Lindsay Clayton Jenkins
How Judge Jenkins rules, drawn from 31 signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
About Judge Jenkins
Lindsay Clayton Jenkins is a judge of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. Appointed by President Joseph R. Biden, Judge Jenkins received a commission on February 24, 2023.
Judge Jenkins's practices and standing orders
Rules for cases before Judge Jenkins, as published on the court's website (checked October 8, 2026). Judges revise these often, so confirm the current version on the court's site before you file.
- Case Procedures ↗
- Standing Order Governing Criminal Pretrial & Trial Procedures ↗
- jenkins initial status report reassigned 1.24 ↗
Key rules
Motions
After amendment in response to a motion to dismiss, answer or renew the motion within 21 days.
“If the nonmoving party elects to amend its pleading in response to the motion to dismiss, then the moving party (unless otherwise ordered) must, within 21 days of the amended pleading, file either an answer or a renewed motion to dismiss.”
Conferences
File a joint initial status report of no more than seven single-spaced pages seven days before the hearing.
“The parties must file a Joint Initial Status Report, not to exceed seven single-spaced pages, at least seven days before the initial status hearing.”
Trial
Seek court permission before contacting jurors after trial.
“After the conclusion of any civil or criminal trial, no party, agent or attorney shall communicate with any members of the petit jury before which the case was tried without first receiving permission of the Court.”
Standing orders for every case in this court
Orders the court applies to all of its cases, whichever judge has them, as published on the court's website (checked October 8, 2026).
How Judge Jenkins decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
In Peaster v. McDonald's Corporation, she held that a Section 1981 plaintiff could plead discrimination based on a combination of two protected characteristics as a but-for cause of unequal treatment.
“Applying analogous reasoning here, the Court concludes that a §1981 plaintiff may plead that discrimination based on the combination of two protected characteristics was a but-for cause of disparate treatment. This conclusion also makes logical sense: it would be odd for a defendant to escape liability under §1981 by discriminating based on two protected characteristics instead of just one.”
In a reinsurance dispute, Jenkins denied the reinsurers’ request to stay arbitration and compelled arbitration of their claims about prior awards. She held that the preclusive effect of an earlier arbitral award, including one confirmed by a court, was a defense for the arbitrators to decide.
“It is well settled in the Seventh Circuit, and other circuits, too, that the preclusive effect of a prior arbitral award—whether or not confirmed by a court—is a defense subject to arbitration.”
In a Wisconsin-law loan dispute, Jenkins granted the lender summary judgment against a frustration-of-purpose defense. The borrower’s difficulty buying and profitably selling medical gloves did not establish that both parties made commercial success a purpose of the loan, and the borrower continued making payments after supply problems arose.
“But the purpose of a contract being that a party will undertake a venture is very different from the purpose being that the venture will turn a profit.”
In a Section 2241 immigration detention case, she required an individualized explanation for revoking humanitarian parole and ordered a bond hearing within five days or release when the agency gave only a conclusory termination letter. The decision turned on the parole history and the absence of a reasoned revocation and custody determination.
“The court orders Respondents to provide Bellia Castillo with a bond hearing to assess his dangerousness and flight risk within five days or, alternatively, release him from custody.”
In a proposed class action involving a dental scheduling portal, she let federal and state wiretap claims proceed because the complaint plausibly alleged disclosure of identifiable health information, making the statutory crime-tort exception potentially applicable.
“An alleged disclosure that violates HIPAA is sufficient to plausibly allege a violation of the ECPA, and here, Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged that Defendants transmitted their individually identifiable health information to third parties in violation of HIPAA such that the crime-tort exception may apply. These claims survive.”
Procedural preferences
In Rankin v. Chicago Park District, she deemed supported facts admitted where the plaintiff did not controvert the defendants' Local Rule 56.1 statement with specific record citations.
“Because Rankin cites nothing in the record to explain his lack of information, and thus his inability to confirm or deny the facts alleged in those paragraphs, those facts are deemed admitted to the extent they are supported by the record materials cited by Defendants.”
In Mata v. Deslauriers, Inc., she declined supplemental jurisdiction over a state biometric-privacy class claim because it did not share a common nucleus of operative facts with the federal employment claim and would substantially predominate.
“Because the amended complaint raises two sets of claims with different relevant evidence and witnesses, 'which are not so interrelated that it would make jurisprudential sense to try them in the same lawsuit,' the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction.”
In Peaster v. McDonald's Corporation, she dismissed two claims without prejudice and allowed amendment because the plaintiff might cure the defects identified in the order.
“The law is clear that a court should deny leave to amend only if it is certain that amendment would be futile or otherwise unwarranted. It may be possible for Peaster to cure the defects the Court has identified, so granting leave to amend would not be futile.”
Cautions
In Fonseca v. Hornblower Cruises and Events, LLC, she dismissed a retaliatory-discharge claim supported only by a threadbare invocation of public policy and required more specific allegations for the whistleblower claim.
“But the Supreme Court of Illinois has held that this type of threadbare invocation of public policy is inadequate.”
In Rankin v. Chicago Park District, she granted summary judgment on a retaliation claim because a seven-month gap after an EEOC charge, without further evidence connecting the charge to the decision, did not support an inference of retaliation.
“Under Seventh Circuit precedent, it would be far too speculative to infer a retaliatory motive solely from the fact that Rankin was fired approximately seven months after filing an EEOC Charge.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“Defendants' motion to dismiss [Dkt. 16] is granted as to Count II (§1981 hostile environment) and Count IV (intentional infliction of emotional distress) and denied as to Count I (§1981 disparate treatment) and Count III (§1981 retaliation).”
