Manish Suresh Shah
How Judge Shah decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
On a consumer food-labeling claim he applies the 'reasonable consumer' standard rigorously at the pleading stage: a 'Naturally Flavored' qualifier dispels any expectation that a flavor word (e.g. 'Cheese') means a predominant real ingredient, and an ingredient is not a 'characterizing ingredient' unless it is in the product's name. Dictionary definitions and FDA nuances do not set consumer expectations.
“plaintiff hasn't explained why 'Naturally Flavored' wouldn't dispel any expectation of predominantly real cheese that a reasonable consumer might have. To the extent plaintiff is making a deceptive-conduct ICFA claim, it fails.”
He polices administrative exhaustion and EEOC-charge scope strictly: a Title VII claim must be 'like or reasonably related' to the charge (a sex-harassment claim is not reasonably related to a race-only charge), and an Illinois Human Rights Act claim requires submitting the EEOC's determination to the IDHR before suit.
“Gill's sexual harassment claim doesn't even involve the same people or events as her racial discrimination claim. ... Count III is dismissed without prejudice.”
On Illinois premises-liability he reads duty and foreseeability at the level the Illinois Supreme Court set in Marshall, not narrowly: an innkeeper-guest 'special relationship' creates an affirmative duty to protect guests from foreseeable third-party criminal attacks, foreseeability turns on the 'general character of the event' rather than a prior near-identical incident, and breach/causation are jury questions not resolved on a 12(b)(6). A defendant arguing 'no duty / not foreseeable' on a motion to dismiss will usually lose if a special relationship exists.
“Reasonable foreseeability depends on the general character of the event or harm and not its precise nature or manner of occurrence.”
Procedural preferences
He enforces Local Rule 56.1 and Article III standing carefully on summary judgment, and will not weigh competing affidavits: where the movant's and non-movant's sworn accounts conflict on material facts, summary judgment is denied because it 'cannot be used to resolve swearing contests.'
“Cohan's assertion that his and Paloni's statements are entitled to greater weight because they are accompanied by photos would require credibility determinations and weighing the evidence, which is inappropriate at summary judgment.”
He distinguishes Article III standing claim-by-claim. In a BIPA suit he will sever and remand the bare-statutory-violation claims (Sec. 15(a)/(c)) that lack a concrete injury while keeping the Sec. 15(b) informed-consent claim that alleges concrete harm -- so a removed BIPA case can split between federal and state court.
“King's motion to remand, [18], is granted. The claims under BIPA § 15(a) and (c) are severed and remanded to the Circuit Court of Cook County. PeopleNet's motion to dismiss, [14], is denied.”
Cautions
Bad-faith litigation conduct draws sanctions under the court's inherent power, not Rule 11: deliberately evading service of process (even after counsel appears) and stalling the merits is sanctionable, and he will award the opponent's fees as a measured alternative to default.
“Bensenville Hospitality's deliberate evasion of service, compounded with its failure to timely respond to pleadings, was in bad faith. ... Cohan is awarded $2,325 in attorney's fees and $133 in costs.”
A Title VII retaliation claim requires evidence the employer had ACTUAL knowledge of the protected activity. Where there is no evidence the decisionmaker knew of the plaintiff's EEOC charge, the causation element fails at summary judgment.
“even if the EEOC complaint was protected activity, there's no evidence that the Board knew about it ... which means Khan hasn't shown that the Board acted because of her EEOC complaint.”
Motion outcomes
Counted from classified signed orders only. Percentages are shown only where the sample is large enough to be meaningful; smaller samples are reported as raw counts.
| Motions to dismiss N = 5 |
Granted: 3Granted in part: 1Denied: 1 | counts only |
| Summary judgment N = 2 |
Granted: 1Denied: 1 | counts only |
| Motion for sanctions N = 1 |
Granted: 1 | counts only |
| Motions to remand N = 1 |
Granted: 1 | counts only |
A "1 of 1" is one ruling, not a tendency. Treat small samples as illustrative, not predictive.
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“General Mills's motion to dismiss, [18], is granted. Smith's negligent-misrepresentation claim and breach-of-warranty claims are dismissed with prejudice. Her ICFA, common-law fraud, and unjust-enrichment claims are dismissed without prejudice.”
“Defendant's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, [23], is granted and the complaint is dismissed with prejudice. Enter judgment and terminate civil case.”
“Cohan's motion for summary judgment [41] is denied.”
“Cohan's motion for sanctions [34] is granted. Bensenville Hospitality shall pay Cohan $2,458 by June 10, 2016.”
“Defendants' motion for summary judgment, [416], is granted. Enter judgment and terminate civil case.”
“CEC's partial motion to dismiss, [30], is granted. Counts II, III, and V are dismissed without prejudice. Counts IV and VI are dismissed with prejudice.”
“PeopleNet's motion to dismiss, [14], is denied. The complaint states a claim under BIPA § 15(b).”
“King's motion to remand, [18], is granted. The claims under BIPA § 15(a) and (c) are severed and remanded to the Circuit Court of Cook County.”
“Defendant's motion to dismiss, [22], is granted in part, denied in part. Count II is dismissed with prejudice.”
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
Median case duration in the sampled dockets: 90 days (N = 17).
Recent (2025-2026) docket shows a mix typical of an active N.D. Ill. judge: 'Schedule A' IP cases (copyright/trademark -- ALO LLC, Hayward, Endurance Warranty), prisoner civil-rights (Roman v. Stateville), consumer/FDCPA (Densmore v. Firstource), ERISA union benefit-fund collections (Operating Engineers Local 399), employment/Title IX (Doe v. University of Chicago), and banking (Mohovich v. Byline Bank). His written-opinion docket sampled here spans consumer food-labeling/ICFA, BIPA, ADA Title III, COVID religious-liberty, and Title VII employment. Nature-of-suit is only partially reported in docket case-level metadata.