Iain David Johnston
How Judge Johnston rules, drawn from 35 signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
About Judge Johnston
Iain David Johnston is a judge of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. Appointed by President Donald J. Trump, Judge Johnston received a commission on September 23, 2020.
Judge Johnston's practices and standing orders
Rules for cases before Judge Johnston, as published on the court's website (checked October 8, 2026). Judges revise these often, so confirm the current version on the court's site before you file.
Key rules
Motions
File the joint initial status report at least four business days before the hearing or by the ordered date.
“At least four (4) business days before the initial status hearing or by the date set by the Court, any party that has appeared shall join in completing and filing this Court's Joint Initial Status Report (revised 6/25/2025).”
Motions
Deliver motion courtesy copies to the operations specialist at least 48 hours before presentment.
“A courtesy copy of all motions must be delivered to Operations Specialist Yvonne Pedroza in Room 2200 at least 48 hours before the time of presentment.”
Motions
Serve default judgment motions and notice at least seven days before presentment.
“Service of the motion for default judgment and notice of presentment must occur at least seven (7) days before the motion for default judgment is presented.”
Standing orders for every case in this court
Orders the court applies to all of its cases, whichever judge has them, as published on the court's website (checked October 8, 2026).
How Judge Johnston decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
In DeJaynes v. Powell, Johnston denied a motion to dismiss a third party complaint because the movant relied on summary judgment and post verdict cases and asked the court to resolve factual issues at the pleading stage. He cited his standing order urging counsel to use cases from the same procedural posture.
“As everybody hopefully learned in the first semester of law school, counsel should rely on decisions involving motions to dismiss when briefing a motion to dismiss and decisions involving motions for summary judgment (or Rule 50) when briefing a motion for summary judgment.”
In Tlapa Castillo v. Snyders, Johnston denied remand under the federal officer removal statute. He read § 1357(g)(10) to permit a local sheriff to communicate and cooperate with immigration officers without a written agreement, rejecting the plaintiff’s contrary statutory argument.
“Without binding precedent to the contrary, the Court takes Congress at its word.”
In Arora v. Kharat, Johnston dismissed counterclaims whose dismissal the counterclaimants did not oppose. He quoted his standing order treating a failure to answer a colorable dismissal argument as a concession of the pleading’s insufficiency.
“If the Court is presented with a colorable argument in a motion to dismiss, and the plaintiff fails to respond to that motion, the Court will assume that the plaintiff concedes the insufficiency of its complaint.”
Procedural preferences
In Thorsen v. Community Unit School District 300, Johnston declined supplemental jurisdiction over state law fiduciary duty counts because the unsettled Illinois labor law issues would require him to break new ground. The plaintiff’s federal religious discrimination count against the school district continued.
“The Court is weary about potentially breaking new ground in Illinois labor relations law without clear authority to do so by Illinois law.”
In the Sharp family's civil rights case, he dismissed the claims with prejudice after three unsuccessful pleading opportunities. He also held that Officer Zenaty was entitled to qualified immunity on the unreasonable seizure claim because the plaintiffs had not identified clearly established law covering the alleged conduct.
“Because the Plaintiffs were given three opportunities to plead plausible claims and failed to do so, the dismissal is with prejudice.”
In a pregnancy discrimination pleading, the court rejected arguments drawn from summary judgment cases because the complaint needed plausible allegations, not evidence for each element. The close timing of lost overtime and termination after disclosure allowed the discrimination claim to proceed.
“Ms. Delitz doesn’t need to hang factual allegations on each element of a claim.”
Cautions
In Chaudhry v. Community Unit School District 300 Board of Education, Johnston dismissed the plaintiffs’ Monell claims with prejudice after their fourth amended complaint still failed to allege facts showing a widespread practice the school board would have noticed.
“the complaint continues to state an implausible theory of Monell liability because it does not plead enough factual matter to raise the inference that any assertedly unconstitutional practice had become so widespread that the Board was bound to have noticed it.”
In Trexler v. City of Belvidere, Johnston excluded one proposed use of force expert entirely and limited the other after finding inadmissible legal conclusions and irrelevant opinions. In that order, he also described his practice of routinely barring such proposed experts.
“the Court disfavors use of force ‘experts.’ The Court routinely bars these proffered opinion witnesses. ... Even the Magistrate Judges warn counsel not to waste their time and money on these types of ‘experts.’”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“Five bites at the apple are enough. The claims against the District are dismissed with prejudice.”
“Community Unit School District 300's motion to dismiss [128] is granted in part and denied in part. Thorsen's Title VII religious discrimination claim (Count I) remains, Counts II and III are dismissed without prejudice.”
“Local Education Association District 300's motion to dismiss [131] is granted in its entirety, Counts IV and V are dismissed.”
“Because Bayko's argument for dismissal relies entirely on cases addressing the wrong procedural posture, he has failed to meet his burden of establishing the insufficiency of the third-party complaint. ... The motion to dismiss [35] is denied.”
“For the reasons above, the Court denies Mr. Cover's motion for reconsideration under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e).”
