Lisa A. Jensen

U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois magistrate Appointed by merit selection (U.S. District Court, N.D. Ill.) 5 signed orders read

How Judge Jensen decides

Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.

What persuades

In Social Security appeals she enforces the ALJ's 'logical bridge' / no-cherry-picking duty hard, and independently combs the record: she will reverse-and-remand where the ALJ builds a theme (here, 'normal gait') that the underlying treatment notes contradict, 'plays doctor' by assessing the significance of clinical findings without a medical expert, overstates the claimant's daily activities, or rests on conclusory 'routine/conservative' and 'successful treatment' assertions. What persuades her is a decision that engages the contrary evidence; what loses is selective summary.

“in this Court's own review of the record, it found additional examples to support plaintiff's argument. In particular, Exhibit 13F ... Only one of these eight findings [of gait] was normal. ... medical expertise is typically needed to make assessments about what is 'normal' or 'significant' for particular ailments.”

On PLRA exhaustion she reads grievances functionally, not technically, and favors the prisoner where the prison had notice and a chance to fix the problem: if the grievance officer reached the merits, a later untimeliness ruling by the ARB does not defeat exhaustion (merits-forfeiture); ongoing denial of medical care is a continuing violation so a grievance is not untimely; and a prisoner need not name every defendant -- omitting names is 'a mere technical defect' when the wrongdoing is described.

“a prisoner's remedies are exhausted when a Grievance Officer addresses a grievance on its merits, but the ARB later examines the grievance on procedural grounds ... the grievance has served its function of alerting the state and inviting corrective action, and [D]efendants cannot rely on the failure to exhaust defense.”

Procedural preferences

She will not stay discovery merely because a motion to dismiss is pending. The movant must show good cause: a true threshold issue (standing, jurisdiction, qualified immunity) that 'affirmatively demonstrates that a case can go nowhere,' or a concrete, substantiated showing of undue burden (cost estimates, an affidavit) -- not a generic complaint about expense. She also weighs real-world prejudice, including a plaintiff's serious illness, against a stay.

“There is no requirement that discovery cease during the pendency of a motion to dismiss. ... granting a stay of discovery upon the filing of a motion to dismiss would 'allow the exception to swallow the rule.' ... broadly decrying the time and expense ... without any substantiation, does not establish good cause for staying discovery.”

Cautions

On a contested citizenship/diversity question she applies a totality-of-the-circumstances domicile analysis and gives little weight to after-the-fact, self-serving statements of intent, while treating a party's earlier pleadings as evidentiary admissions against interest. Voter/vehicle registration is just one non-dispositive factor -- especially where the listed address is fictitious -- and intent to be domiciled somewhere without physical presence there does not establish domicile. The party invoking diversity carries the burden by a preponderance.

“These after the fact statements of intent with regard to citizenship are viewed skeptically by this Court ... Because Plaintiff's current statements alleging that he had no intent to make Illinois his domicile are self-serving, they are given little weight. However, his statements of domicile in his pleadings ... are statements against interest and thus they carry evidentiary weight.”

Motion outcomes

Counted from classified signed orders only. Percentages are shown only where the sample is large enough to be meaningful; smaller samples are reported as raw counts.

Summary judgment
N = 2
Granted: 1Denied: 1 counts only
Motions to dismiss
N = 1
Denied: 1 counts only
Default judgment
N = 1
Granted: 1 counts only
Motion for protective order
N = 1
Denied: 1 counts only
Motion to enforce settlement
N = 1
Moot / procedural: 1 counts only

A "1 of 1" is one ruling, not a tendency. Treat small samples as illustrative, not predictive.

Signed rulings

A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.

Tamara P. v. Saul (Commissioner of Social Security)
3:18-cv-50400 · 2020-02-10
Summary judgment (plaintiff (claimant)) Granted

“For the above reasons, plaintiff's motion for summary judgment is granted, the Government's motion is denied, and the case is reversed and remanded for further proceedings.”

Summary judgment (defendant (Commissioner)) Denied

“plaintiff's motion for summary judgment is granted, the Government's motion is denied, and the case is reversed and remanded for further proceedings.”

Knight v. Wexford Health Sources / Zahtz
3:21-cv-50330 (consolidated with 3:21-cv-50329) · 2022-10-25
Motions to dismiss (defendant) Denied

“it is this Court's report and recommendation that Defendants' motions to dismiss the complaints for failure to exhaust administrative remedies [44] in Case No. 3:21-cv-50329 and [40] in Case No. 3:21-cv-50330 be denied.”

Construction Industry Retirement Fund of Rockford v. Industrial Services Group, Inc.
3:20-cv-50123 · 2020-11-19
Default judgment (plaintiff) Granted

“it is this Court's report and recommendation that Plaintiff's motion for default judgment [28] be granted and that judgment be entered in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendant Industrial Services Group, Inc. in the amount of $8,276.80.”

Harper v. Central Wire, Inc.
3:19-cv-50287 · 2020-09-02
Motion for protective order (defendant) Denied

“Defendants Phibro-Tech, Inc. and C P Chemicals have moved for a protective order to stay discovery until the Court rules on its pending Motions to Dismiss. Dkt. 77. For the following reasons, Defendants' motion for a protective order is denied.”

Dawson v. Baldwin
3:19-cv-50058 · 2022-10-11
Motion to enforce settlement (plaintiff) Moot / procedural

“Plaintiff agrees to convert his motion [167] into an oral motion to extend the date to dismiss the case with prejudice to 10/25/2022. Accordingly, it is this Court's report and recommendation that Plaintiff's motion be granted, and the parties' stipulation to dismiss this case [163] [164] would be modified to a dismissal without prejudice, to become a dismissal with prejudice on 10/25/2022.”

Shea v. Koehler
3:12-cv-50201 · 2019-07-25

Order read, EXCLUDED from motion stats (rules on no party motion -- it is a referred R&R resolving a court-raised subject-matter-jurisdiction/citizenship question after a Seventh Circuit remand). After an evidentiary hearing, she finds the pro se attorney-plaintiff was domiciled in Illinois when he filed (physical presence + intent to remain at his mother's Roscoe home, per his own prior pleadings), so there was no complete diversity and the district court may relinquish supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims. Grounding quote: 'this Court concludes that Plaintiff has not proven by a preponderance of the evidence that after leaving his domicile in Illinois, he had established a domicile in either California or Nevada ... and therefore his domicile remained Illinois. Because various defendants were domiciled in Illinois, Plaintiff cannot establish diversity of citizenship.' Counts as an order read, not toward motion stats.