Nancy Jo Rosenstengel
How Judge Rosenstengel decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
On a partial MSJ for punitive damages she acts as gatekeeper: whether punitive damages reach the jury is a question of law for the court, ordinary negligence is not enough, but where inferences viewed for the non-movant could support wanton conduct (here, inadequate training) she lets that single issue go to the jury rather than foreclosing it.
“a jury may be able to find gross negligence or wanton disregard on behalf of Page E.T.C. ... because the Court cannot assess credibility and must view all inferences in favor of Manier, the Court will let punitive damages move forward as to training.”
She will resolve an open question of statutory interpretation by her own plain-text analysis rather than waiting for the circuit: held (against the 6th Cir., with the 3d/5th/8th) that the FMLA imposes individual liability on public-sector supervisors.
“The Court is persuaded that the FMLA's plain language allows for individual liability within the public sector, just as in the private sector.”
Reads pro se prisoner filings for SUBSTANCE, not eloquence: a grievance exhausts a claim if, read as a whole, it contains the same factual allegations later raised, even if it does not articulate dissatisfaction with each defendant by name. Defeats hyper-technical exhaustion defenses.
“Although perhaps not stated as eloquently as Dr. Blum would prefer, the grievance contains the same factual allegations that Haynes later raises in his amended complaint. Because Haynes has met all requirements of the Illinois Administrative Code, he has fully exhausted his grievance against Dr. Blum.”
Excusable-neglect leniency: she will accept a late filing under Rule 6(b) where the delay was reasonable and the opposing party is not prejudiced, even while noting a party has been 'less than diligent.'
“the Court finds that Pederson's failure to file the Amended Complaint until after the Motion to Reconsider was decided is the result of excusable neglect and grants her request to file it out of time.”
Procedural preferences
Monell liability requires affirmative record evidence of an inadequate policy AND causation; a plaintiff who leaves that 'evidentiary hole' loses at summary judgment, and derivative claims (respondeat superior, indemnification) fall with the individual claims.
“the record reveals no evidence of inadequate suicide prevention policies. And without such evidence, there can be no Monell liability here.”
Section 1983 requires personal involvement -- a defendant must have caused or participated in the deprivation; supervisory roles, signing off, and denying grievances do not create liability.
“An individual cannot be held liable in a [Section] 1983 action unless he caused or participated in an alleged constitutional deprivation.”
On discovery of senior corporate executives she puts the burden on the party RESISTING the deposition (the 'apex witness doctrine' is not adopted in the 7th Cir.); a senior executive with unique knowledge of corporate intent is deposable, though she will tailor format/location to the executive's burden.
“the party seeking to avoid discovery bears the burden of showing good cause exists to prevent the discovery.”
Pick the right vehicle: in federal court a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is NOT the way to challenge the sufficiency of an Illinois 735 ILCS 5/2-622 medical-malpractice certificate of merit -- that is a summary-judgment question. She will deny the MTD on that ground alone.
“The proper vehicle to address whether the plaintiff has met the requirements of Section 5/2-622 in federal court is a motion for summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, which can be filed at any time.”
Personal jurisdiction / venue in mass-tort and product-liability joinder: she applies Bristol-Myers Squibb strictly -- non-forum plaintiffs cannot ride on forum plaintiffs' claims, and she will dismiss (rather than transfer) where plaintiffs had no reasonable basis to believe venue was proper and cannot identify a transferee forum. File in your home district.
“non-Illinois Plaintiffs should bring their actions in the forums where the activities giving rise to their claims occurred.”
Inherent-authority sanctions require a finding of BAD FAITH; mere haste or carelessness (e.g. filing an MSJ on insufficiently-reviewed figures) does not qualify and is better pursued under Rule 11. She adopts magistrate R&Rs on such motions (clear-error review where unobjected).
“Any sanctions imposed pursuant to the court's inherent authority must be premised on a finding of bad faith”
As an MDL transferee judge she balances judicial economy against each member case's individuality: she will NOT issue an omnibus dismissal across hundreds of consolidated cases, instead resolving recurring merits issues case-by-case through bellwether / trial-selection plaintiffs.
