Stephen Patrick McGlynn
How Judge McGlynn decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
At summary judgment, genuinely disputed material facts (e.g. probable cause, and qualified immunity that turns on those facts) defeat the motion -- he sends them to the jury rather than resolving them himself.
“These questions of material fact are the province of the jury, not the undersigned.”
At the pleadings stage he accepts facially-sufficient allegations as enough to survive: e.g., under Illinois' Innocent-Seller statute, a well-pleaded allegation that the seller had actual knowledge of / created the defect keeps a non-manufacturer in, with the factual contest reserved for later.
“While Numotion may be able to ultimately prevail in its position, this is a factual argument which must be resolved at a later stage in this action.”
Procedural preferences
Plead a 'short and plain statement' that gives each defendant fair notice. He will dismiss a sprawling, comingled, conclusory complaint under Rule 8 and will not reconstruct a coherent claim for the pleader.
“The Court is not obliged to comb a complaint in an attempt to piece together a coherent claim and will not do so here.”
Reconsideration is not a vehicle to re-argue: Rule 59(e)'s 28-day deadline is hard, and Rule 60(b) needs newly discovered evidence or extraordinary circumstances, not a renewed disagreement with the court's reasoning.
“Motions to reconsider are not an appropriate tool to [rehash] old arguments or for presenting arguments that should have been raised before the court made its decision.”
Cautions
Develop every argument with legal authority. Failing to respond to, or to support with case law, an argument in a dispositive motion waives the point -- this cost the plaintiff their Monell claims (Giesler) and their entire complaint (Ferrari). A consistent, decision-grade signal.
“Where a party, such as here, fails to provide adequate legal argument regarding a motion to dismiss, the underlying claim is waived.”
He disfavors facial constitutional challenges and demands concrete-injury standing -- he will not rule on harms asserted on behalf of hypothetical, unnamed parties. Bring an as-applied challenge with a named, injured plaintiff.
“it will not entertain arguments made on behalf of hypothetical Illinois citizens; the movants must present concrete evidence, not scattershot theories”
Motion outcomes
Counted from classified signed orders only. Percentages are shown only where the sample is large enough to be meaningful; smaller samples are reported as raw counts.
| Motions to dismiss N = 3 |
Granted: 1Granted in part: 2 | counts only |
| Summary judgment N = 3 |
Granted: 1Granted in part: 1Denied: 1 | counts only |
| Motion to appoint counsel N = 1 |
Denied: 1 | counts only |
| Motion for reconsideration N = 1 |
Denied: 1 | counts only |
A "1 of 1" is one ruling, not a tendency. Treat small samples as illustrative, not predictive.
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“the Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part Defendant City of Herrin and Dylan Sollers' Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 38). On Counts I, II, III, IV, and V, summary judgment is DENIED. On Counts VI, VII, VIII, IX, and X, summary judgment is GRANTED. Those counts are DISMISSED with prejudice.”
28 U.S.C. 1915(e)(2)/1915A screening dismissal of a pro se inmate's diversity amended complaint (legal malpractice + intentional infliction of emotional distress against his former criminal-defense attorney). DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE for failure to state a claim (criminal-malpractice plaintiff must plead actual innocence -- conviction not overturned; claim also time-barred). Grounding quote: 'pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1915A(b)(2), the Court DISMISSES this Complaint with prejudice for failure to state a cause of action.' Counts as an order read; not a party-motion ruling, so excluded from motion stats. Prejudice: with_prejudice; leave_to_amend: denied (second pleading; first was dismissed w/o prejudice with leave).
“Defendants' Motions to dismiss (Docs. 65, 70, 72, 101) are GRANTED. All other motions are DENIED as moot. The Complaint (Doc. 53) is DISMISSED with prejudice. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to enter judgment and close this case on the Court's docket.”
“the Court DENIES defendant's Motion to Dismiss with respect to COUNT I and GRANTS the Motion with respect to Count IV. As such, Numotion is ORDERED to answer count I within fourteen days”
“the motion to dismiss for failure to serve is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. (Doc. 43). The December 4, 2023 services of process on Defendants Connors and Matevousian were ineffective and are therefore QUASHED.”
“The second motion for appointment of counsel is DENIED. (Doc. 41).”
“the Langley Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 133) is DENIED because they have failed to meet their burden to prove that PICA-mandated registration requirement is unconstitutional under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.”
“Director Kelly's Cross Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Doc. 151) is GRANTED. This ruling is confined to the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment challenge brought by the Langley Plaintiffs in Count 1 of their Complaint only.”
“Session's Motion for Reconsideration fails under the standards of both Rule 59(e) and Rule 60(b). ... The Court correctly granted Summary Judgment in Menasha's favor, and the Motion for Reconsideration (Doc. 54) is DENIED.”
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
Median case duration in the sampled dockets: 315 days (N = 20).
Median motion-to-ruling time: 84 days (N = 7).
Counts are illustrative from a capped enumeration, not an authoritative caseload census; no FJC IDB baseline loaded on this record.