Joseph Henry McKinley Jr.
How Judge McKinley rules, drawn from 27 signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
About Judge McKinley
Joseph H. McKinley, Jr. is a judge of the United States District Court for the Western District of Kentucky. Appointed by President William J. Clinton, Judge McKinley received a commission on August 14, 1995. Judge McKinley assumed senior status on June 9, 2019.
Judge McKinley's practices and standing orders
The court's website lists no individual practices or standing orders of Judge McKinley's own (checked October 9, 2026), so the court's local rules and general orders are the place to look (court page ↗).
Standing orders for every case in this court
Orders the court applies to all of its cases, whichever judge has them, as published on the court's website (checked October 9, 2026).
How Judge McKinley decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
In a Clean Air Act permitting dispute, the judge deferred heavily to the local pollution-control agency's own interpretation of its permitting regulation over the plaintiffs' competing reading, reasoning that an agency's interpretation of its own rule gets considerable deference unless plainly erroneous: procedural compliance findings from the regulator carry real weight even against a sympathetic environmental-harm narrative.
“The Court begins its analysis by looking to the APCD's own interpretation and application of its regulations... The Court should only reject the APCD's conclusion... 'if the agency's interpretation [of its own regulations] is plainly erroneous or inconsistent.'”
When a medical record is silent on whether an injury impaired daily activities, the judge treats a treating physician's contemporaneous silence as more persuasive than a later, litigation-driven certification: an opinion rendered years after the fact, based only on a file review, is 'nothing more than a post hoc opinion' next to what the record actually documented at the time.
“Dr. McCoy's opinion is rendered long after the Plaintiff recovered from his injury and is based on a review of the same medical records that Dr. Whittaker and the ABCMR reviewed... absent from the medical records are complaints from Plaintiff regarding his inability to dress or bathe.”
Even where a plaintiff's evidence that an x-ray was misread is assumed true, the judge requires proof the defendant actually perceived and disregarded a known risk, not just that a layperson could later see the same fracture in hindsight: a single diagnostic error, without more, reads as negligence rather than the deliberate indifference the Eighth Amendment demands.
“lay persons are generally not capable of reading x-rays or MRIs... '[mis]reading or misinterpreting an x-ray on one occasion without more does not rise to the level of deliberate indifference.'”
On summary judgment, corroborating prisoner affidavits and a verified complaint kept a legal-mail claim alive when officers disputed opening the mail; the same factual conflict defeated both sides’ motions.
“there is a genuine dispute of material fact.”
In a prisoner retaliation case, evidence that the officer would have filed a disciplinary report for the observed infraction defeated the claim despite evidence of a retaliatory motive.
“However, Defendant has shown that, absent any retaliatory intentions, he would have reported the infraction anyway.”
Procedural preferences
Prefers to let affirmative defenses like exhaustion and limitations be resolved at summary judgment rather than on a pre-answer motion to dismiss when they turn on evidence outside the pleadings: a defendant who wants a quick exit on these grounds needs a developed record, not just an assertion.
“Failure to exhaust administrative remedies under the PLRA is an affirmative defense for which defendants bear the burden of proof... proof of lack of exhaustion generally requires resort to matters outside the pleadings, such as affidavits or documentary evidence.”
Applies the traditional two-step FLSA collective-certification process even when a defendant urges the stricter one-step Swales approach, reasoning that once counsel has already been adding opt-in plaintiffs informally without any judicial oversight, court-authorized notice is the more orderly way to control, not delay, the case's growth.
“Plaintiffs' counsel, with no judicial involvement, has added more than ninety opt-in plaintiffs since this litigation began... Absent court-authorized notice, the collective will only continue to expand... without any judicial oversight.”
In a multi-plaintiff prisoner case, the court required each plaintiff to sign the amended pleading and address his own filing fee; it dismissed one plaintiff without prejudice for failing to sign.
