Manish Suresh Shah
How Judge Shah rules, drawn from 24 signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
About Judge Shah
Manish Suresh Shah is a judge of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. Appointed by President Barack Obama, Judge Shah received a commission on May 1, 2014.
Judge Shah's practices and standing orders
Rules for cases before Judge Shah, as published on the court's website (checked October 8, 2026). Judges revise these often, so confirm the current version on the court's site before you file.
Key rules
Motions
File motions at least three business days before the hearing.
“Motions must be filed no later than the third business day before the motion is to be heard.”
Conferences
File a joint status report of no more than five pages by the court’s deadline.
“The parties must file a joint written status report, not to exceed five pages in length by the deadline set by the Court.”
Trial
Seek court permission before contacting jurors after trial.
“After the conclusion of a trial, no party, agent, or attorney shall communicate with any members of the petit jury before which the case was tried without first receiving permission of the Court.”
Standing orders for every case in this court
Orders the court applies to all of its cases, whichever judge has them, as published on the court's website (checked October 8, 2026).
How Judge Shah decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
In Smith v. General Mills Sales, Shah dismissed the food-labeling claim because the “Naturally Flavored” qualifier on the pizza-roll package undermined the alleged expectation of predominantly real cheese.
“plaintiff hasn't explained why 'Naturally Flavored' wouldn't dispel any expectation of predominantly real cheese that a reasonable consumer might have. To the extent plaintiff is making a deceptive-conduct ICFA claim, it fails.”
In Gill v. CEC Employee Group, Shah dismissed the Title VII sexual-harassment claim without prejudice because it involved different people and events from the race claim in the EEOC charge. He also dismissed the state claim for failure to exhaust its administrative route.
“Gill's sexual harassment claim doesn't even involve the same people or events as her racial discrimination claim. ... Count III is dismissed without prejudice.”
In a suit over a hotel guest’s fatal stabbing, Shah denied dismissal of the estate’s premises-liability claim. The alleged hotel-guest relationship and attacker’s visible conduct on the property made a third-party assault plausibly foreseeable at the pleading stage. He separately dismissed the fiancée’s emotional-distress claim.
“Because of their special relationship, Harrah’s had a duty to take reasonable steps to protect Burgarino from third-party assaults, and the one alleged in the complaint fell within the zone of foreseeability.”
In a professional-liability coverage dispute, he begins with the policy's coverage grant before reaching exclusions. A complaint seeking return of unauthorized fees did not allege covered damages or covered professional services, and the separate exclusion for mishandled funds independently defeated coverage.
“The underlying complaint shows that the claims are a dispute over fees—the only harm alleged by the underlying complaint is $31,182.38 in fees Kennelly charged for non-tendered or unauthorized services. A dispute over fees cannot result in ‘Damages’ as defined in the policy and so is not covered.”
Procedural preferences
In Cohan v. Bensenville Hospitality, Shah denied the plaintiff's summary-judgment motion because conflicting sworn accounts about hotel accessibility raised factual disputes. He declined to weigh credibility or choose between those accounts.
“Cohan’s assertion that his and Paloni’s statements are entitled to greater weight because they are accompanied by photos would require credibility determinations and weighing the evidence, which is inappropriate at summary judgment.”
In King v. PeopleNet, Shah severed and remanded the BIPA § 15(a) and (c) claims because the alleged violations did not establish Article III injury. He retained the § 15(b) claim and denied the defendant's motion to dismiss.
“King’s motion to remand, [18], is granted. The claims under BIPA § 15(a) and (c) are severed and remanded to the Circuit Court of Cook County. PeopleNet’s motion to dismiss, [14], is denied.”
In one tax lien case, the court left questions about whether the government properly revoked an earlier lien release for factual development. It denied dismissal where the complaint plausibly alleged enforceable liens.
“Whether the government has followed the proper procedures for reinstating its liens is a factual question that cannot be resolved at this stage of the litigation.”
In a detainee civil rights suit, he deferred a limitations defense at the pleading stage because the complaint did not have to address an affirmative defense. He later granted summary judgment after limited discovery established the injury date and the plaintiff did not contest the motion.
“the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense that need not be addressed in plaintiff’s complaint.”
In the reviewed railway labor dispute, he required the pilot to complete the last internal grievance stage before compelling arbitration, leaving a later suit available after exhaustion.
“The clerk shall enter judgment in favor of defendants, without prejudice to plaintiff filing suit after exhausting administrative remedies.”
In one health-data tracking suit, he denied an adult plaintiff’s request to proceed under initials where medical sensitivity and possible emotional harm did not show a substantial risk of harm sufficient to overcome public access and prejudice to the defendant.
“M.D.F. fails to articulate a substantial risk of harm that could befall him if he litigates using his name.”
Cautions
In Cohan v. Bensenville Hospitality, Shah granted sanctions under the court's inherent authority after the hotel operator evaded service and delayed responding to pleadings. He awarded $2,458 in fees and costs, a lesser sanction than default judgment.
“Bensenville Hospitality’s deliberate evasion of service, compounded with its failure to timely respond to pleadings, was in bad faith. ... Cohan is awarded $2,325 in attorney’s fees and $133 in costs.”
A Title VII retaliation claim requires evidence the employer had ACTUAL knowledge of the protected activity. Where there is no evidence the decisionmaker knew of the plaintiff's EEOC charge, the causation element fails at summary judgment.