“For the reasons set forth above, Tlapa's motion to remand [17] is denied. The Sheriff's allegations are sufficient to confer jurisdiction on this Court.”
“For the reasons stated above, the Court grants Defendants’ motion for summary judgment [135]. Final judgment shall enter for Defendants on all claims.”
“The Court grants Defendants’ motion for summary judgment and dismisses the case with prejudice.”
“The Court adopts Magistrate Judge Schneider’s December 01, 2022, Report and Recommendation in its entirety. This case is dismissed with prejudice.”
“The request by defendant Dr. Zahtz to dismiss the Third Amended Complaint based on his affirmative defense of failure to exhaust is granted.”
“this Court accepts Judge Jensen’s Report and Recommendation [60], dismisses the Third Amended Complaint, and denies the motion for leave [61].”
“Appellee’s motion to dismiss is granted. This action is remanded to the Circuit Court of the Twenty-Second Judicial Circuit, McHenry County, Illinois.”
“Contrary to Appellee’s argument, Appellants’ appeal was not statutorily barred. Thus, the Court, in its discretion, determines that additional sanctions of attorneys’ fees are unwarranted.”
“State Farm’s motion to dismiss and discharge [18] is granted in part and denied in part. State Farm is dismissed from this suit, its duties having been discharged with the deposit of the interpleader funds. The motion’s requested relief for permanent injunction and attorneys’ fees and costs is denied without prejudice.”
“For the foregoing reasons, the Court grants Counter Defendants’ motion to dismiss the amended counterclaim [85]. ... Because Counter Plaintiffs had the opportunity to amend their counterclaim, are represented by experienced counsel, and did not provide any clarity why the amended counterclaims should proceed, all dismissals are with prejudice.”
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
Median case duration in the sampled dockets: 254.0 days (N = 11).
Median motion-to-ruling time: 154 days (N = 9).
- Sampled across 2020-2022 filings (his first years as an Article III judge).
- The civil docket of this Rockford-division judge spans civil rights / police (Campbell v. City of Sycamore, Redmond v. City of Rockford), prisoner civil rights (Bernard, Adair v. Dart, Lisle v. Simpson), employment civil rights (Thurman v. Titan Tire), premises/PI (Durso and Baker v. Menard), insurance (Allied Emergency Services v. Travco), patent/licensing (Bataan Licensing v. Donaldson), and contract (Harrington).
- Durations are markedly longer than the senior-judge records in this corpus: an active-judge profile.
Pending matters in the official report
Reported by the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts under the Civil Justice Reform Act, as of March 31, 2026.
| Motions pending more than six months | 0 |
| Bench trials submitted more than six months | 0 |
| Bankruptcy appeals pending more than six months | 0 |
| Social Security appeals pending more than six months | 2 |
| Civil cases pending more than three years | 56 |
| Report | Motions over six months | Cases over three years |
|---|---|---|
| Mar 2026 | 0 | 56 |
| Sep 2025 | 0 | 57 |
| Mar 2025 | 1 | 37 |
| Sep 2024 | 1 | 40 |
| Mar 2024 | 0 | 31 |
| Sep 2023 | 13 | 29 |
| Mar 2023 | 9 | 28 |
| Sep 2022 | 0 | 24 |
| Mar 2022 | 2 | 30 |
| Sep 2021 | 0 | 34 |
| Mar 2021 | 0 | 22 |
| Sep 2020 | 0 | 15 |
A snapshot on that date: matters listed may since have been decided or reassigned. A motion referred to a magistrate judge is counted for both judges. Motions in multidistrict litigation, section 2255 cases and Social Security appeals are not counted, and a very large three-year count is generally a multidistrict docket. Source: Appendix A of the report (PDF); about the report.
How long civil cases take in this court
For the whole of U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, not for Judge Johnston: median time from filing to disposition of the civil cases the court closed in the 12 months ending September 30, 2025, as reported by the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts.
| Cases | Median time | |
|---|---|---|
| All civil cases closed | 12,205 | 5.9 months |
| Closed with no court action | 4,300 | 7 months |
| Closed before pretrial | 7,558 | 5.4 months |
| Closed during or after pretrial | 305 | 12.6 months |
| Closed during trial | 42 | 49.5 months |
| 12 months ending | Cases closed | Median time |
|---|---|---|
| Sep 2025 | 12,205 | 5.9 months |
| Sep 2024 | 9,700 | 6.8 months |
| Sep 2023 | 7,093 | 6 months |
| Sep 2022 | 6,841 | 7.3 months |
| Sep 2021 | 9,703 | 15.1 months |
| Sep 2020 | 8,046 | 10.6 months |
| Sep 2019 | 8,134 | 7.4 months |
The table leaves out prisoner petitions, land condemnations, deportation reviews, recovery of overpayments and enforcement of judgments, and reports no median for fewer than 10 cases. A district that closed a large multidistrict litigation in the period shows very large counts and long medians for that year. Source: Table C-5, U.S. District Courts (spreadsheet).
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