“Plaintiffs shall file an amended complaint on the Court-approved Sec. 1983 form and each Plaintiff shall sign the complaint within 30 days... Lamond is DISMISSED as a Plaintiff without prejudice to his filing a separate action based on his failure to sign the complaint.”
A changed supplemental discovery answer was available for use in summary judgment briefing but did not justify striking the answer itself.
“However, this is not grounds for striking the response. Plaintiff is free to make this argument in response to the motion for summary judgment and at trial, should a trial of this action take place.”
Cautions
Treats a habeas petitioner's guilty plea as a firm bar (via Heck v. Humphrey) to any later Sec. 1983 claim that would necessarily undermine that conviction, including Fourth Amendment unlawful-search and wrongful-arrest claims arising from the same evidence the plea rested on: pleading guilty forecloses the civil-rights theory, not just the criminal appeal.
“Plaintiff's claims against Defendants White and Coomes for wrongful arrest and unlawful search and seizure are barred by the principles set forth in Heck v. Humphrey... pleading guilty to a criminal charge estops the plaintiff from challenging probable cause for the arrest.”
Grants absolute judicial immunity to state-court judges sued under Sec. 1983 without extended analysis whenever the challenged conduct, however aggressively characterized as biased or fraudulent, occurred within the judge's judicial capacity and jurisdiction, closing off collateral federal attacks on adverse state-court rulings at the screening stage.
“A judge is entitled to immunity from suit even when accused of acting in bad faith, maliciously, or corruptly... It is evident that the actions alleged in the complaint were in the scope of the judges' judicial capacity.”
In a long-dormant prisoner case, the court dismissed without prejudice for failure to prosecute after mail was repeatedly returned and the plaintiff did not respond to court orders.
“The Court concludes this case must be dismissed for lack of prosecution... DISMISSED without prejudice for failure to prosecute. This is a final Order.”
In a prisoner excessive-force case following a guilty plea to resisting arrest, he separated alleged force during arrest from force after handcuffing; the claim failed when the plaintiff identified no force after he was under control.
“The question here is whether Defendant Murrell applied excessive force after Plaintiff was ‘handcuffed and brought under control.’”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“Defendant's motion is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. No later than July 1, 2021, the parties shall complete discovery on the issue of personal jurisdiction.”
“Plaintiffs' Motion for Conditional Certification [DN 128] is GRANTED and Defendants' Motion to Hold Plaintiffs' Motion in Abeyance [DN 140] is DENIED. The Court conditionally certifies an FLSA collective action of all individuals who worked as coal miners at the Dotiki, Warrior/Cardinal, and River View mines after May 19, 2017.”
“IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants' motions to dismiss (DNs 7, 8) are DENIED.”
“IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the petition for writ of habeas corpus brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2254, [DN 1], is DENIED and DISMISSED.”
“IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Respondent's motion to dismiss because the petition was filed outside the applicable 1-year period of limitation, [DN 16], is GRANTED.”
“IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Petitioner's objections [34] are overruled. The Court adopts the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation [31]. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the petition for writ of habeas corpus is denied and dismissed.”
“IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the petition for writ of habeas corpus filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2254 (DN 1-1) is DENIED and DISMISSED.”
“IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the petition for writ of habeas corpus (DN 1) and the amended petition for writ of habeas corpus filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2254 (DN 10) are DENIED and DISMISSED.”
“Plaintiff's Motion to Certify Class [DN 32] is GRANTED, Defendant's Motion to Permit Expedited Discovery Prior to Ruling on Motion for Collective Certification [DN 43] is DENIED, Plaintiff's Motion to Stay Discovery Pending Ruling on Plaintiff's Motion for Conditional Certification [DN 33] is DENIED AS MOOT, and Defendant's Motion to Strike Proposed Notice Forms [DN 45] is DENIED.”
