Sara Lee Ellis
How Judge Ellis rules, drawn from 45 signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
About Judge Ellis
Sara Lee Ellis is a judge of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. Appointed by President Barack Obama, Judge Ellis received a commission on October 8, 2013.
Judge Ellis's practices and standing orders
Rules for cases before Judge Ellis, as published on the court's website (checked October 8, 2026). Judges revise these often, so confirm the current version on the court's site before you file.
Key rules
Motions
File motions by the third business day before their hearing.
“All motions must be filed no later than the third business day (excluding federal holidays and weekends) before the day the motion is to be heard.”
Conferences
File a joint initial status report of no more than five pages at least seven days before the hearing.
“At least seven days prior to the initial status hearing, the parties must file a joint Initial Status Report, not to exceed five pages in length, in the format of the template at the link below.”
Trial
Seek court permission before contacting jurors after trial.
“After the conclusion of a trial, no party, agent or attorney shall communicate with any members of the petit jury before which the case was tried without first receiving permission of the Court.”
Standing orders for every case in this court
Orders the court applies to all of its cases, whichever judge has them, as published on the court's website (checked October 8, 2026).
How Judge Ellis decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
In Valladares v. Pruco Life, Ellis dismissed a life-insurance suit after reading the suicide exclusion together with its endorsement. Although the insurer left the effective-date blanks empty, the same sentence set the date by payment and delivery of the policy, placing the death within the exclusion period.
“That the Policy requires a reader to consult multiple pages to reach an otherwise clear answer does not render the Policy ambiguous. ... the only reasonable interpretation is that the effective date was March 1, 2019, the date the premium was paid and the Policy delivered.”
In Campbell v. Obaisi, Ellis granted summary judgment on a prisoner’s medical-care claim. Campbell had not offered independent evidence that a delay in orthopedic appointments worsened his condition or prolonged pain, and Ellis found no basis to attribute the scheduling delay to the physician.
“a plaintiff must also provide independent evidence that the delay exacerbated the injury or unnecessarily prolonged pain. ... nothing in the record would allow a trier of fact to attribute the delay in Campbell's two orthopedic appointments to Dr. Obaisi.”
In Manzo v. Uber Technologies, Ellis dismissed without prejudice the consumer-protection theories premised on Uber’s alleged violation of Chicago taxi and livery rules. She allowed separate misrepresentation theories about fares, gratuities, and Uber’s status as a transportation provider to proceed.
“the Court agrees with the D.C. Circuit and finds that Alsubbah cannot use the ICFA or the IUDTPA 'as a backdoor method' to bring a claim that Uber violates Chicago taxi and livery regulations.”
In one insurance claim-practices case, the court first dismissed a conclusory count without prejudice. After amendment supplied concrete allegations about claim handling, it allowed the count past the pleading stage while leaving the facts for later testing.
“the allegations in his amended complaint suffice to survive dismissal.”
Procedural preferences
In McGee v. Fifth Third Bank, Ellis considered factual assertions in a self-represented plaintiff’s dismissal brief that were consistent with his complaint. She still dismissed the contract claim because the agreement did not require the bank to request a financial statement.
“The Court considers the additional facts included in McGee’s response that are consistent with the amended complaint.”
In Chicago Title v. Sinikovic, Ellis considered adverse inferences from defendants’ Fifth Amendment invocations alongside affirmative evidence on summary judgment. She granted judgment on several claims but left factual questions, including the amount of punitive damages, for a jury.
“a party may not rest on the adverse inference alone: ‘Silence is a relevant factor to be considered in light of the proffered evidence, but the direct inference of guilt from silence is forbidden.’”
She requires a joint statement of undisputed facts for summary judgment. In an insurance dispute, she reached the merits despite the insurer’s separate fact statement, while warning that future filings must follow her procedure.
“While the Court overlooks GNY’s violation in the interest of resolving the parties’ arguments on their merits, it expects GNY to fully comply with the Court’s procedures going forward.”
Cautions
In Chicago Title v. Sinikovic, Ellis declined to impose a constructive trust over money spent on one defendant’s wedding because no identifiable fund remained in her possession. She imposed a trust on a separately traced $40,000 investment in property held by another defendant.
“Because there is not an identifiable fund to which the amount by which Larisa was unjustly enriched can be traced, the Court will not impose a constructive trust on any funds or property in Larisa’s possession.”
In Palos Community Hospital v. Healogics, Ellis denied dismissal of a declaratory-judgment suit over a wound-care services contract. The complaint alleged a live dispute about termination and ongoing obligations, including the provider’s continued occupancy, that a declaration could resolve.
“Because an actual case or controversy exists and PCH has adequately pleaded facts to state a claim under the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act, ... the Court denies the motion.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“For the foregoing reasons, the Court grants Pruco's motion to dismiss [11]. The Court dismisses the complaint with prejudice and terminates the case.”
“For the foregoing reasons, the Court grants Fifth Third's motion to dismiss [42]. The Court terminates as moot McGee's other pending motions [40], [44].”
“For the foregoing reasons, the Court denies the motion to dismiss [16]. Healogics is ordered to answer the complaint by June 15, 2016.”
