Jennifer B. Coffman
Judge Coffman no longer hears cases. This profile is preserved as a historical record of how they ruled.
How Judge Coffman decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
Coffman treated the law governing the employment relationship as controlling a workers' compensation reimbursement dispute despite the accident's Kentucky location.
“the issue before the court is the legal basis for the set-off.”
Coffman allowed constitutional claims to proceed where the complaint identified less restrictive alternatives and alleged that access restrictions were not narrowly tailored.
“The plaintiffs’ complaint alleges that less restrictive alternatives exist, that the government’s actions with respect to the traffic plan are not narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest, and that the actions thus violate the plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights.”
Procedural preferences
Coffman denied an additional brief when the ordinary motion papers were sufficient and the rules did not authorize the requested filing.
“The motion, response, and reply memoranda provided the court sufficient information to dispose of the motion to dismiss, and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not authorize such a pleading.”
Coffman applied the demanding standard for striking pleaded material and retained allegations that could bear on motive.
“motions to strike are viewed with disfavor and are infrequently granted.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“Miller’s motion for summary judgment (R. 15) is GRANTED insofar as it requests reimbursement for the $439,441.83 paid to Thompson and reimbursement for property damage.”
“IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that CRS’s Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 16) is DENIED.”
“IT IS ORDERED that the Plan’s motion to reconsider (R. 117) is DENIED.”
“The plaintiffs’ motion for class certification (R. 45) is GRANTED and this action is CERTIFIED as a class action.”
“The Plan’s motion to dismiss the second amended complaint (R. 43) is DENIED.”
“The court will deny the defendant’s motion to stay the proceedings (R. 44) as moot in light of the court’s denial of the motion to dismiss and the fact that the motion for class certification has been resolved.”
“The plaintiffs’ motion for leave to file a sur-reply (R. 54) is DENIED.”
“The plaintiffs’ motion to strike the report and affidavit of David Godofsky (R. 56) is GRANTED.”
“The plaintiffs’ motion to strike the report and affidavit of Stephen Gagel (R. 57) is GRANTED.”
“This matter is before the court upon defendant’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim (R. 7). For reasons discussed below, the motion will be granted.”
“Summitt Trucking LLC’s motion for summary judgment (R. 49) is DENIED.”
“Donald Dekalands’s motion for summary judgment (R. 64) is DENIED.”
“Great American Assurance Co.’s motion for declaratory judgment (R. 73) is GRANTED. The intervenor, Great American Assurance Company, has no duty to defend or indemnify Donald Dekalands.”
“IT IS ORDERED that the plaintiffs motion for partial summary judgment (DE 17) is GRANTED.”
“The court will grant summary judgment for the defendant on the plaintiffs claim for retaliation under the FMLA. The court will also grant summary judgment for the plaintiff on her claim that the defendant interfered with her rights under the FMLA.”
“IT IS ORDERED that the amended motion to transfer, DE 11, is GRANTED.”
“IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the remaining motions are DENIED AS MOOT.”
“IT IS ORDERED that the defendant’s motion to dismiss (DE 19) is DENIED.”
“IT IS ORDERED that Lynch’s motion to dismiss (R. 11) is DENIED as to count 1 and GRANTED as to counts 2 and 3.”
“IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Roccanova’s motion to dismiss (R. 12) is DENIED.”
“IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Rudy’s motion to dismiss and motion to strike (R. 13) are DENIED.”
“Accordingly, Defendant John Marshall’s motion for summary judgment, R. 63, is GRANTED.”
“Given the absence of an evidentiary record upon which to predicate injunctive relief, Smith’s request for a temporary injunction must be denied.”
“Plaintiffs Complaint [R. 2] is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.”
“IT IS ORDERED that the defendants’ motion to dismiss, DE 4, is GRANTED, and the plaintiffs claims under Kentucky law and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against defendants in their official capacities are DISMISSED.”
“IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the defendants’ partial motion to dismiss, DE 4, is GRANTED, and the plaintiffs claims under Kentucky law and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the defendants in their individual capacities are DISMISSED with the exception of plaintiffs state law and federal claims sounding in malicious prosecution.”
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
The located historical matters included benefits, civil-rights, government-collection, contract, product-liability, employment, prisoner, environmental, and ERISA disputes. The sampled records did not contain usable motion timelines.
A historical record
Judge Coffman no longer hears cases. This profile stays available as a record of how they ruled. If you're preparing for a matter, start from the court's current bench.