Fred Louis Wham

How Judge Wham rules, drawn from 21 signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.

Judge Wham no longer hears cases. This profile is preserved as a historical record of how they ruled.

Court
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Illinois
Position
district
Status
Deceased
Served
1927–1967
Appointed by
Calvin Coolidge (Republican)
Commissioned
1927-03-01
Education
University of Illinois College of Law, LL.B., 1909
Signed orders read
21

How Judge Wham decides

Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.

What persuades

Wham declined to require additional detail in a complaint that met the governing pleading rule, pointing the requesting party toward discovery and other procedural tools for particulars.

“As I read the Rules of Civil Procedure, the complaint conforms to their requirements. Other methods are provided by the rules for obtaining additional particulars”

At the pleading stage, Wham allowed reasonable inferences to supply details that the complaint did not state word for word when the allegations still gave fair notice of the claim.

“I am not inclined to agree with counsel for defendants that the complaint, tested by the requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure must fully spell out by definite verbiage each element of a willful and wanton injury if the missing element or elements naturally follow or may reasonably be inferred from the facts that are alleged in the complaint.”

Cautions

Wham dismissed a private statutory suit where the enactment created both the asserted right and an exclusive administrative remedy that the plaintiffs could not replace with a district-court injunction action.

“where a statute gives a new right and declares the remedy, any one seeking or relying on the right so given is confined for his remedy to that which is prescribed in the statute.”

Signed rulings

A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.

Progressive Miners of America Local Union No. 109 v. Peabody Coal Co.
No. 4629 · 1934-05-07
Motions to dismiss (defendants) Granted

“Defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ bill, as amended, for want of jurisdiction in the court to entertain the suit as brought and for want of proper parties plaintiff, is sustained, and said bill, as amended, is hereby dismissed.”

Snook v. Industrial Commission of Illinois
No. 2858 · 1934-11-02
Motions to remand (plaintiff) Granted

“Plaintiff’s motion, wbicb will be taken as a motion to remand cause to the state court, is hereby allowed.”

Henson v. Eichorn
· 1938-03-24
Motions to dismiss (Home Owners’ Loan Corporation) Granted

“The motion of the defendant Home Owners’ Loan Corporation to dismiss must be and is hereby sustained.”

Lost Trail, Inc. v. Allied Mills, Inc.
No. 22 · 1938-12-29
Motion for more definite statement (defendant) Denied

“Defendant’s motion will be and is hereby denied.”

Nordman v. Johnson City
No. 4731 · 1939-01-11
Motion to strike answer paragraphs (plaintiff) Denied

“The motion to strike the answer and paragraphs 5, 7, 14, 22 and 23 thereof will be denied.”

Motion to strike affirmative defense (plaintiff) Granted

“The motion to strike affirmative defense No. 1 is sustained.”

Motion to strike affirmative defense (plaintiff) Denied

“Motion to strike affirmative defense No. 2 is denied.”

Motion to strike affirmative defense (plaintiff) Granted

“Affirmative defense No. 3 may be stricken.”

Motion to strike counterclaim (plaintiff) Denied

“The motion to strike counterclaim No. 1 will be and is hereby denied.”

Motion for more definite statement (plaintiff) Denied

“The motion to make more definite and certain will be denied.”

Martin v. Moery
No. 26 · 1939-08-29
Motions to strike (plaintiffs) Denied

“The motion to strike is denied.”

Motion for judgment (plaintiffs) Denied

“Plaintiffs’ motion for judgment which is coupled with their motion to strike must fall with their motion to strike.”

Motions to dismiss (defendants Ralph and Gertrude Moery) Denied

“Defendants’ motion to dismiss the amended complaint is denied”

Dodson v. Raker
No. 137 · 1940-07-02
Motion for new trial (plaintiff) Granted

“I am of opinion that a new trial should be granted and that the new trial should be limited to the issue of the amount of the damages the plaintiff is entitled to recover. It is so ordered.”

Gengler v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.
Civ. 106 · 1941-01-02
Petition for rehearing (defendant) Granted

“The court, over opposition of counsel for plaintiff, allowed the petition and deferred entry of interlocutory decree pending the rehearing.”

Sohio Corp. v. Gipson
No. 127 · 1941-01-04
Summary judgment (defendants O. C. Meyers and John M. Halco) Granted

“Taking all the facts together, I am of opinion that the motion for summary judgment should be and it is hereby allowed.”

Spreitler v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co.
No. 230 · 1941-01-04
Motion to set aside verdict and enter judgment (defendant) Denied

“Defendant’s motion to set aside the verdict and enter judgment for the defendant will be denied.”

Motion for new trial (defendant) Denied

“Defendant’s motion for a new trial must also be denied.”

In re Pray Drilling Co.
No. 8198 · 1941-10-11
Petition for appointment of receiver (petitioning creditors) Denied

“The very inadequate petition of the petitioning creditors for the appointment of a receiver was not accompanied by any tender of a petitioning creditors’ bond and is, therefore, denied.”

Mott v. City of Flora
Civil Action No. 625 · 1943-01-07
Motions to strike (City of Flora) Denied

“The motion of the City of Flora to strike certain portions of the complaint and the motion of the other defendants to dismiss will be and each is hereby denied.”

Motions to dismiss (the individual city defendants) Denied

A historical record

Judge Wham no longer hears cases. This profile stays available as a record of how they ruled. If you're preparing for a matter, start from the court's current bench.