Charles Ralph Simpson III

How Judge Simpson rules, drawn from 23 signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.

Court
U.S. District Court for the Western District of Kentucky
Position
District judge
Status
Senior status
Appointed by
Ronald Reagan (Republican)
Commissioned
August 4, 1986
Education
University of Louisville (B.A., 1967); University of Louisville School of Law, now the Louis D. Brandeis School of Law (J.D., 1970)
Signed orders read
23

About Judge Simpson

Charles Ralph Simpson, III is a judge of the United States District Court for the Western District of Kentucky. Appointed by President Ronald Reagan, Judge Simpson received a commission on August 4, 1986. Judge Simpson assumed senior status on February 1, 2013.

Judge Simpson's practices and standing orders

The court's website lists no individual practices or standing orders of Judge Simpson's own (checked October 9, 2026), so the court's local rules and general orders are the place to look (court page ↗).

Standing orders for every case in this court

Orders the court applies to all of its cases, whichever judge has them, as published on the court's website (checked October 9, 2026).

Key rules from these orders · The court's local rules ↗

How Judge Simpson decides

Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.

What persuades

In a criminal civil-rights prosecution over the manner of a fatal search-warrant execution, the judge required the government to trace an officer's specific use of force to the alleged constitutional violation as its legal cause: when a co-occupant's gunfire, not the defendant's own shots, provoked the fatal return fire, that intervening act broke the chain of causation the felony charge required.

“K.W.'s opening fire became the proximate, i.e., the legal, cause of Taylor's death because that exercise of lethal force usurped control over the circumstances and directly led to Taylor's fatal wounding by drawing return fire.”

In Blue Spirits Distilling v. Luctor International, Simpson rejected veil piercing against affiliated companies because the complaint alleged no facts supporting that theory.

“Blue Spirits' argument falls flat because it did not plead any factual allegations to support a corporate veil piercing claim, nor did its Amended Complaint contemplate same.”

In White v. Schneider Hotels, Simpson found that White had abandoned her race-based claims in her deposition testimony. He also treated her failure to respond to the defense argument as a waiver of opposition.

“White’s testimony shows that she has abandoned her race-based claims. Also, by failing to respond to Defendants’ argument, she waived her opposition to it.”

In a credit-reporting claim, treated a charged-off account with a zero balance as accurate because it told creditors that the debt had been charged off and that the borrower owed nothing at present.

“Wells Fargo’s reporting would not mislead creditors as to Ray’s current financial obligation to Wells Fargo.”

In an insurance benefits dispute, the court found no wrongful delay where the insurer waited for confirmation of the insured’s death from investigating agencies before paying benefits.

“it was not unreasonable for LINA to wait for confirmation of death from the state or agencies that investigated Henning’s disappearance.”

Procedural preferences

In United States v. Reyes, Simpson denied a defendant's request for a separate trial in a conspiracy case. He found the defendant's general assertions of spillover prejudice insufficient to overcome the presumption against severance in that case.

“Without more evidence of 'substantial,' 'undue' or 'compelling prejudice' to his defense within the appropriate timeframe, these conclusory assertions offered by I. Reyes are insufficient to overcome the presumption against severance in this case.”

In Huffman v. Robey, Simpson denied a prisoner's request for a preliminary injunction requiring medication treatment and a change in prison medical policy. Although related claims survived screening, the plaintiff had not shown a likelihood of success or irreparable injury on the preliminary injunction record.

“Motions seeking to obtain affirmative preliminary injunctive relief must be more closely scrutinized than the already-disfavored motion for preliminary injunction which seeks to maintain the status quo.”

In Blue Spirits Distilling v. Luctor International, Simpson denied a one sentence request for leave to amend included at the end of an opposition brief. The plaintiff had supplied no proposed amended complaint for the court to review; the order left open consideration of a proper motion.

“But it did not tender a proposed amended complaint to the court, so there is nothing for the court to review.”

In a disability appeal, the court treated a new ground for reversal raised for the first time in objections to a magistrate judge’s recommendation as forfeited.

“Claimant cannot raise a new ground for reversal now. Swain, 379 F. App’x at 517–18. His argument is forfeit.”

Cautions

The judge accepted the government's own correction of the trial record as sufficient basis to dismiss an indictment with prejudice and order a defendant's immediate release, without demanding further briefing once the prosecution acknowledged the problem.

