Matthew F. Kennelly
How Judge Kennelly decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
He treats access to the courthouse functionally: a complaint counts as 'filed' for the statute of limitations the moment the clerk receives it, even without the filing fee or a granted IFP petition, so a fee/IFP gap does not time-bar an otherwise-timely suit.
“a complaint is considered to have been filed for statute of limitations purposes when the court clerk receives the complaint, not when it is formally filed in compliance with all applicable rules involving filing fees and the like.”
In TCPA cases he draws a sharp direct-vs-vicarious liability line: a creditor is not directly liable for a debt collector's robocalls unless the creditor itself initiated the calls; liability otherwise must run through federal common-law agency.
“direct liability could only attach where to the person or entity who actually initiated the unlawful phone calls.”
In pharmaceutical failure-to-warn cases he applies the learned-intermediary doctrine but reads the prescribing physician's deposition skeptically: hedged 'I believe' testimony about what the doctor knew of a drug's risks, and the risk that the doctor was retrojecting later-acquired knowledge, creates a triable fact issue that defeats summary judgment.
“it would not be unreasonable for a jury to find based on the totality of these statements that Dr. Kochendorfer could not say what—if anything—he knew about the risks of TRT at the time he prescribed AndroGel to Kenneth.”
Procedural preferences
A pending JPML transfer motion does not automatically buy a stay before him; he weighs judicial economy against prejudice and will keep a high-profile case moving (here a request for injunctive relief alleging ongoing harm) rather than wait for the MDL panel.
“the potential prejudice to the plaintiffs that would result from a stay outweighs the interests of judicial economy and the potential for hardship to the defendants and the government that would accompany denial of a stay.”
He defers to valid arbitration agreements: where a dispute was sent to arbitration he will confirm the award and dismiss the parallel suit rather than re-examine the merits, denying a losing party's motion to vacate absent a recognized statutory ground.
“the Court grants Mr. Leonard's motion to amend his complaint [24] but also grants defendants' motions to dismiss [12] [14] and their motion to confirm the arbitration award.”
Cautions
Equitable tolling is granted 'sparingly' -- ongoing settlement negotiations do NOT toll a Title VII filing deadline, because nothing stops a plaintiff from filing suit while still negotiating. File within the 90 days regardless of settlement talks.
“The doctrine of equitable tolling ... is applied 'sparingly.' ... Batchelor's settlement negotiations do not warrant tolling the ninety-day limitation period.”
Quasi-judicial immunity is broad: a non-judge entity acting at the direction of a court (e.g. a court-appointed foreclosure-sale corporation) is absolutely immune from suit for those acts.
“both the Supreme Court and the Seventh Circuit have held that a party does not need to be a judge to be entitled to judicial (or quasi-judicial) immunity.”
He enforces summary-judgment forfeiture strictly: an opposing party that fails to develop an argument against a moving party's challenge to a particular claim waives it, and the claim is dismissed even if the headline claims survive. Brief every claim in the SJ response.
“perfunctory, undeveloped arguments without discussion or citation to pertinent legal authority are waived”
Motion outcomes
Counted from classified signed orders only. Percentages are shown only where the sample is large enough to be meaningful; smaller samples are reported as raw counts.
| Summary judgment N = 9 |
Granted: 4Granted in part: 3Denied: 2 | counts only |
| Motions to dismiss N = 7 |
Granted: 5Denied: 2 | counts only |
| Motion for leave to amend N = 2 |
Granted: 2 | counts only |
| Motion for leave to file N = 1 |
Granted: 1 | counts only |
| Motion for sanctions N = 1 |
Moot / procedural: 1 | counts only |
| Motion to confirm arbitration N = 1 |
Granted: 1 | counts only |
| Motion to exclude N = 1 |
Denied: 1 | counts only |
| Motions to remand N = 1 |
Denied: 1 | counts only |
| Motions to stay N = 1 |
Denied: 1 | counts only |
| Motion to vacate arbitration N = 1 |
Denied: 1 | counts only |
A "1 of 1" is one ruling, not a tendency. Treat small samples as illustrative, not predictive.
