Rebecca Grady Jennings

A motion filed after the pretrial deadline needs a concrete good-cause showing tied to genuinely new information or technology. Prior notice of the issue and a failure to identify a new method defeated that showing in the reviewed criminal case.

“Hankison both had notice that law enforcement had attempted to unlock the phone with incorrect passcodes as early as September 2022 and has made no showing that new technology unavailable to the FBI came to light after the motion deadline had passed. As a result, Hankison has not demonstrated good cause for his untimeliness.”

For a pleaded institutional policy claim, a plausible policy or custom and a direct causal link to the injury can suffice at dismissal even without a detailed evidentiary account.

“At the motion to dismiss stage, it is sufficient for a plaintiff to plausibly allege an unlawful policy or custom and a direct causal link to the harm. Daugherty v. Louisville-Jefferson Cnty. Metro Gov’t, 495 F. Supp. 3d 513, 524 (W.D. Ky. 2020) (finding plaintiff sufficiently stated a § 1983 claim based on a municipal policy or custom where ‘Plaintiff [] plausibly alleged that Louisville Metro has an illegal policy or custom of disproportionately stopping and searching African- Americans’ and ‘plausibly connected this policy or custom to [the officer’s] conduct in his case’). 8 Case 3:23-cv-00209-RGJ-RSE Document 75 Filed 09/25/26 Page 9 of 12 PageID #: <pageID> Wellpath argues that Plaintiff’s policy or custom claim must be dismissed because Plaintiff fails to identify an unlawful practice or policy that can be attributed to Wellpath specifically. [DE 39-1 at 234]. Wellpath maintains that ‘dismissal is also appropriate because Plaintiff fails to allege sufficient facts to support the theory that a “persistent and widespread practice of deliberate indifference to the needs of LMDC inmates/detainees” amounted to an “official custom and practice.”’ [DE 39-1 at 236]. In response, Plaintiff maintains that Wellpath ignores the many factual allegations in the amended complaint that, drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of Plaintiff, demonstrate that Wellpath had a custom of tolerance to federal rights violations. [DE 44 at 290–91]. Contrary to Wellpath’s argument, Plaintiff alleges sufficient facts to support a Monell claim based on custom of tolerance or acquiescence to federal rights violations. For example, Plaintiff alleges that Wellpath systemically ignored the use of illegal drugs in the facility, including an instance that was recorded on video where a Wellpath nurse gave unprescribed narcotics to an inmate. [DE 25 ¶¶ 35, 56]. Plaintiff alleges there was no investigation of the Wellpath nurse incident or an arrest of the nurse. [Id. ¶ 35]. Plaintiff claims numerous overdose deaths have occurred due to systemic failures, and that Wellpath has ‘ignore[d] or otherwise not properly “address[ed] [the] issue of illegal drugs and other dangerous substances being brought into the facility . . . .” [Id. ¶ 56]. Thus, Plaintiff alleges a pattern of unconstitutional conduct—that is, “not properly addressing [the] issue of illegal drugs and other dangerous substances being brought into the facility,” resulting in the deaths of inmates [Id.]. She also alleges that Wellpath “had direct, personal, and specific knowledge” of the pattern of unconstitutional conduct but failed to correct the issue. [Id. ¶ 102]. Finally, she alleges that this failure resulted in the Decedent’s death. [Id. ¶ 59 (“Had the Defendants not been deliberately indifferent to the rampant drug problems at LMDC, 9 Case 3:23-cv-00209-RGJ-RSE Document 75 Filed 09/25/26 Page 10 of 12 PageID #: <pageID> Moman Anderson, Jr. would not have died.”). Drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of Plaintiff, the Court finds that Plaintiff sufficiently alleges a policy, custom, or practice on the part of Wellpath that caused the constitutional injury. The Court DENIES Wellpath’s motion to dismiss as to Count IV. 2. Count V: Failure to Train To establish Monell liability for failure to train or failure to supervise, a plaintiff must allege: “(1) the training or supervision was inadequate for the tasks performed; (2) the inadequacy was the result of the municipality’s deliberate indifference; and (3) the inadequacy was closely related