“The Indictment DN 3 and Superseding Indictment DN 25 are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE for the reasons stated in the Notice of Filing to Correct the Record DN 40. James Hickman III shall be RELEASED FROM CUSTODY FORTHWITH.”

In Bruederle’s jail suit, Simpson held that claims against Lt. Norris other than outrage were untimely under Kentucky’s one-year statute of limitations and dismissed those claims with prejudice.

“all claims but Bruederle’s cause of action for outrage should have been filed by December 5, 2005 and that because Bruederle failed to file against Defendants until September 27, 2006, these claims are barred by the one-year statute of limitations in Ky. Rev. Stat. § 413.140(1)(a).”

Signed rulings

A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.

United States v. Meany and Jaynes
3:22-CR-00085-CRS · 2024-08-22
Motion to dismiss indictment (defendant) Granted

“Defendant Kyle Meany’s Partial Motion to Dismiss Count 1 (DN 33) is GRANTED. The final sentence of Count One of the Indictment is hereby STRICKEN and the felony charges against defendant Meany as found in Count One of the Indictment are hereby by DISMISSED without prejudice.”

Motion to dismiss indictment (defendant) Denied

“Defendant Kyle Meany's Motion to Dismiss Count 4 (DN 34) is DENIED.”

Motion to dismiss indictment (defendant) Granted in part

“Defendant Joshua Jaynes' Motion to Dismiss Count I (DN 35) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. To the extent Jaynes seeks dismissal of the felony changes in Count One, his Motion (DN 35) is GRANTED but to the extent that he seeks complete dismissal of Count One, his Motion (DN 35) is DENIED.”

Motion to dismiss indictment (defendant) Denied

“Defendant Joshua Jaynes' Motion to Dismiss Count II (DN 36) is DENIED.”

Motion to dismiss indictment (defendant) Denied

“Defendant Joshua Jaynes' Motion to Dismiss Count III (DN 37) is DENIED.”

United States v. Jaynes and Meany
3:22-cr-00085-CRS · 2025-08-20
Motion to dismiss indictment (defendant) Granted

“Defendants' Motions to Dismiss (DN 61 and DN 62) are GRANTED. The final sentence of Count One of the Superseding Indictment is hereby STRICKEN and the felony charges against defendants Jaynes and Meany are hereby by DISMISSED without prejudice.”

United States v. Jaynes and Meany
3:22-cr-00085-CRS · 2026-03-27
Motion to dismiss indictment (plaintiff) Granted

“The Court hereby GRANTS the Government's motion. The Indictment and Superseding Indictment on file in the above-captioned case are hereby dismissed with prejudice as against both defendants, Joshua Jaynes and Kyle Meany.”

United States v. Reyes
3:22-CR-79-CRS · 2025-03-25
Motion to sever (defendant) Denied

“IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant Ishia Reyes's Motion to Sever (DN 123) is DENIED.”

Blue Spirits Distilling, LLC v. Luctor International, LLC
3:23-CV-223-CRS · 2024-05-10
Motions to dismiss (defendant) Granted in part

“Defendants' Motion to dismiss, DN 24, is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part as follows: 1. The Motion is GRANTED as to Counts I, II, III, VII, IX, and X of the Amended Complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted and those Counts are DISMISSED as to all Defendants. a. Counts I, II, III, and IX are dismissed without prejudice. b. Counts VII and X are dismissed with prejudice.”

Motion for leave to amend (plaintiff) Denied

“Blue Spirits' perfunctory 'Alternative Motion' for leave to amend its Amended Complaint, DN 29-2, is DENIED.”

White v. Schneider Hotels, LLC
3:23-CV-00168-CRS-CHL · 2025-09-15
Summary judgment (defendant) Granted

“Because Defendants have shown that White lacks sufficient proof of elements necessary to her claims and because White has failed to carry her burden of proof in opposition to those Rule 56 arguments, the Court will grant Defendants' summary judgment Motion (DN 29) and enter a judgment in their favor as to all claims by White.”

Huffman v. Robey
3:25-CV-P93-CRS · 2025-03-27
Preliminary injunction (plaintiff) Denied

“IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff's motion (DN 6) is DENIED.”

