Marvin E. Aspen
How Judge Aspen rules, drawn from 9 signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
How Judge Aspen decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
In patronage / First Amendment-employment cases he follows Riley v. Blagojevich: the question is the 'inherent powers' of the office as set out in the official position description, not what the particular officeholder actually did day to day. A plaintiff who attacks only his personal lack of discretion (not the systematic reliability of the position description) loses; party affiliation can be a lawful requirement for a policymaking post.
“Our focus is on the ‘inherent powers’ of the office, not what any individual officeholder actually does.”
He applies the FAA's strong presumption in favor of arbitration: a broad arbitration clause creates a presumption that all contract disputes are arbitrable, and the party resisting must produce 'the most forceful evidence' of a purpose to exclude the claim. He will compel arbitration of even the question of which contract terms control.
“any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration.”
On a Rule 12(b)(6) preclusion argument he insists on a FINAL judgment on the merits in the prior forum: a state court's denial of a motion to dismiss, or a ruling that contradictory affidavits raise a fact dispute, is not a merits determination and triggers neither res judicata nor collateral estoppel. He distinguishes the cause of action (FDCPA method-of-collection claim) from the underlying debt.
“Absent a final judgment on the merits, neither the doctrine of collateral estoppel, nor res judicata apply.”
In trademark cases, evidence of federal registration and earlier public use can support preliminary relief even without proof of actual consumer confusion when competing marks and products are nearly identical. A party alleging fraudulent procurement must offer specific evidence rather than speculation about what could have been manipulated.
“Absent specific, non-speculative evidence demonstrating that Zhang defrauded the USPTO, we cannot conclude that Zhang’s Amazon.com listing and the information contained therein is a fabrication or that Zhang fraudulently obtained his trademark registration.”
Procedural preferences
He favors abstention/stays over dueling rulings: where a state proceeding is already deciding a dispositive question of state law (e.g., the Illinois statute of limitations), he will sua sponte stay the federal case under Colorado River to avoid piecemeal litigation and inconsistent results, deferring to the state court's expertise in its own law — even with fully-briefed motions to dismiss in front of him.
“we stay the action sua sponte, pending a decision by the Cook County Circuit Court on the issue of whether the applicable statute of limitations bars the Foreclosure Action.”
When invoking an arbitration clause, ask for a STAY, not a dismissal — he follows the Seventh Circuit rule that the proper course is to stay the proceedings rather than dismiss outright, and will deny the dismissal request on that ground even while compelling arbitration.
“the proper course of action when a party seeks to invoke an arbitration clause is to stay the proceedings rather than to dismiss outright”
After a dismissal and judgment entered together, he looks to the substance of a post-judgment request rather than its caption and applies the liberal amendment standard unless futility is certain from the proposed pleading's face.
“it is the substance of a motion that counts, not its label.”
Cautions
He will impose the 'harsh sanction' of Rule 41(b) dismissal with prejudice on a clear record of delay or contumacious conduct, and he holds parties to the EXACT terms of his orders: when he ordered a treating-physician affidavit on deposition competency, a letter from counsel incorporating a three-sentence doctor's note (and filed 19 days late) did not satisfy the order. He weighs the Seventh Circuit's McMahan six factors explicitly.
“Plaintiff did not comply with our Order. First, instead of filing an affidavit or declaration from her treating physician, Plaintiff filed an affidavit from her lawyer”
On summary judgment he disregards conclusory, unsupported argument and inadmissible material: a brief 'replete with unsupported conclusory arguments' and Rule 56.1 statements unsupported by admissible evidence are struck, and he will not credit a plaintiff's self-serving affidavits about his own job duties against the official position description.
“Foster’s brief in opposition to summary judgment is replete with unsupported conclusory arguments.”
Consumer-fraud allegations must identify the concrete statement the buyer actually encountered. An asserted advertising 'theme' or a plaintiff's own added quantity or efficacy gloss will not substitute for a plausibly deceptive representation under the reasonable-consumer standard.
“since plaintiff cannot identify an advertisement that he saw, the court cannot begin to evaluate whether a reasonable consumer could be misled by it.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“For the reasons discussed above, the motion to dismiss is denied.”
“we grant defendant Russell Stover’s motion to stay proceedings and compel arbitration, and deny its motion to dismiss.”
“the proper course of action when a party seeks to invoke an arbitration clause is to stay the proceedings rather than to dismiss outright”
“we grant defendants’ motion for summary judgment on both counts and dismiss the complaint.”
“we grant Defendant’s motion and dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint for want of prosecution with prejudice, and deny Plaintiff’s Second Motion to Substitute her son as party plaintiff.”
“deny Plaintiff’s Second Motion to Substitute her son as party plaintiff.”
In this debt-collection suit, the plaintiff alleged that a Cook County foreclosure action was time-barred under Illinois law. Rather than decide the fully briefed dismissal motions, Judge Aspen stayed the federal case under the Colorado River doctrine because the decisive limitations question was already pending in state court. The court wrote: 'we stay the action sua sponte, pending a decision by the Cook County Circuit Court on the issue of whether the applicable statute of limitations bars the Foreclosure Action.'
“For the foregoing reasons, UAB’s motion to dismiss (Dkt. No. 32) and its motion for a preliminary injunction (Dkt. No. 46) are denied, and Zhang’s motion for a preliminary injunction (Dkt. No. 15) is granted.”
“We overrule Plaintiff’s objections, adopt Magistrate Judge Jantz’s Report and Recommendation, and deny Plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction [3].”
“For the above reasons, the court grants defendants’ motion to dismiss. (Doc. 44). The second amended complaint (Doc. 41) is dismissed with prejudice.”
“For the above reasons, the court construes plaintiff’s motion as a Rule 59(e) motion to alter or amend this court’s previous opinion granting dismissal with prejudice and a Rule 15(a)(2) motion to amend his complaint (Doc. 68). That motion is granted.”
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
Median case duration in the sampled dockets: 207.0 days (N = 9).
Even in senior status Aspen draws a full civil mix plus a criminal calendar: 'Schedule A' trademark/IP enforcement suits, contract (incl. insurance-coverage), consumer-protection class actions (e.g., FDCPA/consumer fraud), civil rights, immigration/labor-certification (APA) review, and personal injury. Criminal dockets excluded from the duration sample.
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