Mark Andrew Beatty
How Judge Beatty decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
Reads pro se prisoner complaints liberally at 1915A screening and recruits counsel where the case is serious and the litigant is disadvantaged: under Pruitt v. Mote he weighed the plaintiff's competence (English as a second language) and the severity of the injuries over the lack of proof of efforts to find counsel, and recruited counsel.
“Given the severity of the allegations, and to promote an efficient resolution of Plaintiff's claims, the Court finds it best to assign counsel to assist with this matter.”
On out-of-state medical/dental defendants he conducts a careful specific-personal-jurisdiction analysis and will find jurisdiction where the provider purposefully directed activity at Illinois -- an ongoing referral/business relationship with an in-forum provider plus collaboration on a joint treatment plan and communications into the forum 'inject' the defendant into forum-state care (Kostal line), distinguishing the unilateral-patient-contact cases (Solomon, Clemens).
“The Hockel Defendants purposefully directed their activities at Illinois by deliberately establishing and maintaining a business relationship with Dr. Movahed, an Illinois-based surgeon; ... by collaborating with Dr. Movahed on a joint treatment plan for Plaintiff ... and encouraging Plaintiff to consent to the surgery in Illinois.”
Treats a prison grievance system as unavailable when it operates as a dead end rather than merely processing a grievance slowly. A merits-free denial tied to an open-ended investigation, with no notice of timing or recourse, defeated exhaustion summary judgment.
“Mr. Frakes’s grievances, however, were summarily denied without any consideration of their merit because the investigation into the incident was not complete. Moreover, Mr. Frakes was not provided with any information about the timeline of the investigation and when it might conclude. Nor was he told if he would even be notified when the investigation concluded, or if he had any other avenue for recourse. The prison, in essence, refused to hear his claim.”
Procedural preferences
On Social Security review he is a substantive (not deferential rubber-stamp) reviewer: he reverses and remands where the ALJ ignores a whole line of contrary evidence or relies on outdated state-agency consultant opinions, demanding a 'logical bridge' between the evidence and the conclusion.
“The ALJ simply cannot recite only the evidence that is supportive of her ultimate conclusion without acknowledging and addressing the significant contrary evidence in the record.”
On deliberate-indifference MSJs he draws a firm negligence-vs-deliberate-indifference line: a doctor's professional treatment decision is presumptively valid and not actionable under the Eighth Amendment unless 'blatantly inappropriate,' and a defendant can win summary judgment by pointing to an absence of evidence on an essential element. His grants on this basis have survived de novo district-judge review.
“a defendant can carry its summary judgment burden by pointing to an absence of evidence to support an essential element of the plaintiff's case without actually submitting any evidence”
Will send deliberate-indifference claims to a jury when the record supports competing inferences about whether interim treatment reflected professional judgment or instead prolonged severe pain. Neither side receives summary judgment when credibility and medical-response questions run both ways.
“Given that there is evidence pointing in both directions and a reasonable jury could find in favor of either Plaintiff or Desai, neither party is entitled to summary judgment. The question of whether Desai acted with deliberate indifference must be left to the judgment of a jury.”
Cautions
A federal habeas petitioner faces a heavy burden to excuse administrative exhaustion. A general belief that the process will fail is insufficient without case-specific evidence of unavailability, futility, or irreparable harm.
“The general belief that the administrative process would not succeed is not an excuse to not take that step.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“The motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction filed by Defendants Brian J. Hockel, DDS and Brian Hockel, DDS, P.C. (Doc. 80) is DENIED.”
“This ruling in turn renders Plaintiff's motion to change venue (Doc. 87) MOOT.”
“The Commissioner's final decision denying Plaintiff's application for disability benefits is REVERSED and REMANDED to the Commissioner for rehearing and reconsideration of the evidence, pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. 405(g). The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment in favor of Plaintiff.”
“Plaintiff's Motion for Recruitment of Counsel (Doc. 3) is GRANTED.”
“ADOPTS the Report in its entirety (Doc. 78); OVERRULES Johnson's objections (Doc. 85); GRANTS the defendants' motion for summary judgment (Doc. 69)”
“Defendants' motions for summary judgment for failure to exhaust administrative remedies (Docs. 78, 80, and 81) are GRANTED. Plaintiff's claims are DISMISSED without prejudice”
“ADOPTS the Report in its entirety (Doc. 43); and DENIES the St. Clair County Sheriff's motion for summary judgment on the issue of exhaustion (Doc. 18).”
“For these reasons, Ms. Kincaid-Hicks has not met the heavy burden of establishing why futility justified her failure to exhaust her administrative remedies. Therefore, her petition for habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 is DENIED (Doc. 1) and this cause of action is DISMISSED with prejudice.”
“Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 70) is DENIED. Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 72) is likewise DENIED.”
“Defendants Justin Warren and Jordan Heckler’s motion for judgment on the pleadings (Doc. 70) is DENIED.”
“Their motion for summary judgment on the issue of exhaustion (Doc. 71) is likewise DENIED.”
After dismissing the complaint without prejudice and allowing amendment, the court dismissed the action with prejudice under Rule 41(b) when the plaintiff missed the amended-complaint deadline, sought no extension, and had been warned of the consequence.
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
Median case duration in the sampled dockets: 224 days (N = 10).
Median motion-to-ruling time: 319 days (N = 6).
Counts are illustrative from a capped enumeration, not an authoritative caseload census. A recurring pattern in the sampled consent docket: contested civil cases frequently resolve at a court-hosted settlement conference or by stipulated voluntary dismissal rather than on a dispositive motion (e.g. Edwards, Romaine, Russell).
Put Judge Beatty's record to work
Ezel drafts and answers grounded in this exact profile: how Judge Beatty actually rules, not a generic AI guess.
Opens in Ezel Pro. Every answer is grounded in Judge Beatty's own signed orders and cites them.