Frederick J. Kapala
How Judge Kapala rules, drawn from 21 signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
Judge Kapala no longer sits on this court. This profile is preserved as a historical record of how they ruled here.
About Judge Kapala
Frederick J. Kapala served as a United States District Judge for the Northern District of Illinois after receiving his commission in May 2007. He took inactive senior status in May 2019, when the court stopped assigning him civil and criminal cases.
How Judge Kapala decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
In Harris v. Hammil, Kapala rejected the argument that a prisoner failed to exhaust merely because his grievance omitted the defendant’s name or used the wrong checkbox. He nonetheless granted the doctor summary judgment because the grievance addressed a different episode before she treated him.
“The evidence in the record evaluated under controlling Seventh Circuit case law forecloses the defendant's arguments regarding exhaustion for failure to check the right box or to name the defendant in the grievance.”
In Taylor v. Chandler, Kapala denied exhaustion-based summary judgment because the prisoner’s verified account of filing grievances conflicted with the defendants’ records. He scheduled a Pavey hearing to resolve that factual dispute.
“Because the motion for summary judgment based on failure to exhaust administrative remedies is factually contested by the parties, this court will deny the motion, and instead schedule a Pavey hearing on the matter.”
Procedural preferences
In this prisoner's civil rights case, he deemed the defendant's facts admitted after the plaintiff responded to the Local Rule 56.1 statement with argument rather than direct, supported responses to its numbered facts.
“Accordingly, as the plaintiff has failed to properly respond to the defendant’s statement of facts, they are deemed admitted.”
In Clark v. Porter, Kapala dismissed the claims against substituted defendants as time-barred, holding that replacing “Unknown Employees” after the limitations period did not relate back under Rule 15 because lack of knowledge of their names was not a mistake.
“plaintiffs cannot, after the statute of limitations period, name as defendants individuals that were unidentified at the time of the original pleading. Not knowing a defendant’s name is not a mistake under Rule 15.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“Because plaintiff’s failure to name defendants prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations was due to a lack of knowledge as to their identity, and not a mistake in their names, plaintiff cannot avail herself of the relation-back doctrine of Rule 15(c). Accordingly, defendants’ motions to dismiss are granted with prejudice.”
“Defendants’ motion for summary judgment [47] is denied. However, the court will schedule a Pavey hearing for February 20, 2013 at 9:30 a.m. to determine the exhaustion issue on the merits.”
“For the foregoing reasons, Counts I, VI, VII, VIII, IX, and X are dismissed in their entirety and Counts II, III, and IV are dismissed with respect to plaintiffs PDLR, Burke, Banucci, Synergy, DLCM, and FSC.”
“Based on the foregoing, defendants’ motion to dismiss is granted and Counts 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 12, 13, 14, 15, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 42, 43, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 55, 56, 57, 58, and 59 of the second amended complaint are dismissed.”
“For the foregoing reasons, the defendant’s motion for summary judgment is granted. Dr. Jill Wahl is dismissed as a defendant.”
“Defendant’s motion for summary judgment [120] is granted. This case is closed.”
“The Seattle defendants’ Rule 12(b)(2) motion to dismiss [85] is denied.”
“Seattle defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss [96] is granted in part and denied in part. The Brady claim alleged against the Seattle defendants in Count I is dismissed with prejudice.”
“The prosecutors’ motion to dismiss [100] is granted in part and denied in part. Count V is dismissed with prejudice. Count II is dismissed without prejudice to refiling within 30 days.”
“Defendant’s motion for summary judgment [28] is granted in part and denied in part. The motion is denied as to Count I except as to plaintiff’s claim for hostile work environment, which is dismissed. The motion is denied as to Count II. The motion is granted as to Counts III, IV, and V.”
“Helmolds and the Trust’s motion to dismiss [8] is granted in part and denied in part. Count VI is dismissed but plaintiff is granted leave to file an amended complaint within 21 days if he wishes to add a request for punitive damages as a remedy for another claim.”
“Lowmans’ motion to dismiss [21] is denied.”
“McDowell’s motion to vacate, set aside, or correct sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 [1] is denied.”
“Motions for leave to seek discovery [9] [11] are denied.”
“Petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 [1] is denied.”
“For the foregoing reasons, defendants’ motion for summary judgment is granted.”
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
Median case duration in the sampled dockets: 64.0 days (N = 7).
- Sampled 2015-2017 filings. Nature-of-suit mix skews heavily to prisoner litigation — §2255 motions to vacate sentence (510), §2254 habeas (530), and prison-condition suits (555) — plus pro se immigration/DHS habeas, FCRA (e.g. Whirl v. TransUnion), and a steady volume of same-day administrative/miscellaneous matters (NLRB applications such as NLRB v. Becker, criminal/registration filings).
- The contested civil merits cases that generate his written reasoning (Title VII employment, product/consumer-fraud class actions, multi-count civil-rights suits) are a smaller share of the enumerable docket.
A historical record
Judge Kapala no longer sits on this court. This profile stays available as a record of how they ruled here. If you're preparing for a matter, start from the court's current bench.