Ronald A. Guzmán

U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois Appointed by Bill Clinton (Democratic) 4 signed orders read

How Judge Guzmán decides

Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.

What persuades

On a res judicata / claim-preclusion defense he demands a genuine final judgment on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction, and he applies Illinois preclusion law precisely: an unreviewed IHRC administrative decision gets no preclusive effect in federal court, and an Illinois dismissal for want of prosecution is NOT an adjudication on the merits (distinguishing federal Rule 41(b)). He will not build the moving party's preclusion argument for it.

“the Court has no basis on which to conclude that Plaintiff’s IDHR complaint and subsequent proceedings preclude her claims here.”

On a Lanham Act trade-dress claim he requires the asserted trade dress to be described in concrete, specific detail — stripping out conclusory adjectives — so the court and defendant can identify the distinctive, non-functional features; labels like 'unique' and 'recognizable' do not state a claim. Photographs are not required but detailed feature descriptions are.

“Simply using conclusory words like “unique” and “recognizable” does not make it so.”

In employment cases he applies the Seventh Circuit's materially-adverse-action requirement: a written warning (or a Hatch Act warning letter) is not an adverse employment action, and a claim already fully litigated through an administrative tribunal and affirmed on appeal is barred by res judicata. Unexhausted Title VII theories are dismissed.

“A written warning, however, does not constitute an adverse action.”

Procedural preferences

He is solicitous of pro se litigants' procedural footing: he construed a pro se plaintiff's misfiled factual allegations as part of her complaint, granted leave to amend to consolidate them, and (on the other side) confirmed the required pro se LR 56.1 'Notice to Pro Se Litigant' had been served before treating unopposed summary-judgment facts as admitted.

“the Court grants leave for Plaintiff to file the proposed second amended complaint in full.”

Cautions

He enforces the PLRA exhaustion requirement strictly against prisoner plaintiffs: a detainee who did not appeal a disciplinary conviction or file a grievance cannot have the merits of the resulting due-process claims considered, and an unopposed, LR 56.1-noticed summary-judgment motion will have its facts deemed admitted.

“Because the record establishes that plaintiff did not exhaust administrative remedies, the Court cannot consider the merits of his due process claims.”

Motion outcomes

Counted from classified signed orders only. Percentages are shown only where the sample is large enough to be meaningful; smaller samples are reported as raw counts.

Motions to dismiss
N = 3
Granted: 1Granted in part: 1Denied: 1 counts only
Motion for leave to amend
N = 1
Granted: 1 counts only
Summary judgment
N = 1
Granted: 1 counts only

A "1 of 1" is one ruling, not a tendency. Treat small samples as illustrative, not predictive.

Signed rulings

A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.

Roldan v. Coca Cola Refreshments, USA, Ltd.
1:20-cv-00305 · 2020-10-13
Motions to dismiss (defendant) Denied

“For the reasons stated below, Defendant’s motion to dismiss [40] is denied.”

Motion for leave to amend (plaintiff) Granted

“Plaintiff’s motion for leave to file a second amended complaint is granted.”

Lewis v. Donahoe (Postmaster General)
1:14-cv-06707 · 2015-06-18
Motions to dismiss (defendant) Granted

“For the reasons stated above, Defendant’s motion to dismiss is granted. Civil case terminated.”

Plum Markets, LLC v. Compass Group USA, Inc.
1:20-cv-06759 · 2021-02-01
Motions to dismiss (defendant) Granted in part

“Compass Group USA, Inc.’s motion to dismiss [9] is granted in part. The trade dress claim is dismissed without prejudice to repleading. ... The rest of the motion to dismiss is denied.”

Perkins v. Cook County Municipality
1:12-cv-02494 · 2013-10-10
Summary judgment (defendant) Granted

“defendants’ motion for summary judgment is granted [45] and this case is terminated.”

Caseload & timing

From public federal docket records for this judge.

Median case duration in the sampled dockets: 42.5 days (N = 10).

Sampled from a 2023 filing cohort (Guzmán in senior status). Mix: immigration mandamus/APA (Mayorkas/Garland delay suits), personal injury (incl. pharmaceutical product), consumer/FDCPA, ERISA/union pension-fund collections, and commercial/contract. NOTE the durations below are unusually short for a senior judge (see caveat) and likely include stipulated/administrative terminations and possible reassignments, not contested merits dispositions.