Iain David Johnston
How Judge Johnston decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
Procedural posture matters intensely to him: he has a standing order (and enforces it) that on a motion to dismiss, litigants should rely on cases decided on motions to dismiss -- summary-judgment and post-verdict cases are 'not particularly helpful' because of the differing standards. A movant who argues factual questions (duty, proximate cause) and cites SJ cases on a 12(b)(6) motion will lose for failing to meet its burden.
“As everybody hopefully learned in the first semester of law school, counsel should rely on decisions involving motions to dismiss when briefing a motion to dismiss and decisions involving motions for summary judgment (or Rule 50) when briefing a motion for summary judgment.”
He reads statutory text closely and will follow plain text over policy or slippery-slope arguments. In the Federal Officer Removal context he held that 8 U.S.C. 1357(g)(10) permits a local officer to cooperate with ICE without a formal written agreement, taking 'Congress at its word' and rejecting contrary out-of-circuit reasoning ('Hypotheticals do not trump unambiguous statutory text.').
“Without binding precedent to the contrary, the Court takes Congress at its word.”
He treats a party's failure to respond to a motion or an argument as a forfeiture/concession, by Standing Order. If you do not address an opposing argument on a motion to dismiss, he will assume you concede that point and dismiss it; ignoring a motion entirely while litigating other matters reads as abandonment (Rule 41(b)). Always brief every argument the other side raises.
“If the Court is presented with a colorable argument in a motion to dismiss, and the plaintiff fails to respond to that motion, the Court will assume that the plaintiff concedes the insufficiency of its complaint.”
Procedural preferences
He holds parties to the representations they make in their briefs (e.g., limiting a time-barred allegation to 'background evidence' only, or pinning a conspiracy's 'unlawful act' to a single asserted theory) and then decides the motion on that narrowed basis. He will also address a Rule 12(b)(1) subject-matter-jurisdiction challenge before the merits and decline supplemental jurisdiction over novel/complex unsettled state-law questions rather than 'break new ground' in state law.
“The Court is weary about potentially breaking new ground in Illinois labor relations law without clear authority to do so by Illinois law.”
On qualified immunity he requires the plaintiff to point to a 'closely analogous case' placing the constitutional question 'beyond debate'; generic citations (Terry, Caniglia) will not clear the clearly-established prong. And he enforces a hard three-amendments limit: after repeated failed pleadings he dismisses WITH prejudice.
“The Bank insists that the district judge abused his discretion by dismissing the complaint with prejudice rather than allowing it to try again. But in court, as in baseball, three strikes and you’re out.”
Cautions
Monell municipal-liability claims must be pleaded with real factual matter showing a widespread custom the policymaker was bound to notice; allegations of a single rogue employee's conduct will not do, and he will not let conclusory custom allegations 'unlock the doors of discovery.' After repeated amendments he will dismiss WITH PREJUDICE. Reconsideration under Rule 59(e) is an 'extraordinary remedy granted sparingly' -- rehashing prior arguments or alleging bias from judicial rulings alone will fail.
“the complaint continues to state an implausible theory of Monell liability because it does not plead enough factual matter to raise the inference that any assertedly unconstitutional practice had become so widespread that the Board was bound to have noticed it.”
He openly disfavors use-of-force 'experts' and routinely bars them; in a Section 1983 excessive-force case he barred one side's expert entirely and large portions of the other's, excluding opinions that recite legal conclusions (e.g., applying the Graham factors) or address matters not at issue. Do not build an excessive-force case around a use-of-force expert in his courtroom, and keep any expert away from legal conclusions.
“the Court disfavors use of force “experts.” The Court routinely bars these proffered opinion witnesses. ... Even the Magistrate Judges warn counsel not to waste their time and money on these types of “experts.””