“each lawsuit consolidated within the MDL must independently state a claim”
Motion outcomes
Counted from classified signed orders only. Percentages are shown only where the sample is large enough to be meaningful; smaller samples are reported as raw counts.
| Summary judgment N = 5 |
Granted: 3Granted in part: 1Denied: 1 | counts only |
| Motions to dismiss N = 5 |
Granted: 1Granted in part: 2Denied: 2 | counts only |
| Motion for protective order N = 2 |
Granted: 1Denied: 1 | counts only |
| Motion for sanctions N = 2 |
Denied: 2 | counts only |
| Motions to remand N = 1 |
Granted: 1 | counts only |
| Motion to sever N = 1 |
Denied: 1 | counts only |
| Motions to compel N = 1 |
Granted: 1 | counts only |
| Motion to waive costs N = 1 |
Granted: 1 | counts only |
| Motion to preclude summary judgment N = 1 |
Denied: 1 | counts only |
A "1 of 1" is one ruling, not a tendency. Treat small samples as illustrative, not predictive.
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“the Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 287). The Court grants summary judgment as to punitive damages for cell phone use and hiring. The Court denies summary judgment on the issue of punitive damages as to training; that issue will go to the jury.”
“the motions for summary judgment filed by Falkenbury (Doc. 52) and the County Defendants (Doc. 59) are GRANTED. This entire action is DISMISSED with prejudice.”
“the motions for summary judgment filed by Falkenbury (Doc. 52) and the County Defendants (Doc. 59) are GRANTED. This entire action is DISMISSED with prejudice.”
“Defendants' motion for summary judgment (Docs. 52, 53) is GRANTED. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to enter judgment in favor of Defendants John Baldwin, Dee Dee Brookhart, and Jared Wagner and close the case.”
“the Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendants (Doc. 22) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Counts I and II are DISMISSED as to the IHRA claims, and Cowell is granted leave of 14 days to amend Counts I and II to remove those portions. The motion is DENIED in all other respects.”
“Apple's motion for protective order (Doc. 168) is DENIED, and Plaintiffs' motion to compel (Doc. 164) is GRANTED. Plaintiffs are GRANTED leave of court to depose Craig Federighi within 14 days of this Order”
“Apple's motion for protective order (Doc. 168) is DENIED, and Plaintiffs' motion to compel (Doc. 164) is GRANTED. Plaintiffs are GRANTED leave of court to depose Craig Federighi within 14 days of this Order”
“Plaintiff's request for sanctions is DENIED.”
“Defendants' Supplemental Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 3543) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Count IV of the Amended Complaint in Fuller v. Syngenta Crop Protection, LLC, et al., Case No. 3:21-pq-836-NJR is DISMISSED. Defendants' Supplemental Motion to Dismiss is DENIED without prejudice as to all remaining public nuisance claims, pending further consultation among the parties and the Court.”
“the Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 23) is GRANTED ... This action shall proceed with solely the Initial Plaintiffs ... All other Plaintiffs are DISMISSED without prejudice.”
“the Motion to Sever (Doc. 25) is DENIED.”
“For these reasons, all pending motions to dismiss (Docs. 44, 45, 70, 73, and 97) are DENIED.”
“the Motion to Remand filed by Plaintiff Nancy Kluge Pederson (Doc. 26) is GRANTED. The case shall be REMANDED to the Circuit Court of the First Judicial Circuit in Williamson County, Illinois, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.”
“SIHS's Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 29) is DENIED.”
“the Motion for Summary Judgment on the Issue of Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies filed by Defendant Bob Blum (Doc. 71) is DENIED.”
“Thurmond's objection (Doc. 72) is SUSTAINED. The Bill of Costs (Doc. 69-3) is DENIED.”
“The Report and Recommendation (Doc. 31) is ADOPTED in its entirety, and Plaintiff's motion for sanctions (Doc. 26) is DENIED.”
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
Median case duration in the sampled dockets: 345.5 days (N = 24).
Median motion-to-ruling time: 37 days (N = 7).
Counts are illustrative from a capped enumeration, not an authoritative caseload census; no FJC IDB baseline loaded on this record.