Virginia Mary Kendall
How Judge Kendall decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
At the pleading stage she applies the MINIMAL Title VII standard: a plaintiff need not allege a similarly-situated comparator or a prima facie case, because McDonnell Douglas is an evidentiary standard, not a pleading requirement. Save the comparator fight for summary judgment.
“The plaintiff is not required to include allegations -- such as the existence of a similarly-situated comparator -- that would establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the 'indirect' method of proof.”
On summary judgment she will not let ambiguous physical evidence resolve a factual dispute against the non-movant: where a security video is obscured and the parties' accounts diverge, the video does not 'easily provide' the disputed fact and the issue goes to the jury.
“the video does not 'easily provide[] probable cause.' ... the altercation is almost entirely obscured from view, blocked by a large object.”
She reads the ADA's 'place of public accommodation' to include websites, following the Seventh Circuit's considered dictum (Doe v. Mutual of Omaha; Morgan) and the First Circuit over the Third/Fifth/Sixth/Ninth Circuits. A web retailer cannot defeat a Title-III accessibility claim by saying the blind plaintiff could have phoned or emailed instead.
“This court, too, elects to follow the Seventh Circuit's considered dictum that a place of public accommodation is not limited to physical spaces.”
For an Illinois Consumer Fraud Act claim by a non-resident, the dispositive question is the Avery 'primarily and substantially in Illinois' nine-factor test. A defendant's Illinois headquarters alone is NOT enough, but allegations that the deceptive decisions were made, statements issued, contracts negotiated, and payments received in Illinois will carry it past a motion to dismiss. She cites her own prior Stericycle opinion as the framework.
“While Plaintiffs' previous Complaint was plainly insufficient because the only tie was that Walgreens is headquartered in Illinois with no mention of the allegedly deceptive conduct, here there are numerous factors that tie the deceptive conduct to Illinois.”
Procedural preferences
She enforces Local Rule 56.1 strictly and will call out counsel by name for ignoring it: a summary-judgment opponent who fails to respond paragraph-by-paragraph to the movant's statement of facts and to file a statement of additional facts forfeits the chance to create a dispute. Comply with 56.1 to the letter.
“These errors are unacceptable -- and they complicate the task of verifying the factual allegations. While Porter is proceeding pro se now, he was represented by two attorneys during summary-judgment briefing, both of whom should have complied with this long-established rule and failed to do so.”
She holds parties to Local Rule 56.1 even when the non-movant is pro se: failing to respond to the movant's statement of facts means those facts are deemed admitted under Rule 56(e), and the motion is decided on the movant's uncontested record. 'Even pro se litigants must follow procedural rules.'
“Towers, by not responding to Defendants' motion, has failed to properly address Defendants' assertions of fact. ... the Court will consider the facts presented by Defendants as undisputed for the purposes of this motion as permitted by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e).”
She extends Rule 4(m) leniency to pro se plaintiffs who attempt service promptly and cause no prejudice -- especially where a dismissal would be effectively with prejudice on limitations grounds -- rather than dismissing on a technical service defect.
“While this service is not technically proper, the Plaintiff attempted proper service, and did so promptly after filing the Complaint. ... Defendant has not been prejudiced by the delay caused by the service.”
The Illinois one-refiling rule (735 ILCS 5/13-217) is a hard preclusion limit she will apply even to a federal-question case: a plaintiff who voluntarily dismisses gets exactly one new action, and the reason for the second dismissal (even lack of personal jurisdiction in another state) is irrelevant. Do not assume forum-shopping refilings are free.
“Illinois law makes clear that Buschle only gets one second bite at the apple after such a voluntary dismissal and she chose to take that bite in Ohio federal court.”
She applies Rule 15(a)(2)'s liberal amendment policy strongly where the new theory rests on evidence that surfaced late through no fault of the movant -- and will not let a defendant's own concealment defeat amendment. Additional discovery alone is not a reason to deny leave to amend.
“denying the filing of the SAC would serve to shield Defendants from liability due to their own actions of concealing the ownership of the company.”
Cautions
She will refuse to consider a new factual allegation that surfaces only at summary judgment -- an affidavit assertion never produced in discovery, never mentioned at deposition, and unsupported by a Local Rule 56.1 citation gets disregarded. Get your key facts into the record during discovery.
“The Court will not, however, consider this statement. The affidavit containing the allegation was never turned over in discovery ... and Porter utterly failed to comply with Local Rule 56.1 by including this assertion with a record citation.”
