Lisa A. Jensen

How Judge Jensen rules, drawn from 22 signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.

Court
U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois
Position
magistrate
Appointed by
merit selection (U.S. District Court, N.D. Ill.)
Commissioned
2019-04
Education
Illinois State University, B.A.; Chicago-Kent College of Law, J.D.
Signed orders read
22

How Judge Jensen decides

Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.

What persuades

In Social Security appeals she enforces the ALJ's 'logical bridge' / no-cherry-picking duty hard, and independently combs the record: she will reverse-and-remand where the ALJ builds a theme (here, 'normal gait') that the underlying treatment notes contradict, 'plays doctor' by assessing the significance of clinical findings without a medical expert, overstates the claimant's daily activities, or rests on conclusory 'routine/conservative' and 'successful treatment' assertions. What persuades her is a decision that engages the contrary evidence; what loses is selective summary.

“in this Court's own review of the record, it found additional examples to support plaintiff's argument. In particular, Exhibit 13F ... Only one of these eight findings [of gait] was normal. ... medical expertise is typically needed to make assessments about what is 'normal' or 'significant' for particular ailments.”

The later consent Social Security opinions reinforce the same requirement with new medical evidence: when imaging or electrodiagnostic findings postdate the agency reviewers, the administrative judge must obtain medical scrutiny if the evidence could change the functional picture, rather than interpret technical results independently or omit contrary portions.

“MRI reports are exactly the type of medical evidence that an ALJ should submit to medical scrutiny, rather than interpreting on his own.”

On PLRA exhaustion she reads grievances functionally, not technically, and favors the prisoner where the prison had notice and a chance to fix the problem: if the grievance officer reached the merits, a later untimeliness ruling by the ARB does not defeat exhaustion (merits-forfeiture); ongoing denial of medical care is a continuing violation so a grievance is not untimely; and a prisoner need not name every defendant: omitting names is 'a mere technical defect' when the wrongdoing is described.

“a prisoner's remedies are exhausted when a Grievance Officer addresses a grievance on its merits, but the ARB later examines the grievance on procedural grounds ... the grievance has served its function of alerting the state and inviting corrective action, and [D]efendants cannot rely on the failure to exhaust defense.”

Procedural preferences

At the pleading stage in an Illinois unjust-enrichment case, she treats a disputed contract's validity or scope as a reason to allow the quasi-contract theory to proceed. A reference to an agreement does not itself plead a valid enforceable contract, and discovery may be needed before the contract bar can be resolved.

“Until the validity or the scope of a contract is determined, it is typically premature to dismiss an unjust enrichment claim.”

She will not stay discovery merely because a motion to dismiss is pending. The movant must show good cause: a true threshold issue (standing, jurisdiction, qualified immunity) that 'affirmatively demonstrates that a case can go nowhere,' or a concrete, substantiated showing of undue burden (cost estimates, an affidavit): not a generic complaint about expense. She also weighs real-world prejudice, including a plaintiff's serious illness, against a stay.

“There is no requirement that discovery cease during the pendency of a motion to dismiss. ... granting a stay of discovery upon the filing of a motion to dismiss would 'allow the exception to swallow the rule.' ... broadly decrying the time and expense ... without any substantiation, does not establish good cause for staying discovery.”

Cautions

On a contested citizenship/diversity question she applies a totality-of-the-circumstances domicile analysis and gives little weight to after-the-fact, self-serving statements of intent, while treating a party's earlier pleadings as evidentiary admissions against interest. Voter/vehicle registration is just one non-dispositive factor, especially where the listed address is fictitious, and intent to be domiciled somewhere without physical presence there does not establish domicile. The party invoking diversity carries the burden by a preponderance.

“These after the fact statements of intent with regard to citizenship are viewed skeptically by this Court ... Because Plaintiff's current statements alleging that he had no intent to make Illinois his domicile are self-serving, they are given little weight. However, his statements of domicile in his pleadings ... are statements against interest and thus they carry evidentiary weight.”

Signed rulings

A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.

Tamara P. v. Saul (Commissioner of Social Security)
3:18-cv-50400 · 2020-02-10
Summary judgment (plaintiff (claimant)) Granted

“For the above reasons, plaintiff's motion for summary judgment is granted, the Government's motion is denied, and the case is reversed and remanded for further proceedings.”

Summary judgment (defendant (Commissioner)) Denied

“plaintiff's motion for summary judgment is granted, the Government's motion is denied, and the case is reversed and remanded for further proceedings.”

