Lindsay Clayton Jenkins
How Judge Jenkins decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
On Section 1981 employment claims she applies Comcast's but-for causation rigorously but reads the pleading standard generously: she held (an issue she noted the Seventh Circuit had not decided) that a plaintiff may plead that the COMBINATION of two protected characteristics (race plus 1981-protected activity) was a but-for cause, reasoning it would be odd for a defendant to escape liability by discriminating on two protected grounds instead of one. A useful authority for plaintiffs framing multi-theory discrimination pleadings before her.
“Applying analogous reasoning here, the Court concludes that a §1981 plaintiff may plead that discrimination based on the combination of two protected characteristics was a but-for cause of disparate treatment. This conclusion also makes logical sense: it would be odd for a defendant to escape liability under §1981 by discriminating based on two protected characteristics instead of just one.”
Strongly pro-arbitration under the FAA: she follows settled Seventh Circuit law that the preclusive effect of a prior arbitration award (even one confirmed by a court) is a procedural defense for the arbitrator, not a gateway 'question of arbitrability' for the court. A party trying to litigate res judicata from a prior award before her should expect to be sent back to arbitration.
“It is well settled in the Seventh Circuit, and other circuits, too, that the preclusive effect of a prior arbitral award—whether or not confirmed by a court—is a defense subject to arbitration.”
Construes the frustration-of-purpose contract defense narrowly (Wisconsin law): she distinguishes between the purpose of undertaking a venture and the purpose of the venture turning a profit, and holds that reduced profitability or even loss does not frustrate a contract's purpose, especially where the party kept performing after the frustrating event arose. Borrowers/defendants asserting commercial-impossibility-style defenses face a steep climb.
“But the purpose of a contract being that a party will undertake a venture is very different from the purpose being that the venture will turn a profit.”
Procedural preferences
Enforces Local Rule 56.1 on summary judgment: facts in the movant's 56.1 statement that the non-movant fails to controvert with specific record citations are deemed admitted, even for a party who 'can neither agree nor disagree.' She will still try to reach the merits, but a non-movant who does not properly dispute facts or file a statement of additional facts effectively concedes the record.
“Because Rankin cites nothing in the record to explain his lack of information, and thus his inability to confirm or deny the facts alleged in those paragraphs, those facts are deemed admitted to the extent they are supported by the record materials cited by Defendants.”
Polices supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims: she declines 28 U.S.C. 1367 jurisdiction where a state claim (here a BIPA class claim) shares no common nucleus of operative facts with the federal anchor claim and would substantially predominate over it. Plaintiffs bolting a large state-law class action onto a discrete federal claim risk having the state claim dismissed without prejudice.
“Because the amended complaint raises two sets of claims with different relevant evidence and witnesses, 'which are not so interrelated that it would make jurisprudential sense to try them in the same lawsuit,' the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction.”
Liberal with leave to amend on a 12(b)(6) dismissal: she dismisses deficient claims without prejudice and sets a concrete deadline to replead, denying leave only where amendment would be futile. A plaintiff whose complaint is dismissed before her usually gets at least one more chance.
“The law is clear that a court should deny leave to amend only if it is certain that amendment would be futile or otherwise unwarranted. It may be possible for Peaster to cure the defects the Court has identified, so granting leave to amend would not be futile.”
Cautions
Conclusory, threadbare allegations lose. On a retaliatory-discharge claim she required more than a bare invocation of public policy; on a whistleblower claim she required specific allegations of an actual refusal, not mere complaints. Pleadings before her must tie facts to each element, not just recite labels.
“But the Supreme Court of Illinois has held that this type of threadbare invocation of public policy is inadequate.”
Suspicious timing, standing alone, will not carry a retaliation claim past summary judgment. She demands evidence that the decisionmaker knew of the protected activity AND additional circumstantial evidence of a causal link; a multi-month gap between a discrimination charge and termination is far too speculative on its own.
“Under Seventh Circuit precedent, it would be far too speculative to infer a retaliatory motive solely from the fact that Rankin was fired approximately seven months after filing an EEOC Charge.”
Motion outcomes
Counted from classified signed orders only. Percentages are shown only where the sample is large enough to be meaningful; smaller samples are reported as raw counts.
| Summary judgment N = 4 |
Granted: 4 | counts only |
| Motions to dismiss N = 3 |
Granted: 1Granted in part: 2 | counts only |
| Motion to compel arbitration N = 1 |
Granted: 1 | counts only |
| Motion to stay arbitration N = 1 |
Denied: 1 | counts only |
A "1 of 1" is one ruling, not a tendency. Treat small samples as illustrative, not predictive.
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“Defendants' motion to dismiss [Dkt. 16] is granted as to Count II (§1981 hostile environment) and Count IV (intentional infliction of emotional distress) and denied as to Count I (§1981 disparate treatment) and Count III (§1981 retaliation).”
“For the foregoing reasons, Hornblower's motion to dismiss [Dkt. 21] is granted in part and denied in part. Counts III and VII are dismissed without prejudice. Count V is dismissed with prejudice to the extent that it is based on a retaliation claim under the IMWA; the FLSA component of the claim survives. The motion to dismiss is denied with respect to Count VI.”
“For the reason stated above, Plaintiffs National Casualty and Nationwide's motion to stay arbitration [Dkt. 4] is denied, and Defendant CNA's motion to compel arbitration and motion to dismiss is granted. [Dkt. 16.] The matter is dismissed without prejudice.”
“The Court agrees with CNA that the preclusive effect of the 2017 Awards on the current proceedings or on future arbitrations is within the scope of the arbitration clauses. An arbitrator must decide what, if any, effect the prior awards have on the parties' disputes. Accordingly, CNA's motion to compel arbitration is granted.”
“For the foregoing reasons, Romans's motion for summary judgment [Dkt. 56] is granted. Judgment shall enter in favor of Romans and against Orange Pelican in the amount of $3,540,000. Civil case terminated.”
“For the reasons stated herein, Defendant Pieroni's motion for summary judgment is granted.”
“For these reasons, Defendant's motion to dismiss Count III is granted [Dkt.37]. Count III is dismissed without prejudice.”
“Defendants' motion for summary judgment [Dkt. 90] is granted. Judgment is entered in favor of Defendants and against Rankin on all remaining counts of Rankin's amended complaint.”
“Because Plaintiff has shown that there is no genuine dispute of fact that the vehicles involved in the McCoy accident are not covered by (1) the Lupjka policy; (2) any of the Lujpka policy's endorsements; or (3) Illinois law, the Court grants its motion for summary judgment. [Dkt. No. 76].”
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
Median case duration in the sampled dockets: 149 days (N = 14).
Her enumerable docket docket is her February-2023-onward district-judge assignments (Eastern Division / Chicago, plus some Western Division / Rockford). The mix is a typical N.D. Ill. civil docket plus a substantial criminal calendar (she is a former Chief of the U.S. Attorney's Criminal Division). Many short-duration civil terminations are state-court removals later remanded or settled, voluntary dismissals, slip-and-fall personal injury against national retailers, and 'Schedule A' trademark/patent enforcement actions.