“For the foregoing reasons, Hornblower's motion to dismiss [Dkt. 21] is granted in part and denied in part. Counts III and VII are dismissed without prejudice. Count V is dismissed with prejudice to the extent that it is based on a retaliation claim under the IMWA; the FLSA component of the claim survives. The motion to dismiss is denied with respect to Count VI.”
“For the reason stated above, Plaintiffs National Casualty and Nationwide's motion to stay arbitration [Dkt. 4] is denied, and Defendant CNA's motion to compel arbitration and motion to dismiss is granted. [Dkt. 16.] The matter is dismissed without prejudice.”
“The Court agrees with CNA that the preclusive effect of the 2017 Awards on the current proceedings or on future arbitrations is within the scope of the arbitration clauses. An arbitrator must decide what, if any, effect the prior awards have on the parties' disputes. Accordingly, CNA's motion to compel arbitration is granted.”
“For the foregoing reasons, Romans's motion for summary judgment [Dkt. 56] is granted. Judgment shall enter in favor of Romans and against Orange Pelican in the amount of $3,540,000. Civil case terminated.”
“For the reasons stated herein, Defendant Pieroni's motion for summary judgment is granted.”
“For these reasons, Defendant's motion to dismiss Count III is granted [Dkt.37]. Count III is dismissed without prejudice.”
“Defendants' motion for summary judgment [Dkt. 90] is granted. Judgment is entered in favor of Defendants and against Rankin on all remaining counts of Rankin's amended complaint.”
“Because Plaintiff has shown that there is no genuine dispute of fact that the vehicles involved in the McCoy accident are not covered by (1) the Lupjka policy; (2) any of the Lujpka policy's endorsements; or (3) Illinois law, the Court grants its motion for summary judgment. [Dkt. No. 76].”
“the Court grants Defendants' motion for summary judgment [Dkt. No. 145] and denies Mack's cross-motion for summary judgment [Dkt. No. 147]. A final judgment ... will enter in favor of Defendants and against Mack.”
“the Court grants Defendants' motion for summary judgment [Dkt. No. 145] and denies Mack's cross-motion for summary judgment [Dkt. No. 147].”
“the Village's motion for summary judgment is granted.”
“the Court denies Sage's motion for summary judgment [Dkt. 204] and grants Federal's motion for summary judgment [Dkt. 214]. Judgment shall enter in favor of Federal and against Sage.”
“the Court denies Sage's motion for summary judgment [Dkt. 204] and grants Federal's motion for summary judgment [Dkt. 214].”
“Garrett, Pork, and Wilcock's motion for summary judgment [Dkt. 121] is granted. All claims against them are terminated, and they are dismissed as Defendants.”
“Brown's motion for summary judgment [Dkt. 115] is granted as to Arbuckle's Eighth Amendment and failure to intervene claims. The only surviving claim is Count Nine, Arbuckle's willful and wanton conduct claim...”
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
Median case duration in the sampled dockets: 149 days (N = 14).
Judge Jenkins's reviewed assignments span the Chicago and Rockford divisions and include a broad civil docket plus a substantial criminal calendar. Many short civil cases involved removed actions later remanded or settled, voluntary dismissals, premises-liability claims against national retailers, and intellectual-property enforcement matters.
Pending matters in the official report
Reported by the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts under the Civil Justice Reform Act, as of March 31, 2026.
| Motions pending more than six months | 0 |
| Bench trials submitted more than six months | 0 |
| Bankruptcy appeals pending more than six months | 0 |
| Social Security appeals pending more than six months | 0 |
| Civil cases pending more than three years | 21 |
| Report | Motions over six months | Cases over three years |
|---|---|---|
| Mar 2026 | 0 | 21 |
| Sep 2025 | 0 | 33 |
| Mar 2025 | 0 | 38 |
| Sep 2024 | 2 | 33 |
| Mar 2024 | 0 | 38 |
| Sep 2023 | 5 | 62 |
| Mar 2023 | 0 | 57 |
A snapshot on that date: matters listed may since have been decided or reassigned. A motion referred to a magistrate judge is counted for both judges. Motions in multidistrict litigation, section 2255 cases and Social Security appeals are not counted, and a very large three-year count is generally a multidistrict docket. Source: Appendix A of the report (PDF); about the report.
How long civil cases take in this court
For the whole of U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, not for Judge Jenkins: median time from filing to disposition of the civil cases the court closed in the 12 months ending September 30, 2025, as reported by the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts.
| Cases | Median time | |
|---|---|---|
| All civil cases closed | 12,205 | 5.9 months |
| Closed with no court action | 4,300 | 7 months |
| Closed before pretrial | 7,558 | 5.4 months |
| Closed during or after pretrial | 305 | 12.6 months |
| Closed during trial | 42 | 49.5 months |
| 12 months ending | Cases closed | Median time |
|---|---|---|
| Sep 2025 | 12,205 | 5.9 months |
| Sep 2024 | 9,700 | 6.8 months |
| Sep 2023 | 7,093 | 6 months |
| Sep 2022 | 6,841 | 7.3 months |
| Sep 2021 | 9,703 | 15.1 months |
| Sep 2020 | 8,046 | 10.6 months |
| Sep 2019 | 8,134 | 7.4 months |
The table leaves out prisoner petitions, land condemnations, deportation reviews, recovery of overpayments and enforcement of judgments, and reports no median for fewer than 10 cases. A district that closed a large multidistrict litigation in the period shows very large counts and long medians for that year. Source: Table C-5, U.S. District Courts (spreadsheet).
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