“Uber's motion to dismiss [8] is granted in part and denied in part. The Court dismisses Plaintiffs' allegations that Uber operates illegally and misrepresents the illegal nature of its services. Count III is dismissed in its entirety ... the Court denies the motion to dismiss with regard to Count I's allegations ... and Count II's allegations.”
“For the foregoing reasons, the Court grants Defendants' motion for summary judgment [40]. The Court enters judgment for Defendants on Campbell's amended complaint and terminates this case.”
“For the foregoing reasons, Chicago Title's motion for summary judgment [134] is granted in part and denied in part. Summary judgment is entered against Elvir Sinikovic on the claims for breach of fiduciary duty (Count I), unjust enrichment (Count III), and accounting (Count IV). ... A constructive trust is imposed on the $40,000 invested by DC&L in the property located at 2925 W. Touhy, Unit 3, Chicago, Illinois.”
“the Court grants Defendants’ motion to dismiss [41]. The Court dismisses the Corporate Defendants from this case for lack of personal jurisdiction. The Court dismisses Plaintiffs’ claims against the Individual Defendants with prejudice and terminates this case.”
“the Court denies the City and the Officers’ motions to dismiss [35, 37].”
“the Court denies Phoenix’s motion to remand [15].”
“the Court grants Diza Tacos’ motion to compel arbitration and stay proceedings [16].”
“the Court denies Liu’s motion to remand [16].”
“the Court grants Dressweet’s motion to vacate [88]. The Court vacates the default judgment entered against Dressweet and dismisses Mori Lee’s claims against it without prejudice for lack of personal jurisdiction.”
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
Median motion-to-ruling time: 184 days (N = 17).
- Recent (2025-2026) the docket slice shows a mix typical of an active N.D.
- Ill. judge: civil rights / Sec. 1983 (Bracey v. Lake County, Foster v. Feliciano, Cunningham v. Rodriguez), prisoner suits (Knox v. IDOC), employment (Berry v. Univ. of Illinois at Chicago), human-trafficking/TVPA (C.S. v. O'Hare Airport Hotel LLC), commercial contract (Contract Manufacturing Services v. RB Global; Van Horst v. United Rentals; Dworkin v. Tandem PES), and criminal (United States v. Mays).
- Her written-opinion docket sampled here spans insurance, consumer credit/FCRA, prisoner Eighth Amendment, declaratory judgment, ICFA/IUDTPA consumer fraud, and embezzlement/fiduciary-duty.
- Nature-of-suit is only partially reported in the case-level docket metadata.
Pending matters in the official report
Reported by the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts under the Civil Justice Reform Act, as of March 31, 2026.
| Motions pending more than six months | 0 |
| Bench trials submitted more than six months | 0 |
| Bankruptcy appeals pending more than six months | 0 |
| Social Security appeals pending more than six months | 0 |
| Civil cases pending more than three years | 20 |
| Report | Motions over six months | Cases over three years |
|---|---|---|
| Mar 2026 | 0 | 20 |
| Sep 2025 | 0 | 21 |
| Mar 2025 | 0 | 21 |
| Sep 2024 | 0 | 22 |
| Mar 2024 | 0 | 29 |
| Sep 2023 | 0 | 32 |
| Mar 2023 | 2 | 30 |
| Sep 2022 | 0 | 26 |
| Mar 2022 | 0 | 27 |
| Sep 2021 | 0 | 29 |
| Mar 2021 | 0 | 27 |
| Sep 2020 | 0 | 23 |
A snapshot on that date: matters listed may since have been decided or reassigned. A motion referred to a magistrate judge is counted for both judges. Motions in multidistrict litigation, section 2255 cases and Social Security appeals are not counted, and a very large three-year count is generally a multidistrict docket. Source: Appendix A of the report (PDF); about the report.
How long civil cases take in this court
For the whole of U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, not for Judge Ellis: median time from filing to disposition of the civil cases the court closed in the 12 months ending September 30, 2025, as reported by the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts.
| Cases | Median time | |
|---|---|---|
| All civil cases closed | 12,205 | 5.9 months |
| Closed with no court action | 4,300 | 7 months |
| Closed before pretrial | 7,558 | 5.4 months |
| Closed during or after pretrial | 305 | 12.6 months |
| Closed during trial | 42 | 49.5 months |
| 12 months ending | Cases closed | Median time |
|---|---|---|
| Sep 2025 | 12,205 | 5.9 months |
| Sep 2024 | 9,700 | 6.8 months |
| Sep 2023 | 7,093 | 6 months |
| Sep 2022 | 6,841 | 7.3 months |
| Sep 2021 | 9,703 | 15.1 months |
| Sep 2020 | 8,046 | 10.6 months |
| Sep 2019 | 8,134 | 7.4 months |
The table leaves out prisoner petitions, land condemnations, deportation reviews, recovery of overpayments and enforcement of judgments, and reports no median for fewer than 10 cases. A district that closed a large multidistrict litigation in the period shows very large counts and long medians for that year. Source: Table C-5, U.S. District Courts (spreadsheet).
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