to or actually caused the injury.” Ellis ex rel. Pendergrass v. Cleveland Mun. Sch. Dist., 455 F.3d 690, 700 (6th Cir. 2006). As to the municipality’s “deliberate indifference,” the plaintiff must either allege: (1) “prior instances of unconstitutional conduct demonstrating that the [municipality] has ignored a history of abuse and was clearly on notice that the training in this particular area was deficient and likely to cause injury”; or (2) “[A] single violation of federal rights, accompanied by a showing that a municipality has failed to train its employees to handle recurring situations presenting an obvious potential for such a violation[.]” Fisher v. Harden, 398 F.3d 837, 849 (6th Cir. 2005); Bd. of County Comm’rs of Bryan County v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 409 (1997). Wellpath argues that the amended complaint fails to allege facts demonstrating prior instances of unconstitutional conduct, so she cannot rely on the first avenue to establish deliberate indifference. [DE 39-1 at 238]. Wellpath also maintains that Plaintiff cannot rely on the second mode of proof for deliberate indifference because “[u]nder the facts of the Complaint, it is not obvious that overdoses were ‘recurring situations’ at LMDC.” [Id. at 239]. Thus, Wellpath’s argument focuses only on the deliberate indifference prong. 10 Case 3:23-cv-00209-RGJ-RSE Document 75 Filed 09/25/26 Page 11 of 12 PageID #: <pageID> As discussed above, the amended complaint alleges prior instances of unconstitutional conduct such that Wellpath would be on notice of the deficiency of training. Plaintiff alleges that a Wellpath nurse gave an inmate narcotics that he was not prescribed, that Wellpath knew that illegal drugs were being brought into the jail and provided to inmates but failed to monitor or investigate those providing illegal substances, and that numerous other inmates died of overdoses prior to Decedent. [DE 25 ¶¶ 34, 35, 56]. Plaintiff further alleges that Decedent would not have died had Wellpath “maintained a training, supervision and policy adherence program that was not deficient to the point where it was deliberately indifferent to inmate safety and medical needs.” [Id. ¶ 120]. Accordingly, Plaintiff alleges sufficient facts to draw a reasonable inference that Wellpath employees engaged in prior instances of unconstitutional conduct such that Wellpath was on notice that its training was deficient and likely to cause injury. Plaintiff further alleges that Wellpath’s failure to train caused Decedent’s injury. Wellpath also argues that the Monell claims should be dismissed on the ground that the amended complaint “is silent about whether [Decedent] was a pre-trial detainee or in custody post- sentencing,” so it is unclear whether the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendment applies. [DE 39-1 at 239]. The Eighth Amendment protects convicted prisoners, City of Revere v. Massachusetts Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 244 (1983), while the claims of pre-trial detainees are protected under the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause. Richko v. Wayne Co., Mich., 819 F.3d 907, 915 (6th Cir. 2016). While the amended complaint fails to specify whether Decedent was a pre-trial detainee or a convicted inmate, this omission alone does not warrant dismissal. While a complaint must give the defendant fair notice of the plaintiff’s claim and the grounds on which it rests, the complaint “need not set down in detail all the particularities of the plaintiff’s claim[.]” Gazette v. City of Pontiac, 41 F.3d 1061, 1064 (6th Cir. 1994) (quoting Westlake v. Lucas, 537 F.2d 857, 858 11 Case 3:23-cv-00209-RGJ-RSE Document 75 Filed 09/25/26 Page 12 of 12 PageID #: <pageID> (6th Cir. 1976)). “At the motion to dismiss stage, it is sufficient for a plaintiff to plausibly allege an unlawful policy or custom and a direct causal link to the harm.””

After finding that a habeas petition was filed in the wrong district, the court transferred it to a district with jurisdiction to avoid the burden and expense of refiling.

“if the court were to dismiss the petition, Petitioner would be stuck with the additional expenses and burden of re-filing. Therefore, the Court finds it in the interests of justice to transfer this matter to the Southern District of Indiana.”