Sidney I. Schenkier
Judge Schenkier no longer hears cases. This profile is preserved as a historical record of how they ruled.
How Judge Schenkier decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
On summary judgment he holds the movant to a strict record-evidence burden: a party that fails to tie its theory to specific evidence (here, specific insurer medical-necessity standards) loses, because summary judgment is the moment to marshal proof.
“A party seeking to defeat a motion for summary judgment is required to 'wheel out all its artillery to defeat it'”
Procedural preferences
At FLSA step-one conditional certification he applies the lenient 'modest factual showing' standard and will certify on affidavits plus payroll data, but separates that from the details of opt-in notice, which he prefers the parties negotiate before he rules.
“we find that plaintiff has made the required modest factual showing that conditional certification is warranted”
Cautions
He is reluctant to dismiss fact-intensive constitutional claims on the pleadings. Applying Mathews v. Eldridge, he let a procedural-due-process damages claim proceed where an ordinance provided no process at all, treating a motion to dismiss as the wrong vehicle to weigh the balance.
“the broad spectrum of arrestees who would be subject to the 2009 Ordinance further suggests to the Court that a motion to dismiss is not the best vehicle in which to address Mr. Roehl's claims”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“we grant plaintiffs motion for conditional certification of a collective action under the FLSA (doc. #25). However, we deny plaintiffs request to approve the form of notice and consent attached to the motion.”
“we deny relator's motion for summary judgment on Count I and grant defendants' motion for summary judgment on Counts II and III.”
“defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiffs complaint (doc. #26) is granted in part, and denied in part: the motion is granted insofar as we dismiss plaintiffs claim for declaratory and injunctive relief, but we deny the motion as to plaintiffs claim for damages.”
“we grant summary judgment for the defendants on Count I of the amended complaint for fraud and for Norvax on Count III for breach of contract.”
“We grant in part Northbound's motion for partial summary judgment on Count III for the withheld earn-out payments, and grant Leadbot's corresponding motion for summary judgment on Count III other than for plaintiffs claim for the withheld earn-out payments.”
“We also grant counter-defendants' motion for summary judgment on all three counts of the counterclaim asserted against them.”
“the Court grants the State Defendants' motion for summary judgment as to Dr. Mitchell-Lawshea, Dr. Garg, and Dr. Saffold, but we deny the State Defendants' motion for summary judgment as to plaintiff's claim that Dr. Newbold was deliberately indifferent by delaying obtaining a night guard for Mr. King (doc. # 246).”
“we grant the Wexford Defendants' motion for summary judgment as to plaintiff's claims against Dr. Fattore-Bruno and Wexford, but we deny the motion for summary judgment as to the claims against Dr. Chapman and Dr. Ghosh as identified in this opinion (doc. # 238).”
“Dexia's motion to compel (doc. # 208) is granted in part and denied in part, in line with the Court's rulings herein. To the extent that they have not already been produced, all documents on the Tatooles Firm's Privilege Log that are subject to the common interest privilege shall be produced to Dexia by June 7, 2005.”
“plaintiff's motion for class certification (doc. # 125) is denied.”
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
Median case duration in the sampled dockets: 1034 days (N = 4).
Median motion-to-ruling time: 160 days (N = 3).
Schenkier's docket combined two very different streams: full consent civil cases that he carried to final judgment under 28 U.S.C. 636(c) -- spanning wage-and-hour (FLSA), qui tam False Claims Act, commercial/contract, and civil-rights matters -- and a heavy volume of search-warrant and sealed miscellaneous duty-magistrate matters that resolve the same day. He was also the long-time supervising/mediating judge of the decades-old Shakman patronage litigation. The duration sample below is drawn from his contested consent merits cases (the ones that produced written opinions) and is therefore biased toward long, hard-fought cases; it is not a random caseload sample.
A historical record
Judge Schenkier no longer hears cases. This profile stays available as a record of how they ruled. If you're preparing for a matter, start from the court's current bench.