Robert William Gettleman

U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois Appointed by Bill Clinton (Democratic) 17 signed orders read

How Judge Gettleman decides

Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.

What persuades

He reads the probate exception to federal jurisdiction narrowly (post-Marshall v. Marshall): a breach-of-fiduciary-duty or tort claim against a trustee that does NOT ask the court to probate a will or administer an estate stays in federal court on diversity. Frame trust/estate-adjacent disputes as tort claims for damages, not as requests to administer the res.

“if a claim does not involve the probate of a will or the administration of a probate estate, a federal court may adjudicate the matter provided there is a basis for federal jurisdiction”

He allows pleading in the alternative under Rule 8: a quantum-meruit / unjust-enrichment count survives a motion to dismiss even where the plaintiff also alleges an express (here unenforceable) contract. Plead the restitution theory alongside the contract claim rather than electing.

“Pursuant to Fed. Civ. P. 8(e)(2), a plaintiff may plead contradictory claims in the alternative.”

In firearm-possession prosecutions he applies the Bruen 'text, history, and tradition' test rigorously and places the burden on the government: he has held 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)'s permanent, categorical lifetime ban on firearm possession by all felons unconstitutional as applied, finding the government's historical analogues (loyalty-oath laws, capital/estate-forfeiture laws) impose neither a 'comparable burden' nor are 'relevantly similar.' A defendant raising a Second Amendment challenge to a felon-in-possession charge has found a receptive forum; the government must marshal a genuine historical-tradition record, not a list of regulations.

“the government has not met its burden under Bruen to prove this nation’s history and tradition of firearm regulation with historical evidence of laws that authorized capital punishment and estate forfeiture for felonies.”

Procedural preferences

On a 12(b)(3) improper-venue motion he prefers to TRANSFER under 28 U.S.C. §1406(a) rather than dismiss, particularly where both parties identify a district where venue is proper. He resolves venue on affidavits and treats unrefuted facts in the movant's affidavit as true. A plaintiff opposing a venue challenge must submit evidence (an affidavit), not just argument in a response brief.

“the court grants defendant’s motion [Doc. 4] in part and transfers this action to the Central District of California pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1406(a).”

He will not convert a 12(b)(6) motion to summary judgment merely because the parties file affidavits; he elects to ignore the extrinsic material and decide the motion on the pleadings.

“The submission of facts outside the allegations of the complaint is improper under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) and the court has elected to ignore the affidavits rather than convert the motion to one for summary judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56.”

On summary judgment he insists on strict compliance with Local Rule 56.1: a party that fails to respond to the movant's numbered statement of facts has those facts deemed admitted, which can be dispositive. Always file a complete, record-cited L.R. 56.1 response.

“Accordingly, the court deems all of plaintiff’s 56.1 statements admitted.”

Cautions

Illinois statute of frauds is enforced on a five-year-plus oral contract: the partial-performance exception is equitable and is NOT available to a plaintiff who seeks only money damages (as opposed to specific performance). If you must rely on an oral multi-year agreement, plead for equitable relief or a restitution theory, not just damages.

“the partial performance exception is an equitable remedy and therefore is unavailable to [plaintiff], who seeks only money damages.”

In TILA rescission cases he applies Regulation Z's 'consumer' definition strictly: a non-titled spouse with only possessory/homestead rights in the dwelling is not entitled to a Notice of Right to Rescind, and the absence of an ownership interest defeats the entire rescission claim.

“Without an ownership interest, she is not a ‘consumer’ under Regulation Z and was not entitled to notice under TILA.”

He recognizes a 'good-faith' affirmative defense for private parties sued under §1983 for relying on a then-valid state statute later held unconstitutional. A litigant seeking retrospective damages for conduct that was lawful under controlling precedent at the time (the Janus fair-share-fee scenario) should expect that defense to bar recovery.

“Defendant AFSCME followed the law and could not reasonably anticipate that the law would change. Consequently, the court concludes that the good faith defense applies, and plaintiff is not entitled to any damages.”

He treats the Illinois 735 ILCS 5/2-622 affidavit-of-merit ('healing-art malpractice') requirement as substantive law that applies in federal court, and enforces it strictly: a conclusory §2-622 report that does not describe the deficient conduct, explain why it was negligent, or state the standard of care will draw a dismissal (typically without prejudice and with leave to file a compliant report). File a detailed, reasoned merit report with any medical-negligence complaint.

