Margaret J. Schneider
How Judge Schneider rules, drawn from 16 signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
About Judge Schneider
Margaret J. Schneider took office as a United States Magistrate Judge for the Northern District of Illinois in February 2021. She graduated from the University of Michigan Law School and clerked for Judge Paul V. Niemeyer of the Fourth Circuit. From 2006 to 2021, she served as an Assistant U.S. Attorney in the district's Rockford and Chicago offices.
Judge Schneider's practices and standing orders
Rules for cases before Judge Schneider, as published on the court's website (checked October 8, 2026). Judges revise these often, so confirm the current version on the court's site before you file.
Key rules
Motions
Serve a default judgment motion at least seven days before presentment.
“Service of the motion for default judgment must occur at least 7 days before the motion for default judgment is presented.”
Discovery
Mail summary judgment courtesy materials to chambers within 24 hours of filing.
“A courtesy copy of the memorandum of law, depositions and other materials relied upon in support of the motion (as required by Local Rule 56.1(a)(1)-(3)) or in opposition to the motion (as required by Local Rule 56.1(b)(1)-(3)) must be mailed to chambers within 24 hours of when it is filed on the CM/ECF system.”
Trial
Seek court permission before contacting jurors after trial.
“After the conclusion of a trial, no party, agent, or attorney shall communicate with any members of the petit jury before which the case was tried without first receiving permission of the Court.”
Standing orders for every case in this court
Orders the court applies to all of its cases, whichever judge has them, as published on the court's website (checked October 8, 2026).
How Judge Schneider decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
In Bunton’s benefits appeal, Schneider remanded because the administrative law judge did not explain why the residual-functional-capacity finding omitted a leg-elevation requirement despite treatment notes and testimony supporting it. She also directed the agency to reconsider its symptom-evaluation language.
“Regardless, the Court cannot trace the ALJ’s reasoning in leaving out a leg elevation requirement in this case.”
In Jesse T. v. Kijakazi, she remanded because the administrative law judge's two-sentence listing analysis did not explain whether the claimant could ambulate effectively; she assessed the decision on the grounds the ALJ actually gave.
“This reasoning is only two sentences and is a barebones conclusion. ... This is 'the very type of perfunctory analysis' the Seventh Circuit has 'repeatedly found inadequate to dismiss an impairment as not meeting or equaling a Listing.'”
In Kevin C. M. v. Bisignano, Schneider found the step-four analysis insufficient because it did not adequately establish the claimant’s past job duties or explain the finding that he could perform that work without uncritical reliance on the vocational expert’s label.
“The ALJ must make the administrative findings at step four based on the evidence and the applicable law and not defer uncritically to a VE’s conclusions.”
In a 2026 consent Social Security appeal, she remanded when the ALJ failed to describe the mental demands of past work as SSR 82-62 required.
“However, the ALJ’s decision did not provide any description of the mental demands or duties involved in Plaintiff’s past work, as required by SSR 82-62.”
In another 2026 consent appeal, she affirmed an RFC that addressed concentration and pace through record-specific mental restrictions supported by testimony, treatment records, and assessments.
“The ALJ’s mental restrictions were appropriately based on Plaintiff’s statements, treatment records, and mental health assessments.”
In the Weyers consent appeal, she remanded when an administrative law judge interpreted a later MRI without an expert medical opinion addressing whether it changed the claimant’s functional limits.
“without the aid of an expert medical opinion regarding the December 2018 MRI, the ALJ did not support her decision with substantial evidence.”
Procedural preferences
In Gevas v. Wexford Health Sources, she ordered fuller discovery responses after finding the plaintiff's repeated 'investigation continues' answers evasive, while narrowing several of the defendants' requests on proportionality grounds.
“Plaintiff's responses are evasive and tantamount to no response at all. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(4) ('[A]n evasive or incomplete disclosure, answer, or response must be treated as a failure to disclose, answer, or respond.').”
Cautions
In Pursley v. City of Rockford, she denied the defendants' late request to add limitations defenses because the underlying facts were known earlier and the proposed defenses would be futile.
“The Court denies Defendants' motion because Defendants failed to promptly seek leave to amend, and the proposed amendments would be futile. ... Defendants' affirmative defense that the statute of limitations would bar Plaintiff's IIED claim would not survive a motion to dismiss and is futile.”
In Brooke N. v. Social Security Administration, she recommended dismissing an unrepresented claimant's late civil action because the claimant had sent an administrative appeal instead of filing in federal court despite written instructions.
“pro se litigants are not entitled to a general dispensation from the rules of procedure or court imposed deadlines. ... Plaintiff offers no explanation as to why she did not follow the instructions on appealing the ALJ's decision.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“her motion for summary judgment, Dkt. 14, is granted and the Commissioner's motion for summary judgment, Dkt. 19, is denied. The decision of the Administrative Law Judge is reversed and the case is remanded.”
“the Commissioner's motion for summary judgment, Dkt. 19, is denied. The decision of the Administrative Law Judge is reversed and the case is remanded.”
“Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, Dkt. 12, is granted, the Commissioner's motion for summary judgment, Dkt. 20, is denied, and the decision of the ALJ is reversed and remanded.”
“the Commissioner's motion for summary judgment, Dkt. 20, is denied, and the decision of the ALJ is reversed and remanded.”
“Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment [17] is denied and the Commissioner's motion for summary judgment [24], is granted. The final decision of the Commissioner denying benefits is affirmed.”
“the Commissioner's motion for summary judgment [24], is granted. The final decision of the Commissioner denying benefits is affirmed.”
“Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment is denied and the Commissioner's motion for summary judgment is granted. The decision of the Commissioner is affirmed.”
“the Commissioner's motion for summary judgment is granted. The decision of the Commissioner is affirmed.”
“Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment [16] is denied and the Commissioner's memorandum in support of motion for summary judgment [21] is granted.”
“the Commissioner's memorandum in support of motion for summary judgment [21] is granted.”
“Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment [11] is denied and the Commissioner's motion for summary judgment [17] is granted.”
“the Commissioner's motion for summary judgment [17] is granted.”
“it is this Court's Report and Recommendation to the District Court that Defendant's motion to dismiss (taken as a motion for summary judgment) [13], be granted.”
“Defendants City Administrator for the City of Rockford ... ask the Court for leave to file an amended answer alleging amended affirmative defenses [284]. For the reasons stated below, Defendants' motion is denied. ... For the foregoing reasons, the Court denies Defendants' motion for leave to file amended affirmative defenses.”
“Defendants' motion to compel [93] is granted ... Defendants' request for reimbursement of their costs in bringing their motion to compel is also granted. Defendants must file a bill of costs and supporting documentation by December 30, 2021.”
“Plaintiff's motion to compel [94] is denied.”
“Plaintiff's motion for an update on the status of this motion [104], is denied as moot.”
“it is this Court's Report and Recommendation that the district court grant the Plaintiffs' motion for a default judgment [18] and enter judgment in the amount of $73,674.60 in favor of the Plaintiffs.”
In an interpleader action, the insurer deposited $28,664.67 in policy proceeds and was discharged. After the two claimants agreed to divide the funds equally, Schneider recommended accepting the settlement and directing the clerk to disburse the proceeds and accrued interest.
“Plaintiff’s motion to reverse and remand the Commissioner’s decision [10] is granted and the Commissioner’s motion for summary judgment [13], is denied.”
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
Median case duration in the sampled dockets: 794 days (N = 9).
Median motion-to-ruling time: 273 days (N = 1).
Pending matters in the official report
Reported by the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts under the Civil Justice Reform Act, as of March 31, 2026.
| Motions pending more than six months | 0 |
| Bench trials submitted more than six months | 0 |
| Bankruptcy appeals pending more than six months | 0 |
| Social Security appeals pending more than six months | 0 |
| Civil cases pending more than three years | 2 |
| Report | Motions over six months | Cases over three years |
|---|---|---|
| Mar 2026 | 0 | 2 |
| Sep 2025 | 0 | 2 |
| Mar 2025 | 0 | 1 |
| Sep 2024 | 0 | 16 |
| Mar 2024 | 0 | 18 |
| Sep 2023 | 0 | 3 |
| Mar 2023 | 2 | 0 |
| Sep 2022 | 0 | 0 |
| Mar 2022 | 0 | 0 |
| Sep 2021 | 0 | 1 |
| Mar 2021 | 0 | 0 |
A snapshot on that date: matters listed may since have been decided or reassigned. A motion referred to a magistrate judge is counted for both judges. Motions in multidistrict litigation, section 2255 cases and Social Security appeals are not counted, and a very large three-year count is generally a multidistrict docket. Source: Appendix A of the report (PDF); about the report.
How long civil cases take in this court
For the whole of U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, not for Judge Schneider: median time from filing to disposition of the civil cases the court closed in the 12 months ending September 30, 2025, as reported by the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts.
| Cases | Median time | |
|---|---|---|
| All civil cases closed | 12,205 | 5.9 months |
| Closed with no court action | 4,300 | 7 months |
| Closed before pretrial | 7,558 | 5.4 months |
| Closed during or after pretrial | 305 | 12.6 months |
| Closed during trial | 42 | 49.5 months |
| 12 months ending | Cases closed | Median time |
|---|---|---|
| Sep 2025 | 12,205 | 5.9 months |
| Sep 2024 | 9,700 | 6.8 months |
| Sep 2023 | 7,093 | 6 months |
| Sep 2022 | 6,841 | 7.3 months |
| Sep 2021 | 9,703 | 15.1 months |
| Sep 2020 | 8,046 | 10.6 months |
| Sep 2019 | 8,134 | 7.4 months |
The table leaves out prisoner petitions, land condemnations, deportation reviews, recovery of overpayments and enforcement of judgments, and reports no median for fewer than 10 cases. A district that closed a large multidistrict litigation in the period shows very large counts and long medians for that year. Source: Table C-5, U.S. District Courts (spreadsheet).
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