John Joseph Tharp, Jr.
How Judge Tharp decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
Treats a complaint as a statement of a CLAIM (a set of facts producing an injury), not a menu of legal theories. A plaintiff who pleads enough facts survives even if the labeled counts or cited statutes are imperfect; legal theories are developed after the pleadings.
“One set of facts producing one injury creates one claim for relief, no matter how many laws the deeds violate.”
On Rule 12(b)(6) he dismisses claims, not alternative legal theories within a claim. If any theory plausibly supports the claim, he will not pass on the viability of the others at the pleading stage.
“Rule 12(b)(6) authorizes the dismissal of claims, not legal theories.”
Procedural preferences
Strict enforcement of Local Rule 56.1: a party opposing summary judgment who fails to controvert the movant's numbered fact statement has those facts deemed admitted. This decides cases — it drove the grant in Solo Labs and shaped Thomas. Respond to every numbered paragraph with record cites.
“All material facts set forth in the moving party's statement are deemed admitted unless controverted by the party opposing the motion for summary judgment.”
Affirmative defenses (statute of limitations, sovereign immunity, exhaustion) are generally not a basis to dismiss on the pleadings unless the complaint itself establishes every element of the defense; raise them at summary judgment with a record.
“a motion to dismiss based on failure to comply with the statute of limitations should be granted only where the allegations of the complaint itself set forth everything necessary to satisfy the affirmative defense.”
On the deadlines/extensions front he is firm: he expects timely requests, not after-the-fact relief. (From his ISBA judicial profile.) He also borrowed Judge Amy St. Eve's pretrial-order format and tends to refer settlement conferences to the magistrate judges.
“he does not subscribe to the 'better to ask forgiveness than permission' school of litigating ... post hoc relief is frowned upon in federal court.”
Cautions
Reacts sharply when a party misuses or distorts controlling authority. He has called an argument that ignored on-point binding precedent and then tried to distinguish it away as bordering on bad faith. Cite controlling Seventh Circuit / Illinois authority straight; do not paper over an adverse case.
“TGC's efforts to transform Vigortone from sow's ear to silk purse are so devoid of merit that they are difficult to excuse as good faith error.”
He polices selective quotation of precedent. In Simmons he flagged that the movant quoted Richman but omitted the very next sentence that undercut the argument, calling the broader contention near-frivolous.
“This argument borders on the frivolous.”
PLRA/Bivens prisoner suits are dismissed on failure-to-exhaust when the grievance record shows the administrative process was not carried to completion — and pro se status does not excuse noncompliance with procedural rules. Both Rodriguez and Regalado ended this way.
“pro se litigants must still comply with the Court's local procedural rules.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“the Wexford defendants' motion to dismiss [68] is granted in part and denied in part.”
“The IDOC defendants' motion to dismiss [83] is denied.”
“The motion to dismiss is, therefore, denied.”
“For the foregoing reasons, the defendant's motion for summary judgment is denied.”
“The defendant's motion for summary judgment [42] is granted. Final judgment for the defendant shall enter.”
“For the reasons stated below, the motion to dismiss is granted in part and denied in part.”
“the Court grants Defendants' motion for summary judgment (R. 22), and dismisses the complaint with prejudice.”
“the City’s motion to dismiss is granted”
“Goodman and Farpoint’s motion to dismiss is granted in part and denied in part”
“GRIT’s motion to dismiss is granted in part and denied in part”
“defendant Tubi’s motions to compel arbitration and to dismiss are both denied”
“the defendants’ motion for summary judgment is denied and the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment is granted”
“the plaintiffs’ partial motion for summary judgment is granted in part and denied in part and the defendant’s partial motion for summary judgment is granted in part and denied in part”
“The plaintiffs’ motion to exclude the defendant’s expert is denied as moot”
“For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss is granted in part and denied in part.”
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
Median case duration in the sampled dockets: 192 days (N = 17).
Active, high-volume Eastern Division (Chicago) docket; per his 2013 ISBA profile his caseload then exceeded 375 cases with about two new cases per day. The January 2019 filing cohort skews to prisoner civil-rights cases (Rowlette, Hilliard, Bailey), consumer-credit litigation (Siegel), ERISA fund collection (Pipe Fitters Local), employment disputes (Todd, Morgan, Dutton), contract and diversity matters (Deutsche Leasing, Penny), an ANDA patent case (Beloteca v. Apicore), and the BIPA biometric-privacy class action Cothron v. White Castle. The December 2024 window shows current intake dominated by Schedule A intellectual-property counterfeiting suits, other trademark and patent cases, immigration mandamus actions, FOIA litigation, benefit-fund collection, and employment cases. This describes caseload composition rather than a counted distribution.
Put Judge Tharp's record to work
Ezel drafts and answers grounded in this exact profile: how Judge Tharp actually rules, not a generic AI guess.
Opens in Ezel Pro. Every answer is grounded in Judge Tharp's own signed orders and cites them.