Ilana Kara Diamond Rovner
Judge Rovner no longer hears cases. This profile is preserved as a historical record of how they ruled.
How Judge Rovner decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
On Section 1983 municipal-liability claims she required specific, well-pleaded facts of a policy or practice rather than conclusory Monell recitals, warning that boilerplate policy allegations would collapse the doctrine into respondeat superior — but she dismissed such counts without prejudice, leaving room to replead after discovery.
“In order to state a claim against a municipality based on a ‘policy’ allegation, plaintiff must set forth specific facts supporting the allegation:”
Procedural preferences
She enforced the summary-judgment burden strictly against the moving party and showed particular care for pro se prisoners, declining to grant judgment where the movant had not squarely answered the plaintiff's actual theory of liability and where the plaintiff's pro se status had constrained his discovery.
“the onus is on defendants to sufficiently respond to the theory of liability underlying Randall’s complaint and to demonstrate the absence of any genuine issue of material fact.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“Accordingly, the Court finds that the Foundation’s claim to the wreck must be upheld and Zych’s claim for ownership must be dismissed.”
“Zych has not provided sufficient evidence from which a reasonable fact-finder could conclude that Aetna abandoned the wreck of the Lady Elgin.”
“For the reasons set forth below, the Court denies the motions.”
“the motion of the Village to dismiss Count I of the complaint is granted without prejudice.”
“plaintiff’s motion for additional attorneys’ fees and costs is granted.”
“Lazzara’s motion to reconsider the October 30, 1984 ruling is granted and summary judgment is entered in favor of plaintiff on his complaint in the amount of $150,000.”
“Esser’s motion for reconsideration is denied as to Counts I, II, III, V, VI, and VII.”
“the Court, having reconsidered on its own motion the Superintendent’s motion for summary judgment on the grounds of abstention, grants the Superintendent’s motion for the reasons set forth above”
“the Court granted the City’s motion for a protective order limiting disclosure of confidential information to third parties”
“Magistrate-Judge Bobrick recommended that the defendant’s motion for summary judgment be denied in part and granted only as to plaintiff’s Title VII claims as they relate to conduct which occurred prior to August 29, 1986”
“the Court denies plaintiffs’ motions for appointment of counsel”
“defendant Burlington Northern Railroad Company’s motions for partial summary judgment are granted”
“Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on Count I is granted because plaintiff’s conviction bars his false arrest claim.”
“Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on Count III is granted because plaintiff failed to comply with the notice requirements of the Tort Immunity Act.”
“the Court finds it unnecessary to consider plaintiffs motion to strike.”
“the government’s motion for summary judgment is granted and the case is dismissed.”
A historical record
Judge Rovner no longer hears cases. This profile stays available as a record of how they ruled. If you're preparing for a matter, start from the court's current bench.