Motion outcomes
Counted from classified signed orders only. Percentages are shown only where the sample is large enough to be meaningful; smaller samples are reported as raw counts.
| Motions to dismiss N = 11 |
Granted: 7Granted in part: 3Denied: 1 | 91% granted |
| Summary judgment N = 3 |
Granted: 3 | counts only |
| Daubert N = 2 |
Granted: 1Granted in part: 1 | counts only |
| Motion for reconsideration N = 1 |
Denied: 1 | counts only |
| Motions to remand N = 1 |
Denied: 1 | counts only |
| Involuntary dismissal N = 1 |
Granted: 1 | counts only |
| Motion for leave to amend N = 1 |
Denied: 1 | counts only |
| Motion for sanctions N = 1 |
Denied: 1 | counts only |
| Motion for attorney fees N = 1 |
Denied: 1 | counts only |
| Motion to compel arbitration N = 1 |
Granted: 1 | counts only |
A "1 of 1" is one ruling, not a tendency. Treat small samples as illustrative, not predictive.
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“Five bites at the apple are enough. The claims against the District are dismissed with prejudice.”
“Community Unit School District 300's motion to dismiss [128] is granted in part and denied in part. Thorsen's Title VII religious discrimination claim (Count I) remains, Counts II and III are dismissed without prejudice.”
“Local Education Association District 300's motion to dismiss [131] is granted in its entirety, Counts IV and V are dismissed.”
“Because Bayko's argument for dismissal relies entirely on cases addressing the wrong procedural posture, he has failed to meet his burden of establishing the insufficiency of the third-party complaint. ... The motion to dismiss [35] is denied.”
“For the reasons above, the Court denies Mr. Cover's motion for reconsideration under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e).”
“For the reasons set forth above, Tlapa's motion to remand [17] is denied. The Sheriff's allegations are sufficient to confer jurisdiction on this Court.”
“For the reasons stated above, the Court grants Defendants’ motion for summary judgment [135]. Final judgment shall enter for Defendants on all claims.”
“The Court grants Defendants’ motion for summary judgment and dismisses the case with prejudice.”
“The Court adopts Magistrate Judge Schneider’s December 01, 2022, Report and Recommendation in its entirety. This case is dismissed with prejudice.”
“The request by defendant Dr. Zahtz to dismiss the Third Amended Complaint based on his affirmative defense of failure to exhaust is granted.”
“this Court accepts Judge Jensen’s Report and Recommendation [60], dismisses the Third Amended Complaint, and denies the motion for leave [61].”
“Appellee’s motion to dismiss is granted. This action is remanded to the Circuit Court of the Twenty-Second Judicial Circuit, McHenry County, Illinois.”
“Contrary to Appellee’s argument, Appellants’ appeal was not statutorily barred. Thus, the Court, in its discretion, determines that additional sanctions of attorneys’ fees are unwarranted.”
“State Farm’s motion to dismiss and discharge [18] is granted in part and denied in part. State Farm is dismissed from this suit, its duties having been discharged with the deposit of the interpleader funds. The motion’s requested relief for permanent injunction and attorneys’ fees and costs is denied without prejudice.”
“For the foregoing reasons, the Court grants Counter Defendants’ motion to dismiss the amended counterclaim [85]. ... Because Counter Plaintiffs had the opportunity to amend their counterclaim, are represented by experienced counsel, and did not provide any clarity why the amended counterclaims should proceed, all dismissals are with prejudice.”
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
Median case duration in the sampled dockets: 254.0 days (N = 11).
Median motion-to-ruling time: 154 days (N = 3).
Sampled across 2020-2022 filings (his first years as an Article III judge). The civil docket of this Rockford-division judge spans civil rights / police (Campbell v. City of Sycamore, Redmond v. City of Rockford), prisoner civil rights (Bernard, Adair v. Dart, Lisle v. Simpson), employment civil rights (Thurman v. Titan Tire), premises/PI (Durso and Baker v. Menard), insurance (Allied Emergency Services v. Travco), patent/licensing (Bataan Licensing v. Donaldson), and contract (Harrington). Durations are markedly longer than the senior-judge records in this corpus -- an active-judge profile.