Knight v. Wexford Health Sources / Zahtz
3:21-cv-50330 (consolidated with 3:21-cv-50329) · 2022-10-25
Motions to dismiss (defendant) Denied

“it is this Court's report and recommendation that Defendants' motions to dismiss the complaints for failure to exhaust administrative remedies [44] in Case No. 3:21-cv-50329 and [40] in Case No. 3:21-cv-50330 be denied.”

Construction Industry Retirement Fund of Rockford v. Industrial Services Group, Inc.
3:20-cv-50123 · 2020-11-19
Default judgment (plaintiff) Granted

“it is this Court's report and recommendation that Plaintiff's motion for default judgment [28] be granted and that judgment be entered in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendant Industrial Services Group, Inc. in the amount of $8,276.80.”

Harper v. Central Wire, Inc.
3:19-cv-50287 · 2020-09-02
Motion for protective order (defendant) Denied

“Defendants Phibro-Tech, Inc. and C P Chemicals have moved for a protective order to stay discovery until the Court rules on its pending Motions to Dismiss. Dkt. 77. For the following reasons, Defendants' motion for a protective order is denied.”

Dawson v. Baldwin
3:19-cv-50058 · 2022-10-11
Motion to enforce settlement (plaintiff) Moot / procedural

“Plaintiff agrees to convert his motion [167] into an oral motion to extend the date to dismiss the case with prejudice to 10/25/2022. Accordingly, it is this Court's report and recommendation that Plaintiff's motion be granted, and the parties' stipulation to dismiss this case [163] [164] would be modified to a dismissal without prejudice, to become a dismissal with prejudice on 10/25/2022.”

Shea v. Koehler
3:12-cv-50201 · 2019-07-25

Report and Recommendation resolving a court-raised subject-matter-jurisdiction and citizenship question after a Seventh Circuit remand. Following an evidentiary hearing, Jensen found that the pro se attorney-plaintiff was domiciled in Illinois when he filed because he was physically present and intended to remain at his mother's Roscoe home, as shown by his prior pleadings. Complete diversity was therefore absent, allowing the district court to relinquish supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims. She wrote: 'this Court concludes that Plaintiff has not proven by a preponderance of the evidence that after leaving his domicile in Illinois, he had established a domicile in either California or Nevada... and therefore his domicile remained Illinois. Because various defendants were domiciled in Illinois, Plaintiff cannot establish diversity of citizenship.' No party motion was pending.

Brown v. O'Malley
3:21-cv-50325 · 2023-01-24
Summary judgment (plaintiff (claimant)) Granted

“For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is granted and the Commissioner’s motion is denied. The decision of the Commissioner is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.”

Summary judgment (defendant (Commissioner)) Denied

“Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is granted and the Commissioner’s motion is denied.”

Baratta v. O'Malley
1:22-cv-00190 · 2023-03-08
Summary judgment (plaintiff (claimant)) Granted

“For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is granted, and the Commissioner’s motion is denied. The decision of the Commissioner is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceeding consistent with this opinion.”

Summary judgment (defendant (Commissioner)) Denied

“Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is granted, and the Commissioner’s motion is denied.”

Norris v. O'Malley
3:22-cv-50087 · 2023-03-31
Summary judgment (plaintiff (claimant)) Granted

“For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is granted, and the Commissioner’s motion is denied. The decision of the Commissioner is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceeding consistent with this opinion.”

Summary judgment (defendant (Commissioner)) Denied

“Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is granted, and the Commissioner’s motion is denied.”

Johnson v. O'Malley
3:22-cv-50082 · 2023-03-31
Summary judgment (plaintiff (claimant)) Denied

“For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is denied, the Commissioner’s motion is granted, and the Commissioner’s decision is affirmed.”

Summary judgment (defendant (Commissioner)) Granted

“Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is denied, the Commissioner’s motion is granted, and the Commissioner’s decision is affirmed.”

Myzia v. O'Malley
3:22-cv-50105 · 2023-05-16
Summary judgment (plaintiff (claimant)) Denied

“For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is denied, the Commissioner’s motion is granted, and the Commissioner’s decision is affirmed.”

Summary judgment (defendant (Commissioner)) Granted

“Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is denied, the Commissioner’s motion is granted, and the Commissioner’s decision is affirmed.”

Buchholz v. O'Malley
3:22-cv-50133 · 2023-05-17
Summary judgment (plaintiff (claimant)) Granted

“For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is granted, and the Commissioner’s motion is denied. The decision of the Commissioner is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.”

Summary judgment (defendant (Commissioner)) Denied

“Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is granted, and the Commissioner’s motion is denied.”

Caseload & timing

From public federal docket records for this judge.

Median case duration in the sampled dockets: 138 days (N = 6).

Median motion-to-ruling time: 24 days (N = 1).

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