Daniel P. McLaughlin
How Judge McLaughlin decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
In Social Security appeals, he remands readily when an ALJ's step-five job-numbers finding rests on a factual slip: he found remand required where an ALJ mischaracterized semi-skilled jobs as unskilled, and separately where an ALJ appeared to attribute testimony to the vocational expert that was never actually given.
“Because the vocational testimony upon which the ALJ said he principally relied is in fact imaginary, the ALJ's decision is not properly supported and the Court cannot properly assess whether the government has satisfied its step five burden.”
He holds ALJs to a heightened, specific duty to explain why they discount a treating or examining source's opinion, and will not accept a generic reference to 'normal' findings as sufficient, particularly for conditions like fibromyalgia where normal physical findings are expected rather than inconsistent with the diagnosis.
“[T]he ALJ erred in this case by finding inconsistency in the medical opinions based on normal examinations without adequately explaining how the examinations were actually inconsistent with the providers' opinions.”
He is willing to affirm the Commissioner where the ALJ's reasoning is adequately explained, even against a multi-pronged challenge -- an affirmance is not automatic to remand and he does not simply rubber-stamp claimant arguments.
“[T]he Court finds that, per the ALJ's explanations and support outlined above, the ALJ reasonably determined that Plaintiff's allegations were not fully corroborated.”
Procedural preferences
He discourages discovery motions and requires a documented, in-person meet-and-confer effort before he will hear one; parties cannot reply to a discovery motion without leave, and he will impose extra meet-and-confer requirements (up to sharing the cost of a court reporter at conferences) if the parties keep filing them.
“requires counsel for parties to meet in person unless it is impracticable to do so ... Parties are forewarned that if the parties' inability to be reasonable and compromise results in the filing of excessive discovery motions, the Court will impose additional meet-and-confer requirements on the parties, that may include the presence of a court reporter at all meet-and-confer sessions.”
He actively conducts his own settlement conferences on consent-reassigned civil cases, working from written pre-conference settlement statements, and will resolve a settlement-conference request himself rather than simply granting one party's motion when the other side's interest is unclear.
“Defendant's Motion does not present the other parties' interest in proceeding to a settlement conference with the Court, and the Court does not schedule settlement conferences without the consent of the other parties that would need to attend the conference.”
Cautions
In an employment case, he dismissed with prejudice on a second try where the plaintiff had already amended once and did not ask for further leave or explain how another amendment would fix the pleading's problems -- an early sign he will end a case rather than allow open-ended repleading once a plaintiff has already had a chance to fix it.
“dismissal with prejudice is appropriate here because Plaintiff 'does not request leave to further amend or suggest how another amendment might cure the defects identified by the present motion[] to dismiss.'”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“Plaintiff's Motion for Protective Order [246] is granted to the extent that otherwise relevant litigation funding materials which include counsel's ‘mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories’ are protected work product and need not be produced. ... The Motion is otherwise denied, and Plaintiff is ordered to produce all relevant, non-privileged discovery related to litigation funding.”
“Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment [14] is denied, and the Commissioner's cross-motion for summary judgment [17] is granted.”
“Defendant's motion to dismiss [20] is granted and Plaintiff's claims are dismissed with prejudice.”
“Plaintiff's motion for summary remand [17] is granted, and the Commissioner's cross-motion for summary judgment [20] is denied.”
“Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment [13] is granted in part and denied in part, and the Commissioner's cross-motion for summary judgment [16] is denied.”
“Plaintiff's motion to remand [13] is granted, and the Commissioner's motion for summary judgment [18] is denied.”
“Plaintiff's motion to reverse the Commissioner's decision [14] is granted in part, and the Commissioner's cross-motion for summary judgment [16] is denied.”
“Plaintiff's motion for summary remand [16] is granted, and the Commissioner's cross-motion for summary judgment [17] is denied.”
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
Median case duration in the sampled dockets: 154 days (N = 5).
His docket since his September 2024 swearing-in is a mix of a criminal duty-magistrate rotation (search warrants, sealed seizure matters, initial appearances -- no civil-motion signal), a steady inflow of consent Social Security disability appeals assigned directly to him as new cases are filed, and ordinary civil cases referred to him or consent-reassigned under Local Rule 73.1 (an antitrust discovery dispute, an insurance coverage declaratory-judgment action, an employment-discrimination case, and a copyright case).
Put Judge McLaughlin's record to work
Ezel drafts and answers grounded in this exact profile: how Judge McLaughlin actually rules, not a generic AI guess.
Opens in Ezel Pro. Every answer is grounded in Judge McLaughlin's own signed orders and cites them.