“even if the EEOC complaint was protected activity, there's no evidence that the Board knew about it ... which means Khan hasn't shown that the Board acted because of her EEOC complaint.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“General Mills's motion to dismiss, [18], is granted. Smith's negligent-misrepresentation claim and breach-of-warranty claims are dismissed with prejudice. Her ICFA, common-law fraud, and unjust-enrichment claims are dismissed without prejudice.”
“Defendant's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, [23], is granted and the complaint is dismissed with prejudice. Enter judgment and terminate civil case.”
“Cohan's motion for summary judgment [41] is denied.”
“Cohan's motion for sanctions [34] is granted. Bensenville Hospitality shall pay Cohan $2,458 by June 10, 2016.”
“Defendants' motion for summary judgment, [416], is granted. Enter judgment and terminate civil case.”
“CEC's partial motion to dismiss, [30], is granted. Counts II, III, and V are dismissed without prejudice. Counts IV and VI are dismissed with prejudice.”
“PeopleNet's motion to dismiss, [14], is denied. The complaint states a claim under BIPA § 15(b).”
“King's motion to remand, [18], is granted. The claims under BIPA § 15(a) and (c) are severed and remanded to the Circuit Court of Cook County.”
“Defendant's motion to dismiss, [22], is granted in part, denied in part. Count II is dismissed with prejudice.”
“Defendant’s motion to dismiss, [20], is granted in part and denied in part. Plaintiff Fox’s claim is dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction. The claims under the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act, Vermont Consumer Fraud Act, other state consumer protection statutes, breach of express warranty, and unjust enrichment survive in part. The claims for breach of implied warranty, negligent misrepresentation, and fraud are dismissed. All dismissals are without prejudice.”
“Landmark’s motion to dismiss, [8], is granted. Kennelly’s complaint is dismissed with prejudice. Enter judgment and terminate civil case.”
“Defendant’s motion to dismiss, [36], is granted. The federal claims are dismissed with prejudice and the state-law claims are dismissed without prejudice. Enter judgment and terminate civil case.”
“Defendant’s motion to dismiss, [7], is denied.”
“Defendant’s motion for summary judgment [50] is granted.”
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
Median case duration in the sampled dockets: 90 days (N = 17).
Median motion-to-ruling time: 161 days (N = 17).
- His recent docket shows a mix typical of an active N.D.
- Ill. judge: Schedule A intellectual-property cases (copyright and trademark: ALO LLC, Hayward, Endurance Warranty), prisoner civil rights (Roman v. Stateville), consumer and FDCPA matters (Densmore v. Firstsource), ERISA union benefit-fund collections (Operating Engineers Local 399), employment and Title IX (Doe v. University of Chicago), and banking (Mohovich v. Byline Bank).
- His written-opinion docket sampled here spans consumer food-labeling/ICFA, biometric privacy, ADA Title III, COVID religious-liberty, and Title VII employment.
- Nature of suit is only partially reported in the case-level docket metadata.
Pending matters in the official report
Reported by the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts under the Civil Justice Reform Act, as of March 31, 2026.
| Motions pending more than six months | 2 |
| Bench trials submitted more than six months | 0 |
| Bankruptcy appeals pending more than six months | 0 |
| Social Security appeals pending more than six months | 0 |
| Civil cases pending more than three years | 559 |
| Report | Motions over six months | Cases over three years |
|---|---|---|
| Mar 2026 | 2 | 559 |
| Sep 2025 | 0 | 594 |
| Mar 2025 | 3 | 597 |
| Sep 2024 | 17 | 592 |
| Mar 2024 | 6 | 536 |
| Sep 2023 | 5 | 533 |
| Mar 2023 | 8 | 496 |
| Sep 2022 | 1 | 426 |
| Mar 2022 | 0 | 36 |
| Sep 2021 | 1 | 28 |
| Mar 2021 | 1 | 17 |
| Sep 2020 | 0 | 11 |
A snapshot on that date: matters listed may since have been decided or reassigned. A motion referred to a magistrate judge is counted for both judges. Motions in multidistrict litigation, section 2255 cases and Social Security appeals are not counted, and a very large three-year count is generally a multidistrict docket. Source: Appendix A of the report (PDF); about the report.
How long civil cases take in this court
For the whole of U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, not for Judge Shah: median time from filing to disposition of the civil cases the court closed in the 12 months ending September 30, 2025, as reported by the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts.
| Cases | Median time | |
|---|---|---|
| All civil cases closed | 12,205 | 5.9 months |
| Closed with no court action | 4,300 | 7 months |
| Closed before pretrial | 7,558 | 5.4 months |
| Closed during or after pretrial | 305 | 12.6 months |
| Closed during trial | 42 | 49.5 months |
| 12 months ending | Cases closed | Median time |
|---|---|---|
| Sep 2025 | 12,205 | 5.9 months |
| Sep 2024 | 9,700 | 6.8 months |
| Sep 2023 | 7,093 | 6 months |
| Sep 2022 | 6,841 | 7.3 months |
| Sep 2021 | 9,703 | 15.1 months |
| Sep 2020 | 8,046 | 10.6 months |
| Sep 2019 | 8,134 | 7.4 months |
The table leaves out prisoner petitions, land condemnations, deportation reviews, recovery of overpayments and enforcement of judgments, and reports no median for fewer than 10 cases. A district that closed a large multidistrict litigation in the period shows very large counts and long medians for that year. Source: Table C-5, U.S. District Courts (spreadsheet).
Draft for Judge Shah with the record in hand
Ezel grounds your drafting and research in this profile: what has persuaded Judge Shah, and what has not, cited to the signed orders.
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