Michael T. Mason
How Judge Mason decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
On Social Security review he applies ordinary substantial-evidence review and will remand where the ALJ 'cherry-picks' the record — selectively crediting a claimant's daily activities while ignoring the limitations and breaks the claimant described — rather than building a logical bridge from the evidence. Counsel appealing an ALJ denial before him should foreground the parts of the record the ALJ omitted.
“The ALJ is not permitted to "cherry pick" from Claimant's testimony about his capabilities to support a denial of benefits.”
He guards the line between administrative fact-finding and medical judgment: an ALJ may not substitute his own lay reading of a clinical test (here, 'normal' circulation/nerve tests) for a physician's view of what it means for a disease's symptoms. A useful remand argument is that the ALJ filled an evidentiary gap with lay opinion.
“The ALJ, however, is not a physician qualified to make a determination about what a normal circulation and nerve test may mean for sarcoidosis symptoms in the legs.”
Procedural preferences
On discovery he enforces the Rule 26(b)(4)(B) consulting-(non-testifying-)expert privilege strictly: he will compel a party to produce the central piece of physical evidence for the opponent's non-destructive testing AND bar the producing party's counsel from attending or videotaping it, treating the choice of what and how to test as protected attorney work product. A party fearing spoliation should negotiate documentation of condition, not insist on attending.
“Rule 26(b)(4)(B) protects against the disclosure of an attorney's mental impressions, conclusions, opinions or legal theories, including the decisions about what to test and how.”
Cautions
He routinely taxes costs against a losing party under Rule 54(d)(1) / 28 U.S.C. 1920 and will overrule a non-prevailing plaintiff's objections; a plaintiff who loses on the merits before him should expect a bill of costs to follow.
“defendant's request that this Court tax costs against Plaintiff Sharon Holyfield-Cooper and in favor of the Board of Education of the City of Chicago in the amount of $2,522.10 [82] is granted. Plaintiff's objections are overruled.”
Motion outcomes
Counted from classified signed orders only. Percentages are shown only where the sample is large enough to be meaningful; smaller samples are reported as raw counts.
| Motion in limine N = 5 |
Granted: 1Granted in part: 2Denied: 2 | counts only |
| Social security review N = 2 |
Granted: 1Denied: 1 | counts only |
| Motions to compel N = 2 |
Granted: 2 | counts only |
| Bill of costs N = 1 |
Granted: 1 | counts only |
A "1 of 1" is one ruling, not a tendency. Treat small samples as illustrative, not predictive.
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“For the reasons set forth below, Claimant's motion for summary judgment is granted, and the Commissioner's cross-motion is denied.”
“For the reasons set forth below, Hodges' motion for summary judgment is denied and the Commissioner's motion for summary judgment is granted.”
“For the reasons stated above, Defendant's motion is granted. Plaintiff is to produce the Drill to Defendant by January 19, 2010. Plaintiff's counsel is not permitted to be present during the testing and inspection of the Drill, nor is he allowed to videotape the testing.”
“plaintiff's Motion in Limine No. 1 to Bar Evidence that Plaintiff and Co-Arrestee Met with an Attorney at the Glenview Police Station [48] is granted; plaintiff's Motion in Limine No. 2 to Bar Certain Evidence Related to Ronald Allen's Criminal History [49] is granted in part and denied in part; and plaintiff's Renewed Motion to Compel Answers to Interrogatory No. 13 [43] is granted.”
“plaintiff's Motion in Limine No. 2 to Bar Certain Evidence Related to Ronald Allen's Criminal History [49] is granted in part and denied in part”
“plaintiff's Renewed Motion to Compel Answers to Interrogatory No. 13 [43] is granted.”
“Defendants' Motion in Limine No. 1 to Bar Evidence of Lost Wages and Legal Bills [45] is denied”
“defendants' Motion in Limine No. 2 to Bar Plaintiff from Disclosing the Private Financial Matters of the Individual Defendants or in the Alternative to Bar Disclosure of Net Worth Until Such Time as Those Issues Survive Motion for Directed Verdict [46] is granted in part”
“defendant's Motion in Limine No. 3 to Bar Plaintiff From Raising by Inference or Otherwise that Defendants Published Newspaper Articles About Her [47] is denied.”
“For the foregoing reasons, pursuant to Rule 54(d)(1) and 28 U.S.C. §1920, defendant's request that this Court tax costs against Plaintiff Sharon Holyfield-Cooper and in favor of the Board of Education of the City of Chicago in the amount of $2,522.10 [82] is granted. Plaintiff's objections are overruled. Enter Bill of Costs.”
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
Mason's enumerable docket docket under his name is dominated by criminal/government miscellaneous matters typical of a magistrate judge on duty (search-warrant applications, parcel/property seizure and forfeiture proceedings), all opened and closed the same day. His civil reasoning work — Social Security appeals, referred discovery and pretrial motions, motions in limine, and Reports and Recommendations to district judges — is reflected in the GovInfo reasoning layer, not in an enumerable assigned-case list.