Charles Ronald Norgle Sr.
How Judge Sr. decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
On an Eighth Amendment deliberate-indifference claim, prolonged untreated dental pain is an objectively serious medical need, and a provider's choice of the 'easier and less efficacious treatment' (temporary fixes, pain meds, refusing to refer to a dentist absent an 'emergency') can itself be deliberate indifference -- so an 'it was never an emergency' defense does not win summary judgment.
“the law is clear that "such emergencies are certainly not the only serious dental conditions that demand reasonably prompt professional attention." ... Thus, this "emergency" argument is no cure-all for Medical Defendants.”
Under the Illinois Trade Secrets Act, common-law claims (unjust enrichment, conversion, trespass to chattels, civil conspiracy) that are predicated solely on the defendant's possession or use of the plaintiff's confidential information are preempted and dismissed -- even where the information may ultimately not qualify as a trade secret. Plead an independent factual basis or lose the duplicative counts.
“Plaintiffs' unjust enrichment claim is dependent on trade secrets and is preempted. ... Accordingly Count IX is dismissed without prejudice.”
Procedural preferences
He enforces Local Rule 56.1 strictly: facts not presented in compliant form are disregarded, and he will not search the record for support a party failed to point out. Put each material fact, with its record cite, in the 56.1 statement.
“Litigants must strictly comply with LR 56.1, and district courts do not abuse their discretion when they disregard facts presented in a noncompliant manner. ... "The court is not required to scour the record for evidence that supports a party's case if the party fails to point it out; that is the counsel's job."”
On cross-motions for summary judgment he evaluates each motion independently and on its own record; denying one side's motion does not mean the other side wins. Brief each motion as a standalone, not as a referendum on the opponent's.
“Each motion is to be evaluated independently, and denial of one does not necessitate the grant of the other.”
Cautions
At summary judgment in a civil-rights case, where video (e.g. dashcam) blatantly contradicts the non-movant's account, he applies Scott v. Harris and will NOT adopt the plaintiff's version of events -- and because probable cause is an absolute defense to false-arrest/malicious-prosecution claims, an officer-defendant's MSJ is granted. If there is dispositive video, address it head-on.
“The video evidence contradicts Plaintiff's account; therefore, the Court will not accept his version of what transpired for purposes of summary judgment.”
He reads statutory exemptions for governmental entities broadly: a housing authority created under the Illinois Housing Authorities Act (and its wholly-controlled subsidiary) is a 'political subdivision' of Illinois exempt from liability under the Illinois Employee Classification Act. A 30(b)(6) witness conceding the entity is not 'public' does not bind the court.
“the Court holds as a matter of law that the DuPage Housing Authority is a "political subdivision" of the State of Illinois for purposes of the IECA and that as such it is exempt from liability under the IECA”
Motion outcomes
Counted from classified signed orders only. Percentages are shown only where the sample is large enough to be meaningful; smaller samples are reported as raw counts.
| Summary judgment N = 6 |
Granted: 1Granted in part: 2Denied: 3 | counts only |
| Motions to dismiss N = 1 |
Granted in part: 1 | counts only |
| Motions to strike N = 1 |
Denied: 1 | counts only |
A "1 of 1" is one ruling, not a tendency. Treat small samples as illustrative, not predictive.
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“Defendants' motion for summary judgment [38] is granted. Civil case terminated. ... For the reasons stated, judgment is entered in Defendants' favor on all claims.”
“Defendants' motion for partial summary judgment [98] is granted in part and denied in part. ... Defendant DHA's motion for summary judgment as to the IECA claim, Count 3, is granted. ... Defendants' motion for summary judgment as to the IPWA claim is denied.”
“Plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment [86] is denied. ... because the Court has held that Defendants are political subdivisions exempt from liability under the IECA, Plaintiff's motion thus is denied.”
“Defendants' motion for summary judgment on Plaintiff's claims under the FLSA and IMWL is denied. ... For the foregoing reasons, ... Defendants' motion for summary judgment is denied.”
“Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment is granted in part and denied in part, and Defendants' motion for summary judgment is denied.”
“In short, due to substantial disputes on issues of material fact at every turn, each motion for summary judgment is denied.”
“Finally, with respect to Defendants' motion to strike, Defendants have submitted an undeveloped argument ... As such, that motion is likewise denied. United States v. Dunkel ... ("Judges are not like pigs, hunting for truffles buried in briefs.")”
“For the aforementioned reasons, Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiffs' complaint is granted in part and denied in part. Defendants' motion to dismiss Counts I, II, and III is denied. ... Finally, the Court grants Defendant's motion to dismiss Counts V, VII, VIII, IX, X. ... to the extent any claim was dismissed, it dismissed without prejudice.”
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
Median case duration in the sampled dockets: 1847 days (N = 3).
Median motion-to-ruling time: 153 days (N = 2).
Senior (inactive) since 2022-10-04, so he no longer takes new cases. His litigated civil docket (the cases sampled here) spans employment/wage (Simpkins, Thurman), Section 1983 civil rights (Brooks false-arrest, Brady jail deliberate-indifference), and trade-secret/commercial (Inmar/Ahalogy). His final pre-senior assignments (mid-2022) were heavily Schedule-A intellectual-property 'Partnerships and Unincorporated Associations' suits and quickly-terminated removals/PI matters. Nature-of-suit only partially reported in docket case-level metadata.