David Wayne Dugan
How Judge Dugan decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
On a motion for a STATUTORY injunction (e.g. 18 U.S.C. 1345), the movant need not make the traditional eBay/Winter showing of irreparable harm or inadequacy of legal remedy -- once a violation is demonstrated, it need only show a reasonable likelihood of future violations. A repeat violation after a signed cease/'voluntary discontinuance' satisfies that.
“Once a violation is demonstrated, the moving party need show only that there is some reasonable likelihood of future violations.”
Procedural preferences
He rigorously enforces administrative exhaustion (FTCA pre-suit presentment; PLRA prison grievances) and resolves DISPUTED prison-exhaustion through a Pavey evidentiary hearing decided on witness credibility rather than on the SJ papers. Plead and prove exhaustion (or genuine unavailability) carefully.
“the Court finds that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, so this case must be dismissed without prejudice.”
He will reconsider his own interlocutory rulings under Rule 54(b) to correct a manifest error of law -- a contrast with the high bar for post-judgment reconsideration. A well-supported, law-grounded reconsideration request can succeed.
“the Court GRANTS Plaintiff's fifth Motion in Limine, construed as a Motion for Reconsideration under Rule 54(b).”
Cautions
To obtain recruited (pro bono) counsel, an indigent litigant must clear the Pruitt/Walker 'threshold': document at least three specific attorney contacts -- names, addresses, means and dates of contact, and any responses (with copies). Bare assertions that firms declined are not enough.
“To adequately demonstrate attempts to recruit counsel in any subsequent motion, Plaintiff must submit the names and addresses of at least three attorneys contacted for representation, the means by which he communicated with those attorneys (e.g., by phone, letter, or email), the date of the communications, and the responses, if any, of the attorneys to his communications.”
Motion outcomes
Counted from classified signed orders only. Percentages are shown only where the sample is large enough to be meaningful; smaller samples are reported as raw counts.
| Summary judgment N = 2 |
Granted: 2 | counts only |
| Motions to dismiss N = 1 |
Moot / procedural: 1 | counts only |
| Default judgment N = 1 |
Granted: 1 | counts only |
| Motion for reconsideration N = 1 |
Granted: 1 | counts only |
A "1 of 1" is one ruling, not a tendency. Treat small samples as illustrative, not predictive.
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by the United States (Doc. 17) is GRANTED. Claims 3-5 against the United States are dismissed because Plaintiff failed to exhaust these claims as required by the FTCA.”
“The Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Prosecution (Doc. 19) is DENIED as MOOT.”
“the Court DENIES Plaintiff's Fourth Motion for the Recruitment of Counsel without prejudice.”
“the Court GRANTS Plaintiff's fifth Motion in Limine, construed as a Motion for Reconsideration under Rule 54(b). ... The Court's prior ruling in the Summary Judgment Order finding that Plaintiff's arguments denying his assault of Defendant Delgado were foreclosed by Heck is hereby VACATED.”
“the Court GRANTS Plaintiff's request for a default judgment against Defendant. ... the Court GRANTS Plaintiff's request for a permanent injunction against Defendant. ... Consistent with these rulings, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff's Motion for the Entry of a Final Default Judgment.”
“Plaintiff's Complaint (Doc. 1) is now DISMISSED without prejudice because he failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. The Clerk of Court shall enter judgment and CLOSE this case.”
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
Median case duration in the sampled dockets: 272 days (N = 17).
Median motion-to-ruling time: 178.5 days (N = 2).
Counts are illustrative from a capped enumeration, not an authoritative caseload census; no FJC IDB baseline loaded on this record.