Virginia Mary Kendall
How Judge Kendall rules, drawn from 35 signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
About Judge Kendall
Virginia Mary Kendall is a judge of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. Appointed by President George W. Bush, Judge Kendall received a commission on January 3, 2006.
Judge Kendall's practices and standing orders
Rules for cases before Judge Kendall, as published on the court's website (checked October 8, 2026). Judges revise these often, so confirm the current version on the court's site before you file.
Key rules
Motions
In a bankruptcy appeal, confer on magistrate consent within 14 days after filing.
“Parties are to meet and confer within 14 days of the appeal's filing to discuss whether they jointly consent to proceed before the Magistrate Judge.”
Conferences
File a joint status report of no more than five pages at least three days before the conference.
“At least three days prior to the status conference, the parties are directed to file a joint written status report of not more than five pages.”
Other
Request an expedited transcript or live feed at least five business days ahead.
“Please contact Judge Kendall's Court Reporter, Gayle McGuigan, at least five (5) business days before the start of any proceeding for which you anticipate needing daily copy transcript and/or a realtime feed or rough-draft transcript so that these services can be scheduled.”
Standing orders for every case in this court
Orders the court applies to all of its cases, whichever judge has them, as published on the court's website (checked October 8, 2026).
How Judge Kendall decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
At the pleading stage she applies the MINIMAL Title VII standard: a plaintiff need not allege a similarly-situated comparator or a prima facie case, because McDonnell Douglas is an evidentiary standard, not a pleading requirement. Save the comparator fight for summary judgment.
“The plaintiff is not required to include allegations -- such as the existence of a similarly-situated comparator -- that would establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the 'indirect' method of proof.”
In Rayas v. United States, she denied summary judgment on a malicious prosecution claim because an obscured, silent security video and conflicting accounts left a factual dispute about probable cause.
“The parties’ differing accounts of the altercation, and the lack of clear video evidence substantiating either account, results in a genuine dispute of material fact regarding probable cause.”
She reads the ADA's 'place of public accommodation' to include websites, following the Seventh Circuit's considered dictum (Doe v. Mutual of Omaha; Morgan) and the First Circuit over the Third/Fifth/Sixth/Ninth Circuits. A web retailer cannot defeat a Title-III accessibility claim by saying the blind plaintiff could have phoned or emailed instead.
“This court, too, elects to follow the Seventh Circuit's considered dictum that a place of public accommodation is not limited to physical spaces.”
In BCBSM, Inc. v. Walgreen Co., she allowed an Illinois Consumer Fraud Act claim by out-of-state plaintiffs to proceed after the amended complaint tied the alleged deceptive conduct to Illinois through statements, contracts, payments, and decisions made there.
“While Plaintiffs’ previous Complaint was plainly insufficient because the only tie was that Walgreens is headquartered in Illinois with no mention of the allegedly deceptive conduct, here there are numerous factors that tie the deceptive conduct to Illinois.”
In the challenge to Illinois’s interchange-fee limit, she reconsidered its application to federal credit unions after the federal credit-union regulator issued a new rule. She granted the requested extension of the permanent injunction while leaving the earlier partial summary-judgment dispositions in place.
“Illinois Bankers’ Motion for Partial Reconsideration [226] is granted as to the Interchange Fee Limitation’s application to federal credit unions;”
Procedural preferences
In Porter v. Illinois Central Railroad, she criticized the plaintiff's attorneys for failing to answer the movant's fact statements paragraph by paragraph or submit additional facts under Local Rule 56.1.
“These errors are unacceptable—and they complicate the task of verifying the factual allegations.”
In Towers v. Team Car Care, Kendall treated the defendants' stated facts as undisputed for summary judgment after Towers did not respond to their motion, as Rule 56(e) permits.
“Therefore, the Court will consider the facts presented by Defendants as undisputed for the purposes of this motion as permitted by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e).”
In Hill's employment-discrimination case, she allowed more time for service after the pro se plaintiff promptly attempted service, the defendant suffered no prejudice, and a dismissal would effectively bar a timely claim.
“While this service is not technically proper, the Plaintiff attempted proper service, and did so promptly after filing the Complaint. ... Defendant has not been prejudiced by the delay caused by the service.”
In Buschle v. Coach, Inc., she dismissed a third suit asserting the same claims after a voluntary dismissal and a refiling in Ohio federal court, applying Illinois's one-refiling rule in the federal case.
“Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss are granted because this is Buschle’s third attempt to file the same claims and she is thus barred by the Illinois one refiling rule.”
In Trustees of the Chicago Regional Council of Carpenters Pension Fund v. Drive Construction, Inc., she granted leave to amend after ownership evidence surfaced in discovery and found that the defendants' alleged concealment and the need for some additional discovery did not justify denying amendment.
“denying the filing of the SAC would serve to shield Defendants from liability due to their own actions of concealing the ownership of the company.”
Cautions
In Porter v. Illinois Central Railroad, she declined to consider a new allegation in the plaintiff's affidavit because it had not been disclosed in discovery or mentioned at his deposition and was unsupported by a Local Rule 56.1 record citation.
“The Court will not, however, consider this statement.”
In Porter v. Illinois Central Railroad, she found no pretext in the plaintiff's comparison with a white employee because the two employees' recording conduct was materially different.
“the record indicates these offenses were sufficiently different to justify two separate responses.”