A.N.A. v. Breckinridge County Board of Education
3:08-cv-00004-CRS-JDM · 2009-03-30
Class certification (plaintiff) Granted

“Plaintiff A.N.A.'s Motion for Class Certification 70 is GRANTED”

Class certification (plaintiff) Granted in part

“Plaintiff J.J.N.'s Motion for Class Certification is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. Two subclasses, as set forth, are certified for purposes of this litigation.”

Noland v. Crews
3:11-cv-195-CRS · 2013-12-05
Habeas petition (petitioner) Denied

“MEMORANDUM OPINON AND ORDER by Senior Judge Charles R. Simpson, III adopting 22 Report and Recommendations and objections are overrruled; certificate of appealability is DENIED; separate judgment will be entered”

Reid v. Tenant Tracker, Inc.
3:23-CV-163-CRS · 2023-08-02
Motions to dismiss (defendant) Granted

“Because the Court finds that Reid has failed to make a prima facie showing that Defendants are amenable to service of process under Kentucky's long-arm statute, she has failed to make a necessary showing for the Court to exercise personal jurisdiction over Defendants... For these reasons, the Court will grant Defendants' motion by separate order.”

Stanley v. Haier US Appliance Solutions, Inc.
3:19-cv-00640-CRS-RSE · 2020-02-11
Motions to dismiss (defendant) Granted

“Stanley's complaint does not state a claim for retaliation under the KCRA that is plausible on its face. Therefore, the Court will grant Haier's motion to dismiss.”

10-Acious, Inc. v. Green Hills Ventures, LLC
3:11CV-395-S · 2011-08-24
Motions to dismiss (defendant) Moot / procedural

“the motion of the defendants, Green Hills Ventures, LLC, et al., to dismiss (DN 5) is DENIED AS MOOT.”

Caseload & timing

From public federal docket records for this judge.

  • The sampled dockets spanned commercial contract and coal-mine wage-and-hour litigation, employment discrimination and FMLA disputes, insurance and consumer-debt disputes, Social Security appeals, defamation, prisoner civil-rights suits, and federal criminal prosecutions including drug and firearms charges as well as the Breonna Taylor-related civil-rights case.
  • Several sampled cases ended in settlement, voluntary dismissal, or reassignment to another judge rather than a contested ruling by this judge, consistent with a broad general civil and criminal docket.

Pending matters in the official report

Reported by the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts under the Civil Justice Reform Act, as of March 31, 2026.

Motions pending more than six months0
Bench trials submitted more than six months0
Bankruptcy appeals pending more than six months0
Social Security appeals pending more than six months0
Civil cases pending more than three years2
ReportMotions over six monthsCases over three years
Mar 202602
Sep 202501
Mar 202502
Sep 202402
Mar 202401
Sep 202302
Mar 202302
Sep 202200
Mar 202200
Sep 202102
Mar 202105
Sep 202008

A snapshot on that date: matters listed may since have been decided or reassigned. A motion referred to a magistrate judge is counted for both judges. Motions in multidistrict litigation, section 2255 cases and Social Security appeals are not counted, and a very large three-year count is generally a multidistrict docket. Source: Appendix A of the report (PDF); about the report.

How long civil cases take in this court

For the whole of U.S. District Court for the Western District of Kentucky, not for Judge Simpson: median time from filing to disposition of the civil cases the court closed in the 12 months ending September 30, 2025, as reported by the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts.

CasesMedian time
All civil cases closed9317.9 months
Closed with no court action1213.7 months
Closed before pretrial7908.4 months
Closed during or after pretrial1727.1 months
Closed during trial3not reported
12 months endingCases closedMedian time
Sep 20259317.9 months
Sep 20249669.9 months
Sep 20238359.6 months
Sep 20221,13011.7 months
Sep 20211,06510.2 months
Sep 20201,1848.4 months
Sep 20191,1118.6 months

The table leaves out prisoner petitions, land condemnations, deportation reviews, recovery of overpayments and enforcement of judgments, and reports no median for fewer than 10 cases. A district that closed a large multidistrict litigation in the period shows very large counts and long medians for that year. Source: Table C-5, U.S. District Courts (spreadsheet).

Draft for Judge Simpson with the record in hand

Ezel grounds your drafting and research in this profile: what has persuaded Judge Simpson, and what has not, cited to the signed orders.

Opens in Ezel Pro.

  • Grounded in Judge Simpson's own signed orders
  • Cites every source it relies on, so you can verify it
  • Chat, drafting and research in one workspace