“Defendants' motion to dismiss [DN 152] is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. Plaintiff's official-capacity claims against Brinker, Browning, Hanley, and Brent are DISMISSED as redundant to his continuing claims against Wellpath. Plaintiff's claims against Wellpath for violations of Titles II and III of the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act are DISMISSED.”
“are DISMISSED with prejudice for failure to state a claim”
“IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff’s motion to supplement (DN 15) is DENIED.”
“IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff’s motion (DN 12) is DENIED.”
A screening order in this pro se prisoner suit initially appeared to be one of Judge McKinley's rulings, but the docket caption identifies the case as CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:22-CV-P624-GNS, and a cross-check of the court's docket records confirms the -GNS suffix belongs to a different sitting judge of this court, not Judge McKinley. This order is excluded from all statistics and retained only as a documented non-match.
“Because Plaintiff fails to meet the necessary procedural requirements, IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff's motion for a temporary restraining order [DN 4] is DENIED.”
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
The general docket is dominated by pro se prisoner civil-rights suits (Sec. 1983 conditions-of-confinement, medical-indifference, and excessive-force claims) and Sec. 2254/2241 habeas petitions filed from county jails and state prisons across the Owensboro, Paducah, and Louisville divisions, alongside a steady counseled civil docket of ERISA, FLSA collective actions, consumer and insurance disputes, environmental permitting, Social Security appeals, and a criminal docket including drug and firearms prosecutions.
Pending matters in the official report
Reported by the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts under the Civil Justice Reform Act, as of March 31, 2026.
| Motions pending more than six months | 0 |
| Bench trials submitted more than six months | 0 |
| Bankruptcy appeals pending more than six months | 0 |
| Social Security appeals pending more than six months | 0 |
| Civil cases pending more than three years | 1 |
| Report | Motions over six months | Cases over three years |
|---|---|---|
| Mar 2026 | 0 | 1 |
| Sep 2025 | 0 | 0 |
| Mar 2025 | 0 | 0 |
| Sep 2024 | 0 | 2 |
| Mar 2024 | 0 | 3 |
| Sep 2023 | 2 | 7 |
| Mar 2023 | 0 | 4 |
| Sep 2022 | 3 | 3 |
| Mar 2022 | 1 | 1 |
| Sep 2021 | 0 | 3 |
| Mar 2021 | 0 | 2 |
| Sep 2020 | 0 | 4 |
A snapshot on that date: matters listed may since have been decided or reassigned. A motion referred to a magistrate judge is counted for both judges. Motions in multidistrict litigation, section 2255 cases and Social Security appeals are not counted, and a very large three-year count is generally a multidistrict docket. Source: Appendix A of the report (PDF); about the report.
How long civil cases take in this court
For the whole of U.S. District Court for the Western District of Kentucky, not for Judge McKinley: median time from filing to disposition of the civil cases the court closed in the 12 months ending September 30, 2025, as reported by the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts.
| Cases | Median time | |
|---|---|---|
| All civil cases closed | 931 | 7.9 months |
| Closed with no court action | 121 | 3.7 months |
| Closed before pretrial | 790 | 8.4 months |
| Closed during or after pretrial | 17 | 27.1 months |
| Closed during trial | 3 | not reported |
| 12 months ending | Cases closed | Median time |
|---|---|---|
| Sep 2025 | 931 | 7.9 months |
| Sep 2024 | 966 | 9.9 months |
| Sep 2023 | 835 | 9.6 months |
| Sep 2022 | 1,130 | 11.7 months |
| Sep 2021 | 1,065 | 10.2 months |
| Sep 2020 | 1,184 | 8.4 months |
| Sep 2019 | 1,111 | 8.6 months |
The table leaves out prisoner petitions, land condemnations, deportation reviews, recovery of overpayments and enforcement of judgments, and reports no median for fewer than 10 cases. A district that closed a large multidistrict litigation in the period shows very large counts and long medians for that year. Source: Table C-5, U.S. District Courts (spreadsheet).
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