 1 | counts only |
| Motion for reconsideration N = 1 |
Denied: 1 | counts only |
A "1 of 1" is one ruling, not a tendency. Treat small samples as illustrative, not predictive.
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“Defendants' motion to dismiss the Amended Complaint is GRANTED without prejudice and with leave to amend within 21 days.”
“Accordingly, the Court grants Defendant's motion to dismiss in part and denies it in part. Paragraphs 13-35 of the Complaint are dismissed as untimely, and the claims against Defendants North, Arbour, Urquhart, and Carlyle are dismissed for failure to state a claim.”
“Accordingly, Defendants' motion to dismiss, [ECF No. 11], is DENIED.”
“For these reasons, the Government's motion to dismiss, [ECF No. 15], is DENIED in its entirety.”
“Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above, Webb's motion to dismiss, [ECF No. 9], is DENIED.”
“Summary judgment is DENIED as to Rita Melkonian, Tricia Willard, and Karen Ensley, and GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART as to Nerissa Burke.”
“Accordingly, the Court is unable to adjudicate summary judgment on the documents presented by the parties and, therefore, denies Elite's motion for summary judgment.”
“To the extent that Mr. Bonbon's submission is styled a "Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment," the motion is denied for the same reason.”
“Harvard's motion for summary judgment, [Harvard, ECF No. 69], is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART”
“the Organizational Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, [AAUP, ECF No. 74], is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART”
“Defendants' motion for summary judgment as to Count V is therefore GRANTED. ... Harvard's and Defendants' summary judgment motions in Case No. 25-cv-11048 are otherwise DENIED.”
“Plaintiffs' motion for class certification, [ECF No. 5], is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. The Court certifies the following class: All individuals who (i) scheduled their appointments for entry to the United States using the CBP One app...”
“Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, [ECF No. 32], is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. ... Summary judgment is hereby entered for Plaintiffs on their first through third claims.”
“Defendants' consolidated motion to dismiss and cross-motion for summary judgment, [ECF No. 39], is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART”
“Burke's motion for summary judgment, [ECF No. 171], is DENIED.”
“The City's motion for summary judgment, [ECF No. 173] is GRANTED IN PART insofar as Plaintiffs' claims are based on the City's written policies, code of silence, failure to supervise, and failure to train and DENIED IN PART insofar as they are based on the acts of City policymakers.”
“Defendants' motion to bifurcate, [ECF No. 175], is DENIED WITH LEAVE TO RENEW.”
“Defendant's motion for summary judgment, [ECF No. 36], is GRANTED in relation to Count I, and DENIED as to Counts II, III, IV, V, VI, and VII. Further, BRP Group is dismissed as a Defendant.”
“DFA's motion as to Count II and Counterclaim II is therefore DENIED.”
“For the reasons set forth herein, both parties' motions are DENIED.”
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
Median case duration in the sampled dockets: 714 days (N = 6).
Median motion-to-ruling time: 240.5 days (N = 4).
Active U.S. District Judge, Boston (Division 1:) with some Worcester (4:) matters. High-profile docket: Students for Fair Admissions v. Harvard (admissions trial), US v. Babich (Insys Therapeutics RICO), US v. Salemme (Mafia), and a 2025-2026 cluster of APA challenges to Trump-administration actions affecting universities (American Association of University Professors - Harvard Faculty Chapter v. DOJ 1:25-cv-10910 = the $2.6B Harvard research-funding case, terminated 2025-10-20; Association of American Universities v. Department of Energy 1:25-cv-10912, terminated 2025-06-30). 2021-filed civil sample skews to FCA qui tam (US ex rel. v. Ultragenyx, Exagen, Cipla -- long sealed pendencies) plus consumer/PI/ADA matters. June-2026 newly-assigned docket is heavily '463 Habeas Corpus - Alien Detainee' 2241 petitions (e.g. Orellana Ruano v. Blanche 1:26-cv-12481, Fernande Aguilera v. Blanche 1:26-cv-12324), terminating quickly. No quantitative nature-of-suit census computed this pass.