John W. Cooley
Judge Cooley no longer hears cases. This profile is preserved as a historical record of how they ruled.
How Judge Cooley decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
In the firefighter case, he treated the combination of disparate screening figures and their timing after a hiring order as sufficient to preserve an intentional-discrimination claim for trial.
“These statistics taken together with their temporal relationship to Judge McGarr’s hiring order raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the defendants intentionally discriminated against plaintiff (and others) on the basis of race.”
For the workplace inspection warrant, he found probable cause in reports of a severe press injury reinforced by an earlier similar safety citation.
“After reviewing the Secretary’s Application materials, Magistrate Cooley found that there was probable cause for believing that the respondent’s worksite should be inspected to the extent requested, and issued the inspection warrant in question.”
Procedural preferences
He described summary judgment as an exceptional procedure and emphasized issue identification rather than resolution.
“Summary judgment under Rule 56, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, is an extreme remedy which should be sparingly employed.”
He declined to send intertwined contract issues to arbitration when doing so would complicate unresolved antitrust litigation.
“Magistrate Cooley recommended that arbitration of such issues be denied because the contractual disputes raised by Ohio-Sealy were inextricably intertwined with its nonarbitrable antitrust claims”
Cautions
In discovery enforcement, he regarded deliberate withholding after an additional opportunity to comply as sufficient to support dismissal.
“this record reflects, clearly and convincingly, that plaintiff has deliberately withheld documents which are unarguably discovery-relevant to this action”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“IT IS RECOMMENDED that plaintiff’s Motion to Strike Defendants’ Affidavits be DENIED.”
“IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that the court construe Defendants’ Motion to Strike and Dismiss the Complaint as a Motion for Summary Judgment and that it be DENIED as it relates to issues of intentional racial discrimination and GRANTED as it relates to due process issues.”
“After reviewing the Secretary’s Application materials, Magistrate Cooley found that there was probable cause for believing that the respondent’s worksite should be inspected to the extent requested, and issued the inspection warrant in question.”
“On April 18, 1980 Magistrate Cooley had ordered Cardunal to produce certain governmental reports of examination of Cardunal (‘reports’) for ‘counsel’s eyes’ only.”
“on November 20, 1980 Magistrate Cooley denied that motion ‘without prejudice to plaintiffs renewing motion after Chief Judge Parsons’ decision is issued on motion regarding same subject matter.’”
“Upon request for clarification Magistrate Cooley entered the Amendment May 28,1981, superseding the March 3,1981 amendment.”
“On July 16, 1981, Magistrate Cooley ordered that plaintiffs answer certain interrogatories and produce a variety of materials that had been withheld from defendants.”
“Relying on the briefs of the parties, and the recommendation of Magistrate Cooley, Judge Shadur entered an order enforcing the subpoena.”
“Magistrate Cooley recommended that arbitration of such issues be denied because the contractual disputes raised by Ohio-Sealy were inextricably intertwined with its nonarbitrable antitrust claims”
“On June 4,1981, Magistrate Cooley recommended that defendants’ motion be denied in all respects”
“the Court adopts Magistrate Cooley’s recommended denial of (1) Ohio’s motion for summary judgment based on collateral es-toppel;”
“and (2) Sealy’s motion to strike the Clayton Act allegation contained in Count VI of the Amended Complaint.”
“the magistrate’s recommendation (1) that defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to post-verdict damages stemming from pre-verdict acts be denied;”
“(2) that Ohio’s motion to sever Count VI of the complaint be granted;”
“(3) that Michigan-Sealy’s motion to file a cross-claim against Sealy be granted;”
“and (4) that Ohio’s motion to consolidate the 1976 and 1979 cases be granted.”
“the Court adopts in full Magistrate Cooley’s recommendation that (1) Haas’ motion for a more definite statement, and as such should be granted;”
“and (2) defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to Count V in the 1976 case be denied.”
“seeking an order precluding disclosure and use of certain documents in the possession of Joseph V. Moffit, Jr., Lloyd Rosen-feld, and Walter Hertz should be denied;”
“the motion by Joseph V. Moffit for a protective order permitting him to answer certain deposition questions should be granted;”
“plaintiffs’ motion in the 1976 case to compel Morris J. Coff to answer certain deposition questions should be granted;”
“a date certain be set for defendant Sealy to specify whether Professor Peter O. Steiner will be retained as an expert.”
“they do not object to his recommended order which would grant defendants’ motion for a more definite statement.”
“On August 26, 1980 Magistrate Cooley refused to certify that discovery had been completed.”
“His report to Judge Aspen was unequivocal in recommending dismissal:”
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
No assigned electronic docket was located for Cooley's 1979-1981 service, so no docket-based caseload mix, case-duration, motion-outcome, or timing claim is available.
A historical record
Judge Cooley no longer hears cases. This profile stays available as a record of how they ruled. If you're preparing for a matter, start from the court's current bench.