Marvin E. Aspen
How Judge Aspen decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
In patronage / First Amendment-employment cases he follows Riley v. Blagojevich: the question is the 'inherent powers' of the office as set out in the official position description, not what the particular officeholder actually did day to day. A plaintiff who attacks only his personal lack of discretion (not the systematic reliability of the position description) loses; party affiliation can be a lawful requirement for a policymaking post.
“Our focus is on the ‘inherent powers’ of the office, not what any individual officeholder actually does.”
He applies the FAA's strong presumption in favor of arbitration: a broad arbitration clause creates a presumption that all contract disputes are arbitrable, and the party resisting must produce 'the most forceful evidence' of a purpose to exclude the claim. He will compel arbitration of even the question of which contract terms control.
“any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration.”
On a Rule 12(b)(6) preclusion argument he insists on a FINAL judgment on the merits in the prior forum: a state court's denial of a motion to dismiss, or a ruling that contradictory affidavits raise a fact dispute, is not a merits determination and triggers neither res judicata nor collateral estoppel. He distinguishes the cause of action (FDCPA method-of-collection claim) from the underlying debt.
“Absent a final judgment on the merits, neither the doctrine of collateral estoppel, nor res judicata apply.”
Procedural preferences
He favors abstention/stays over dueling rulings: where a state proceeding is already deciding a dispositive question of state law (e.g., the Illinois statute of limitations), he will sua sponte stay the federal case under Colorado River to avoid piecemeal litigation and inconsistent results, deferring to the state court's expertise in its own law — even with fully-briefed motions to dismiss in front of him.
“we stay the action sua sponte, pending a decision by the Cook County Circuit Court on the issue of whether the applicable statute of limitations bars the Foreclosure Action.”
When invoking an arbitration clause, ask for a STAY, not a dismissal — he follows the Seventh Circuit rule that the proper course is to stay the proceedings rather than dismiss outright, and will deny the dismissal request on that ground even while compelling arbitration.
“the proper course of action when a party seeks to invoke an arbitration clause is to stay the proceedings rather than to dismiss outright”
Cautions
He will impose the 'harsh sanction' of Rule 41(b) dismissal with prejudice on a clear record of delay or contumacious conduct, and he holds parties to the EXACT terms of his orders: when he ordered a treating-physician affidavit on deposition competency, a letter from counsel incorporating a three-sentence doctor's note (and filed 19 days late) did not satisfy the order. He weighs the Seventh Circuit's McMahan six factors explicitly.
“Plaintiff did not comply with our Order. First, instead of filing an affidavit or declaration from her treating physician, Plaintiff filed an affidavit from her lawyer”
On summary judgment he disregards conclusory, unsupported argument and inadmissible material: a brief 'replete with unsupported conclusory arguments' and Rule 56.1 statements unsupported by admissible evidence are struck, and he will not credit a plaintiff's self-serving affidavits about his own job duties against the official position description.
“Foster’s brief in opposition to summary judgment is replete with unsupported conclusory arguments.”
Motion outcomes
Counted from classified signed orders only. Percentages are shown only where the sample is large enough to be meaningful; smaller samples are reported as raw counts.
| Motions to dismiss N = 3 |
Granted: 1Denied: 1Moot / procedural: 1 | counts only |
| Motion to compel arbitration N = 1 |
Granted: 1 | counts only |
| Summary judgment N = 1 |
Granted: 1 | counts only |
| Motion to substitute N = 1 |
Denied: 1 | counts only |
A "1 of 1" is one ruling, not a tendency. Treat small samples as illustrative, not predictive.
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“For the reasons discussed above, the motion to dismiss is denied.”
“we grant defendant Russell Stover’s motion to stay proceedings and compel arbitration, and deny its motion to dismiss.”
“the proper course of action when a party seeks to invoke an arbitration clause is to stay the proceedings rather than to dismiss outright”
“we grant defendants’ motion for summary judgment on both counts and dismiss the complaint.”
“we grant Defendant’s motion and dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint for want of prosecution with prejudice, and deny Plaintiff’s Second Motion to Substitute her son as party plaintiff.”
“deny Plaintiff’s Second Motion to Substitute her son as party plaintiff.”
FDCPA suit premised on the theory that a Cook County foreclosure action against the plaintiff was time-barred under the Illinois statute of limitations. Rather than rule on the fully-briefed motions to dismiss, Aspen sua sponte STAYED the federal case under the Colorado River doctrine (parallel state proceeding; dispositive limitations question already pending in state court). The MTDs were neither granted nor denied — excluded from motion stats per the runbook (substantive signed order that rules on no party motion). Grounding quote: 'we stay the action sua sponte, pending a decision by the Cook County Circuit Court on the issue of whether the applicable statute of limitations bars the Foreclosure Action.'
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
Median case duration in the sampled dockets: 207.0 days (N = 9).
Even in senior status Aspen draws a full civil mix plus a criminal calendar: 'Schedule A' trademark/IP enforcement suits, contract (incl. insurance-coverage), consumer-protection class actions (e.g., FDCPA/consumer fraud), civil rights, immigration/labor-certification (APA) review, and personal injury. Criminal dockets excluded from the duration sample.