Pretext on a discrimination claim requires showing the employer's stated reason is a lie, not merely that it was mistaken or harsh; a comparator who committed a materially different version of the same conduct will not establish pretext.
“Pretext is a 'lie,' that is, a 'phony reason' for the employment action ... and it 'requires more than showing that the decision was mistaken, ill considered or foolish.'”
A party cannot create a triable issue by contradicting their own sworn testimony: a plaintiff who admitted under oath in an EEO affidavit that age and sex 'were not a factor' cannot resurrect those theories at summary judgment. Mind what your client swore to administratively.
“She cannot disavow those explicit statements now, and the Postal Service is entitled to summary judgment on the remaining part of Count I and Count II as well.”
She enforces administrative-exhaustion bars rigorously. A Title VII claim must match the EEOC charge (a race-only charge does not exhaust national origin) and be timely (45-day counselor contact / 90-day suit window); an FTCA claim against a 'deemed' federal employee requires administrative presentment first -- and the medical-malpractice bar 'should know enough to consult the [PHS] website' to spot federal status.
“claims of national origin discrimination do not relate to or grow out of claims based on race. ... it is too late for Goodlet to file a new charge based on national origin discrimination.”
Motion outcomes
Counted from classified signed orders only. Percentages are shown only where the sample is large enough to be meaningful; smaller samples are reported as raw counts.
| Motions to dismiss N = 12 |
Granted: 3Granted in part: 5Denied: 4 | 67% granted |
| Summary judgment N = 7 |
Granted: 5Denied: 2 | counts only |
| Temporary restraining order N = 1 |
Denied: 1 | counts only |
| Preliminary injunction N = 1 |
Denied: 1 | counts only |
| Motion to dissolve injunction N = 1 |
Denied: 1 | counts only |
| Motion for reconsideration N = 1 |
Granted: 1 | counts only |
| Motion for leave to amend N = 1 |
Granted: 1 | counts only |
A "1 of 1" is one ruling, not a tendency. Treat small samples as illustrative, not predictive.
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“For these reasons, the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted. (Dkt. 88).”
“The government's Motion for Summary Judgment is denied. Genuine disputes of fact remain as to whether there was probable cause to institute proceedings against Rayas for battery and whether Sgt. Echeverry did so with malice.”
“For the reasons stated, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss [10] is granted in part and denied in part.”
“For those reasons, pursuant to 735 ILCS 5/13-217, Defendants' Motions to Dismiss, [12] and [15], are granted and the case is dismissed.”
“WHEREFORE, Defendant's motion to dismiss the Amended Complaint is denied. Defendant shall answer the Amended Complaint within 30 days.”
“Plaintiffs' Motions for a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction 10, 50 are denied. See Opinion for further details.”
“Plaintiffs' Motions for a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction 10, 50 are denied. See Opinion for further details.”
“The Court denies Defendants' Joint Motion to Dismiss 498, except as to Prestage. Plaintiffs' claim of per se violation against Prestage is dismissed without prejudice.”
“the defendants' motion to dismiss is denied in part (Counts I – III) and granted in part with leave to file an amended complaint no later than February 22, 2023 (Count IV & V).”
“For the reasons above, the City's partial motion to dismiss [19] is granted.”
“Defendants' motion to set aside the preliminary injunction (or, in the alternative, to amend the asset freeze) [36] is denied without prejudice.”
“For these reasons, the Court grants Comm. Rubio's Motion for Reconsideration. [231]”
“the Court grants Dania's motion to dismiss claims for damages [15] and denies Dania's motion with respect to all other issues.”
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
Median case duration in the sampled dockets: 944 days (N = 3).
Median motion-to-ruling time: 199 days (N = 3).
As Chief Judge (since 2024-08-01), her current (2026) docket is dominated by miscellaneous 'United States v. Suppressed' matters (1:26-mc-602xx -- grand-jury / wiretap / search-warrant supervision, a typical chief-judge duty), plus new immigration suits (USCIS) and Cook County Jail prisoner civil-rights filings. Her merits civil docket over the years spans Title VII employment (Porter, Cox, Hill, Towers, Lollis, Sinkhorn, Goodlet), antitrust (In re Turkey Antitrust), Second Amendment (Bevis PICA), FTCA / FSHCAA (Rayas, Williams), trade secrets / restrictive covenants (Talman), RICO real-estate fraud (Said/Flip Chicago), ERISA (Drive Construction), ADA Title III website access (Walsh), consumer fraud (BCBSM v. Walgreen), Schedule-A IP (Zou), and UCC commercial (Altana). Nature-of-suit is only partially reported in docket case-level metadata.