Harry Daniel Leinenweber
How Judge Leinenweber rules, drawn from 4 signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
Judge Leinenweber no longer hears cases. This profile is preserved as a historical record of how they ruled here.
About Judge Leinenweber
Harry Daniel Leinenweber was a judge of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. Appointed by President Ronald Reagan, Judge Leinenweber received a commission on December 17, 1985. Judge Leinenweber assumed senior status on June 3, 2002 and served until death on June 11, 2024.
How Judge Leinenweber decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
In Sroga v. Hondzinski, he denied dismissal of the illegal-seizure claim because the alleged temporary permit's validity presented a factual question.
“It may turn out that the permit was indeed not valid but this is a question of fact. The Motion to Dismiss Count I is denied.”
Procedural preferences
In Lauer v. Chicago Board of Education, he rejected the plaintiffs' attempt to resist summary judgment by saying they still lacked evidence after discovery had closed.
“Plaintiffs can hardly expect to defeat a motion for summary judgment by claiming they do not yet have the evidence to prove their case.”
In Laurens v. Volvo Cars of North America, Leinenweber dismissed the common-law fraud claim against VCNA without prejudice because corporate affiliation alone did not plead its role with Rule 9(b) particularity, while allowing other claims to proceed.
“the Complaint fails to satisfy Rule 9(b) with regard to VCNA. Plaintiffs claim that VCNA can be held liable because of its corporate affiliation with VCUSA ... However, this is not sufficient under Rule 9(b).”
In Gu v. Bank of America, he stayed the federal case under Colorado River pending the parallel state proceeding rather than dismissing it.
“Under Colorado River, however, the appropriate remedy is to stay, rather than dismiss, the action. Accordingly, this Court will stay this action pending the outcome of the state court proceeding.”
Cautions
In Sroga, he dismissed the plaintiff’s Monell claim against Chicago with prejudice because the amended complaint did not show a widespread practice of VIN checks on vehicles with obscured VINs and temporary permits.
“There is no evidence that this was a widespread practice. The Motion to Dismiss Count III is granted with prejudice.”
In Lauer, he granted summary judgment on the clerks’ discrimination claims because they offered no evidence contradicting the principal’s testimony that a need for bilingual staff motivated the staffing decision.
“Pretext means a lie, not just an error. ... Plaintiffs offer no evidence to contradict Principal Sauri's deposition testimony that the need for a bilingual clerk was the actual and sufficient motivation for Plaintiffs' termination.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“Plaintiffs completely fail to identify similarly situated individuals and they fail to provide any proof of pretext. In lieu of offering direct evidence of discrimination, they offer only speculation and their bare allegations of discriminatory intent. This is wholly insufficient to withstand summary judgment. Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted.”
“the Court denies Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, but orders the case stayed until the resolution of the parallel state case.”
“1. The Motion to Dismiss Count I is denied as to both Defendants; 2. The Motion to Dismiss Count II is denied as to VCUSA and granted as to VCNA without prejudice; 3. The Motion to Dismiss Count III is denied; and 4. The Motion to Dismiss Count IV is denied.”
“The Court believes Plaintiff has the better of the argument on Count I. The posture of the case is on a motion to dismiss, not for summary judgment. ... The Motion to Dismiss Count I is denied.”
“There is no evidence that this was a widespread practice. The Motion to Dismiss Count III is granted with prejudice.”
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
Median case duration in the sampled dockets: 127.0 days (N = 19).
The caseload description is drawn from the recorded case types and causes of action in a January 2016 filing cohort. It is a limited sample rather than an exhaustive census of Judge Leinenweber's docket.
Pending matters in the official report
Judge Leinenweber was last listed in the Civil Justice Reform Act report as of March 31, 2024.
| Motions pending more than six months | 0 |
| Bench trials submitted more than six months | 0 |
| Bankruptcy appeals pending more than six months | 0 |
| Social Security appeals pending more than six months | 0 |
| Civil cases pending more than three years | 24 |
| Report | Motions over six months | Cases over three years |
|---|---|---|
| Mar 2024 | 0 | 24 |
| Sep 2023 | 0 | 44 |
| Mar 2023 | 1 | 39 |
| Sep 2022 | 1 | 44 |
| Mar 2022 | 2 | 55 |
| Sep 2021 | 1 | 31 |
| Mar 2021 | 3 | 35 |
| Sep 2020 | 0 | 31 |
A snapshot on that date: matters listed may since have been decided or reassigned. A motion referred to a magistrate judge is counted for both judges. Motions in multidistrict litigation, section 2255 cases and Social Security appeals are not counted, and a very large three-year count is generally a multidistrict docket. Source: Appendix A of the report (PDF); about the report.
A historical record
Judge Leinenweber no longer hears cases. This profile stays available as a record of how they ruled here. If you're preparing for a matter, start from the court's current bench.