Robert William Gettleman
How Judge Gettleman decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
He reads the probate exception to federal jurisdiction narrowly (post-Marshall v. Marshall): a breach-of-fiduciary-duty or tort claim against a trustee that does NOT ask the court to probate a will or administer an estate stays in federal court on diversity. Frame trust/estate-adjacent disputes as tort claims for damages, not as requests to administer the res.
“if a claim does not involve the probate of a will or the administration of a probate estate, a federal court may adjudicate the matter provided there is a basis for federal jurisdiction”
He allows pleading in the alternative under Rule 8: a quantum-meruit / unjust-enrichment count survives a motion to dismiss even where the plaintiff also alleges an express (here unenforceable) contract. Plead the restitution theory alongside the contract claim rather than electing.
“Pursuant to Fed. Civ. P. 8(e)(2), a plaintiff may plead contradictory claims in the alternative.”
Procedural preferences
On a 12(b)(3) improper-venue motion he prefers to TRANSFER under 28 U.S.C. §1406(a) rather than dismiss, particularly where both parties identify a district where venue is proper. He resolves venue on affidavits and treats unrefuted facts in the movant's affidavit as true. A plaintiff opposing a venue challenge must submit evidence (an affidavit), not just argument in a response brief.
“the court grants defendant’s motion [Doc. 4] in part and transfers this action to the Central District of California pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1406(a).”
He will not convert a 12(b)(6) motion to summary judgment merely because the parties file affidavits; he elects to ignore the extrinsic material and decide the motion on the pleadings.
“The submission of facts outside the allegations of the complaint is improper under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) and the court has elected to ignore the affidavits rather than convert the motion to one for summary judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56.”
Cautions
Illinois statute of frauds is enforced on a five-year-plus oral contract: the partial-performance exception is equitable and is NOT available to a plaintiff who seeks only money damages (as opposed to specific performance). If you must rely on an oral multi-year agreement, plead for equitable relief or a restitution theory, not just damages.
“the partial performance exception is an equitable remedy and therefore is unavailable to [plaintiff], who seeks only money damages.”
In TILA rescission cases he applies Regulation Z's 'consumer' definition strictly: a non-titled spouse with only possessory/homestead rights in the dwelling is not entitled to a Notice of Right to Rescind, and the absence of an ownership interest defeats the entire rescission claim.
“Without an ownership interest, she is not a “consumer” under Regulation Z and was not entitled to notice under TILA.”
He recognizes a 'good-faith' affirmative defense for private parties sued under §1983 for relying on a then-valid state statute later held unconstitutional. A litigant seeking retrospective damages for conduct that was lawful under controlling precedent at the time (the Janus fair-share-fee scenario) should expect that defense to bar recovery.
“Defendant AFSCME followed the law and could not reasonably anticipate that the law would change. Consequently, the court concludes that the good faith defense applies, and plaintiff is not entitled to any damages.”
Motion outcomes
Counted from classified signed orders only. Percentages are shown only where the sample is large enough to be meaningful; smaller samples are reported as raw counts.
| Motions to dismiss N = 4 |
Granted: 1Granted in part: 2Denied: 1 | counts only |
| Summary judgment N = 2 |
Granted: 1Denied: 1 | counts only |
A "1 of 1" is one ruling, not a tendency. Treat small samples as illustrative, not predictive.
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“For the reasons discussed above, defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is denied.”
“For the reasons discussed above, defendants’ motion to dismiss is granted.”
“For the reasons stated herein, defendant's motion to dismiss Count I is granted. The defendant’s motion to dismiss Count II is denied.”
“defendant AFSCME’s motion [Doc. 175] is granted and plaintiff’s motion [Doc. 177] is denied.”
“Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment [Doc. 177] is denied.”
“the court grants defendant’s motion [Doc. 4] in part and transfers this action to the Central District of California pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1406(a).”
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
Median case duration in the sampled dockets: 113.5 days (N = 16).
Sampled via two filing windows (2021 and 2022) plus a current-docket pull. As a senior judge he still draws a full mix: 'Schedule A' IP/counterfeiting suits, FCRA/consumer-credit (TransUnion), ERISA/insurance, employment & civil-rights (incl. prisoner), trademark/copyright, and a criminal calendar (cr cases excluded from the duration sample). Current 2026 filings remain pending.