A party cannot create a triable issue by contradicting their own sworn testimony: a plaintiff who admitted under oath in an EEO affidavit that age and sex 'were not a factor' cannot resurrect those theories at summary judgment. Mind what your client swore to administratively.
“She cannot disavow those explicit statements now, and the Postal Service is entitled to summary judgment on the remaining part of Count I and Count II as well.”
In Goodlet v. City of Chicago, Kendall dismissed a Title VII national-origin claim with prejudice because the plaintiff’s EEOC charge alleged race discrimination, and the national-origin claim had not been administratively exhausted.
“claims of national origin discrimination do not relate to or grow out of claims based on race. ... it is too late for Goodlet to file a new charge based on national origin discrimination.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“For these reasons, the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted. (Dkt. 88).”
“The government's Motion for Summary Judgment is denied. Genuine disputes of fact remain as to whether there was probable cause to institute proceedings against Rayas for battery and whether Sgt. Echeverry did so with malice.”
“For the reasons stated, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss [10] is granted in part and denied in part.”
“For those reasons, pursuant to 735 ILCS 5/13-217, Defendants' Motions to Dismiss, [12] and [15], are granted and the case is dismissed.”
“WHEREFORE, Defendant's motion to dismiss the Amended Complaint is denied. Defendant shall answer the Amended Complaint within 30 days.”
“For these reasons, the motions for a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction are denied. (Dkt. 10, 50).”
“For the foregoing reasons, the Court denies Defendants’ Joint Motion to Dismiss [498], except as to Prestage. Plaintiffs’ claim of per se violation against Prestage is dismissed without prejudice.”
“the defendants' motion to dismiss is denied in part (Counts I – III) and granted in part with leave to file an amended complaint no later than February 22, 2023 (Count IV & V).”
“For the reasons above, the City's partial motion to dismiss [19] is granted.”
“Defendants' motion to set aside the preliminary injunction (or, in the alternative, to amend the asset freeze) [36] is denied without prejudice.”
“For these reasons, the Court grants Comm. Rubio's Motion for Reconsideration. [231]”
“the Court grants Dania's motion to dismiss claims for damages [15] and denies Dania's motion with respect to all other issues.”
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
Median case duration in the sampled dockets: 944 days (N = 3).
Median motion-to-ruling time: 136 days (N = 11).
- As Chief Judge, Judge Kendall's reviewed docket includes grand-jury, wiretap, and search-warrant supervision, immigration suits, and prisoner civil-rights filings.
- Her merits civil work spans employment, antitrust, Second Amendment, Federal Tort Claims Act, trade-secret, restrictive-covenant, racketeering, employee-benefit, disability-access, consumer-fraud, intellectual-property, and commercial disputes.
- Case-type information was unavailable for some matters.
Pending matters in the official report
Reported by the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts under the Civil Justice Reform Act, as of March 31, 2026.
| Motions pending more than six months | 0 |
| Bench trials submitted more than six months | 0 |
| Bankruptcy appeals pending more than six months | 0 |
| Social Security appeals pending more than six months | 0 |
| Civil cases pending more than three years | 39 |
| Report | Motions over six months | Cases over three years |
|---|---|---|
| Mar 2026 | 0 | 39 |
| Sep 2025 | 0 | 39 |
| Mar 2025 | 0 | 34 |
| Sep 2024 | 0 | 34 |
| Mar 2024 | 0 | 34 |
| Sep 2023 | 1 | 38 |
| Mar 2023 | 0 | 41 |
| Sep 2022 | 0 | 35 |
| Mar 2022 | 0 | 36 |
| Sep 2021 | 0 | 9 |
| Mar 2021 | 0 | 8 |
| Sep 2020 | 0 | 7 |
A snapshot on that date: matters listed may since have been decided or reassigned. A motion referred to a magistrate judge is counted for both judges. Motions in multidistrict litigation, section 2255 cases and Social Security appeals are not counted, and a very large three-year count is generally a multidistrict docket. Source: Appendix A of the report (PDF); about the report.
How long civil cases take in this court
For the whole of U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, not for Judge Kendall: median time from filing to disposition of the civil cases the court closed in the 12 months ending September 30, 2025, as reported by the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts.
| Cases | Median time | |
|---|---|---|
| All civil cases closed | 12,205 | 5.9 months |
| Closed with no court action | 4,300 | 7 months |
| Closed before pretrial | 7,558 | 5.4 months |
| Closed during or after pretrial | 305 | 12.6 months |
| Closed during trial | 42 | 49.5 months |
| 12 months ending | Cases closed | Median time |
|---|---|---|
| Sep 2025 | 12,205 | 5.9 months |
| Sep 2024 | 9,700 | 6.8 months |
| Sep 2023 | 7,093 | 6 months |
| Sep 2022 | 6,841 | 7.3 months |
| Sep 2021 | 9,703 | 15.1 months |
| Sep 2020 | 8,046 | 10.6 months |
| Sep 2019 | 8,134 | 7.4 months |
The table leaves out prisoner petitions, land condemnations, deportation reviews, recovery of overpayments and enforcement of judgments, and reports no median for fewer than 10 cases. A district that closed a large multidistrict litigation in the period shows very large counts and long medians for that year. Source: Table C-5, U.S. District Courts (spreadsheet).
Draft for Judge Kendall with the record in hand
Ezel grounds your drafting and research in this profile: what has persuaded Judge Kendall, and what has not, cited to the signed orders.
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