Harry Daniel Leinenweber
How Judge Leinenweber decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
At the pleading stage he refuses to resolve fact questions the defendant frames as legal ones: a plausible allegation (e.g. a temporary permit affixed to the window, or an advertised mileage figure) survives a Rule 12(b)(6) motion even if it 'may turn out' to be wrong, because that is a question of fact for later.
“It may turn out that the permit was indeed not valid but this is a question of fact. The Motion to Dismiss Count I is denied.”
Procedural preferences
Strictly enforces Local Rule 56.1 on summary judgment: facts in the movant's statement that are not properly controverted with record citations are deemed admitted, and a party cannot defeat MSJ by saying it needs more discovery after discovery has closed.
“Plaintiffs can hardly expect to defeat a motion for summary judgment by claiming they do not yet have the evidence to prove their case.”
Applies the heightened Rule 9(b) 'who, what, when, where, and how' standard to common-law fraud (but Rule 8 to statutory Illinois CFA unfairness claims); a defendant tied to the fraud only by corporate affiliation is dismissed without prejudice for lack of particularized role.
“the Complaint fails to satisfy Rule 9(b) with regard to VCNA. Plaintiffs claim that VCNA can be held liable because of its corporate affiliation with VCUSA ... However, this is not sufficient under Rule 9(b).”
Where a near-identical state-court case is further along, he will invoke Colorado River abstention and STAY (not dismiss) the federal case to avoid piecemeal litigation and inconsistent outcomes -- even applying it sua sponte after rejecting the defendant's proffered Younger ground.
“Under Colorado River, however, the appropriate remedy is to stay, rather than dismiss, the action. Accordingly, this Court will stay this action pending the outcome of the state court proceeding.”
Cautions
A Monell claim needs a genuinely widespread practice, not a handful of scattered instances; recasting a personal-harassment theory as a city-wide unconstitutional policy without supporting authority gets dismissed with prejudice.
“There is no evidence that this was a widespread practice. The Motion to Dismiss Count III is granted with prejudice.”
On Title VII pretext, an honest-but-mistaken business reason is not pretext: 'Pretext means a lie, not just an error.' A bilingual-language job requirement is a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason absent comparator evidence.
“Pretext means a lie, not just an error. ... Plaintiffs offer no evidence to contradict Principal Sauri's deposition testimony that the need for a bilingual clerk was the actual and sufficient motivation for Plaintiffs' termination.”
Motion outcomes
Counted from classified signed orders only. Percentages are shown only where the sample is large enough to be meaningful; smaller samples are reported as raw counts.
| Motions to dismiss N = 4 |
Granted: 1Granted in part: 1Denied: 2 | counts only |
| Summary judgment N = 1 |
Granted: 1 | counts only |
A "1 of 1" is one ruling, not a tendency. Treat small samples as illustrative, not predictive.
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“Plaintiffs completely fail to identify similarly situated individuals and they fail to provide any proof of pretext. In lieu of offering direct evidence of discrimination, they offer only speculation and their bare allegations of discriminatory intent. This is wholly insufficient to withstand summary judgment. Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted.”
“the Court denies Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, but orders the case stayed until the resolution of the parallel state case.”
“1. The Motion to Dismiss Count I is denied as to both Defendants; 2. The Motion to Dismiss Count II is denied as to VCUSA and granted as to VCNA without prejudice; 3. The Motion to Dismiss Count III is denied; and 4. The Motion to Dismiss Count IV is denied.”
“The Court believes Plaintiff has the better of the argument on Count I. The posture of the case is on a motion to dismiss, not for summary judgment. ... The Motion to Dismiss Count I is denied.”
“There is no evidence that this was a widespread practice. The Motion to Dismiss Count III is granted with prejudice.”
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
Median case duration in the sampled dockets: 127.0 days (N = 19).
Descriptive from search_dockets nature_of_suit/cause fields across the Jan-2016 cohort; not an exhaustive census.