“this court concludes that § 622 is a substantive requirement that applies in federal court”

Signed rulings

A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.

Bleecker v. Krantz (Edward G. Krantz Trust)
1:05-cv-07309 · 2006-09-27
Motions to dismiss (defendant) Denied

“For the reasons discussed above, defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is denied.”

Bills v. BNC Mortgage, Inc.
1:06-cv-03283 · 2006-11-03
Motions to dismiss (defendant) Granted

“For the reasons discussed above, defendants’ motion to dismiss is granted.”

Rose Importing and Distributing, L.L.C. v. Seesaw, Inc.
1:06-cv-03623 · 2007-02-21
Motions to dismiss (defendant) Granted in part

“For the reasons stated herein, defendant's motion to dismiss Count I is granted. The defendant’s motion to dismiss Count II is denied.”

Janus v. American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, Council 31 (AFSCME) — on remand
1:15-cv-01235 · 2019-03-18
Summary judgment (defendant) Granted

“defendant AFSCME’s motion [Doc. 175] is granted and plaintiff’s motion [Doc. 177] is denied.”

Summary judgment (plaintiff) Denied

“Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment [Doc. 177] is denied.”

Carrington v. The Israel Emergency Alliance d/b/a StandWithUs
1:21-cv-03713 · 2022-04-08
Motions to dismiss (defendant) Granted in part

“the court grants defendant’s motion [Doc. 4] in part and transfers this action to the Central District of California pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1406(a).”

Salem v. Kaupas
1:12-cv-03141 · 2014-06-13
Summary judgment (defendant) Granted

“For the foregoing reasons, defendants’ motion for summary judgment is granted.”

Rule 56d continuance (plaintiff) Denied

“Thus, plaintiff has failed to comply with the requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d) and his request is denied.”

Schindler v. Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois
1:08-cv-06703 · 2009-08-20
Motions to dismiss (defendant) Granted

“For the foregoing reasons, defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint is granted. Counts IV and V of the complaint are dismissed with prejudice for failure to state federal claims; the remaining counts are dismissed without prejudice.”

Ortiz v. United States
1:13-cv-07626 · 2014-02-19
Motions to dismiss (defendant) Granted

“For the foregoing reasons, defendant’s motion to dismiss is granted without prejudice. ... plaintiff is given leave to file an amended complaint, with an adequate § 622 report, on or before March 17, 2014.”

Pascua v. Jewel Food Stores, Inc.
1:20-cv-02510 · 2022-04-07
Summary judgment (defendant) Granted

“For the reasons stated above, defendant’s motion for summary judgment (Doc. 61) is granted. Civil case terminated.”

U.S. Bank N.A. v. Hauger
1:13-cv-06690 · 2015-04-01
Summary judgment (plaintiff) Granted

“For the reasons stated above, the court grants plaintiff's motion for summary judgment (Doc. 34) and enters judgment in favor of plaintiff U.S. Bank N.A. and against defendants Kenneth E. Hauger and Marie E. Hauger”

Motion to appoint special commissioner (plaintiff) Granted

“and grants plaintiff’s motion for appointment of a special commissioner (Doc. 37).”

Frigon v. Pacific Indemnity Co.
1:05-cv-06214 · 2007-03-14
Motion for reconsideration (defendant) Denied

“Accordingly, defendant’s motion to reconsider is denied.”

Lemon v. Chicago Police Department
1:10-cv-01820 · 2011-01-03
Motion to appoint counsel (plaintiff) Denied

“The plaintiff’s renewed motion for appointment of counsel [#43] is denied.”

Motion for extension of time (plaintiff) Granted

“However, the plaintiff’s motion for an extension of time [#45] is granted.”

Default judgment (plaintiff) Denied

“Finally, the plaintiff’s motion for default judgment is denied. All of the defendants have responded to the complaint by way of a motion to dismiss.”

Caseload & timing

From public federal docket records for this judge.

Median case duration in the sampled dockets: 113.5 days (N = 16).

The reviewed cases come from 2021 and 2022 filing cohorts together with current matters. As a senior judge he continues to handle 'Schedule A' intellectual-property and counterfeiting suits, consumer-credit claims, ERISA and insurance disputes, employment and civil-rights cases, and trademark and copyright matters. Criminal cases are excluded from the duration sample, and current 2026 civil filings remain pending.

Put Judge Gettleman's record to work

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Opens in Ezel Pro. Every answer is grounded in Judge Gettleman's own signed orders and cites them.