Thomas Michael Durkin
How Judge Durkin decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
He enforces Illinois' statute of repose for attorney malpractice strictly: a malpractice/fiduciary-duty claim is barred six years after the act or omission, and the repose period is NOT tolled absent pleaded-and-proven fraudulent concealment (which requires the attorney's awareness of the concealed fact). Even a meritorious-sounding conflict-of-interest claim fails if filed past repose.
“because Nasrabadi has failed to demonstrate fraudulent concealment, the time for the claim to be brought cannot be tolled and it must be dismissed as untimely.”
A valid forum-selection clause pointing to a specific non-federal forum is enforced through forum non conveniens (Atlantic Marine): private-interest factors drop out, the analysis is limited to public-interest factors, and the clause controls 'except in unusual cases.' He will treat a mislabeled Rule 12(b)(3) motion as the correct vehicle rather than deny it on procedural form.
“when a forum-selection clause is in play, the analysis is limited to public-interest factors. And because those factors are rarely strong enough to override the parties' preselected forum, the practical result is that forum-selection clauses should control except in unusual cases.”
Procedural preferences
He will sua sponte transfer a case under 28 U.S.C. 1404(a) -- even with a motion to dismiss pending and without ruling on it -- when the chosen forum (even the plaintiff's home district) has no meaningful connection to the events, the witnesses and evidence are elsewhere, and the other district's docket is less congested. File where the events and witnesses are.
“the Court on its own motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), and without expressing any opinion as to Constellation's motion to dismiss, now transfers this case to the United States District Court for the District of Utah for further proceedings.”
He treats undeveloped legal theories as waived on summary judgment: a party that marshals facts but never identifies the legal duty/elements (or the governing contract or statute) cannot survive SJ, because the court will not research and construct the argument for them.
“By not analyzing the evidence according to the elements of any legally cognizable duty, he is unable to satisfy his burden to avoid summary judgment. ... it is not this court's responsibility to research and construct the parties' arguments, and conclusory analysis will be construed as waiver.”
Cautions
On ERISA jurisdiction he follows the 'modern view': whether a plan is an ERISA plan is a merits element, not a jurisdictional threshold, and subject-matter jurisdiction cannot be waived (a 12(b)(6) filed after an answer is treated as a Rule 12(c) motion). A health policy that covers only a sole working owner with no employees is not an ERISA plan, because ERISA requires an employment relationship between two different persons.
“Till does not allege that his business had any employees. And the insurance policy he bought was for himself alone. ... Accordingly, Till's policy is not covered by ERISA.”
At summary judgment he holds the movant to its burden even on fact-intensive disputes: where phone-company call records, a handwritten log, and screenshots only partially corroborate the alleged calls, a reasonable jury could go either way, so neither side's TCPA/FDCPA summary-judgment motion is granted. Reconcile your documentary evidence before moving.
“Holt is unable to demonstrate that a reasonable jury could not find in favor of MRS on any of the required elements. As such, summary judgment on her TCPA claim in Count IV is denied.”
Motion outcomes
Counted from classified signed orders only. Percentages are shown only where the sample is large enough to be meaningful; smaller samples are reported as raw counts.
| Motions to dismiss N = 3 |
Granted: 2Moot / procedural: 1 | counts only |
| Summary judgment N = 3 |
Granted: 1Denied: 2 | counts only |
A "1 of 1" is one ruling, not a tendency. Treat small samples as illustrative, not predictive.
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“Therefore, National General's motion to dismiss [16] is granted, and Till's claim is dismissed. ... Because Till's ERISA claim is dismissed as a matter of law ... the claim is dismissed with prejudice.”
“For these reasons, Viking's motion [11] is granted, and the case is dismissed without prejudice.”
“the Court on its own motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), and without expressing any opinion as to Constellation's motion to dismiss, now transfers this case to the United States District Court for the District of Utah for further proceedings.”
“Holt is unable to demonstrate that a reasonable jury could not find in favor of MRS on any of the required elements. As such, summary judgment on her TCPA claim in Count IV is denied.”
“a reasonable jury could find that any alleged calls to MRS were made to collect a covered debt because that is what the company "primarily" collects. As such, MRS is not entitled to summary judgment on the FDCPA claims in Counts I, II, and III.”
“Therefore, Kameli's motion for summary judgment [128] is granted.”
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
Median case duration in the sampled dockets: 1127 days (N = 2).
Median motion-to-ruling time: 464 days (N = 1).
Senior since 2023-12-26 but still actively drawing NEW civil assignments in 2026 (e.g. Marin v. Cicero Housing Authority, Pence v. Thermos [fraud], Echols v. Kindred Brands, Sankovitch v. FedEx Freight, Nevels v. Dart [Cook County Sheriff], all filed May/June 2026). The sampled merits cases span ERISA/insurance (Till), commercial contract/forum-selection (DeEnterprises), civil-rights/transfer (Boundaoui), FDCPA/TCPA consumer (Holt), and attorney malpractice/EB-5 (Nasrabadi v. Kameli). Notable career matter (from bio): sentenced ex-Speaker Dennis Hastert (2016). Nature-of-suit only partially reported in docket case-level metadata.