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“For the reasons stated above, the Court denies defendant's motion for a stay (Case No. 06 C 2680, docket no. 18; Case No. 06 C 2837, docket no. 19).”
“Defendants' motion for leave to file supplemental authority is granted (Case No. 06 C 2680, docket no. 21; Case No. 06 C 2837, docket no. 27).”
“For the reasons stated above, the Court denies Aramark's motion to dismiss [docket no. 42].”
“The Court grants defendant Schonecker's motion to dismiss [docket no. 31].”
“For the foregoing reasons, the Court denies Steven Lang's motions for summary judgment [docket nos. 185, 188], grants JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A.'s motion for summary judgment [docket no. 171], and grants TCF National Bank's motion for summary judgment [docket no. 180].”
“For the foregoing reasons, the Court denies Steven Lang's motions for summary judgment [docket nos. 185, 188], grants JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A.'s motion for summary judgment [docket no. 171], and grants TCF National Bank's motion for summary judgment [docket no. 180].”
“For the foregoing reasons, the Court denies Steven Lang's motions for summary judgment [docket nos. 185, 188], grants JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A.'s motion for summary judgment [docket no. 171], and grants TCF National Bank's motion for summary judgment [docket no. 180].”
“TCF National Bank's motion for discovery sanctions is denied as moot [docket no. 207].”
“the Court grants defendant's motion for summary judgment [docket no. 44] and directs the Clerk to enter summary judgment in favor of the defendant.”
“For the reasons stated above, the Court grants plaintiffs' motion for leave to amend [docket no. 131].”
“For the reasons stated above, the Court grants plaintiff's motion for summary judgment [docket no. 118].”
“For the reasons stated above, the Court grants defendant Judicial Service Corporation's motion to dismiss [docket no. 44].”
“For the reasons discussed above, the Court dismisses the claims of plaintiff Charlie Bernaix for lack of personal jurisdiction.”
“The Court also denies plaintiffs' motion to remand.”
“For the reasons stated above, the Court denies defendant's motion to dismiss [dkt. no. 17].”
“For the reasons stated above, the Court grants defendant's motion to dismiss and directs the Clerk to enter judgment dismissing the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.”
“the Court denies AbbVie's motion to exclude Dr. Ardehali's specific causation testimony, grants AbbVie's motion for summary judgment on Papandrea's claims for negligence, breach of implied warranty, fraud, and negligent misrepresentation, and denies AbbVie's motion for summary judgment on Papandrea's claims for strict liability failure to warn, strict liability design defect, breach of express warranty, and loss of consortium [dkt. no. 20].”
“the Court denies AbbVie's motion to exclude Dr. Ardehali's specific causation testimony, grants AbbVie's motion for summary judgment on Papandrea's claims for negligence, breach of implied warranty, fraud, and negligent misrepresentation, and denies AbbVie's motion for summary judgment on Papandrea's claims for strict liability failure to warn, strict liability design defect, breach of express warranty, and loss of consortium [dkt. no. 20].”
“the Court denies the defendants' motion for summary judgment with respect to vicarious liability and claim preclusion but grants the motion with respect to direct liability [dkt. no. 136].”
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
Median case duration in the sampled dockets: 440 days (N = 3).
Even on senior status (since 2021-10-07) Kennelly carries a full docket with heavy MDL/mass-tort work. The 2026 slice is dominated by a wave of out-of-network healthcare-reimbursement suits against MultiPlan/Claritev (e.g. Rehability/Elite Chiropractic/Vega/U Matter Luxury Resort v. MultiPlan), plus ERISA (Central States Pension Fund). The 2015-2016 slice is dominated by Testosterone Replacement Therapy (TRT) MDL 2545 member cases (Teague v. Endo, Landry v. Pfizer [365 product liability], Hall v. Abbott, Sellers v. Actavis) plus federal criminal matters. Nature-of-suit largely unreported in docket case-level metadata for these slices.