Charles Petros Kocoras
How Judge Kocoras decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
On personal jurisdiction over Schedule-A / overseas online sellers, an interactive website accessible in Illinois plus a plaintiff's own investigatory 'test buy' shipped to Illinois is NOT enough -- the plaintiff cannot manufacture jurisdiction; there must be evidence of the defendant targeting Illinois beyond the suit-related test purchase. A key reason such Schedule-A cases get dismissed as to appearing defendants.
“Such sales on their own are insufficient for the purposes of personal jurisdiction ... a plaintiff cannot manufacture jurisdiction against an out-of-state defendant by purchasing that defendant's products from the forum state.”
On labor-arbitrability, he applies the presumption of arbitrability strictly: to keep a grievance out of arbitration a party needs express exclusionary language or 'the most forceful evidence' of intent to exclude. A Last Chance Agreement that waives arbitration of a termination does NOT, by silence, also strip arbitration of the threshold question whether the violation occurred -- ambiguity is resolved in favor of arbitration.
“Agreements that require us to assume that an issue has been excluded from arbitration cannot be said to expressly exclude that issue. ... in uncertain situations, the presumption should favor arbitrability.”
Procedural preferences
He decides cross-motions for summary judgment by assessing each independently -- denying one side's motion does not mean the other side wins. He recites this rule expressly in his cross-MSJ opinions.
“When parties file cross-motions for summary judgment, each motion must be assessed independently, and denial of one does not necessitate the grant of the other.”
He will grant summary judgment even on a fact-intensive question (e.g. identity/forgery) when the non-movant, after the movant carries its burden, offers no admissible evidence a reasonable juror could rely on -- particularly after key expert testimony is stricken. Admissible record evidence, not factual complexity, controls.
“summary judgment is appropriate where the movant has carried its initial burden and the nonmovant has presented no evidence upon which a reasonable juror could rely in returning a verdict for the nonmovant.”
Cautions
A state-law civil-conspiracy claim must rest on an independent unlawful act and a real injury; alleged concealment of a tortfeasor's identity that merely delays (but does not foreclose) the plaintiff's access to the courts is not actionable, because the plaintiff could have sued and obtained the identity in discovery.
“because Chico's conspiracy claim is not grounded in an unlawful act, he has failed to state a civil conspiracy under Illinois law, and accordingly, Count III must be dismissed.”
Section 1927 sanctions require objective or subjective bad faith -- recklessness or indifference to the law -- not mere negligence. Counsel's litigation missteps, without vexatious bad faith, will not yield a fee-shifting sanction from him.
“while counsel certainly made some missteps in pursuing this litigation, these missteps amount to mere negligence rather than vexatious conduct in bad faith. The Moving Defendants' motion for sanctions is denied.”
Motion outcomes
Counted from classified signed orders only. Percentages are shown only where the sample is large enough to be meaningful; smaller samples are reported as raw counts.
| Summary judgment N = 4 |
Granted: 2Denied: 2 | counts only |
| Motions to dismiss N = 3 |
Granted: 2Denied: 1 | counts only |
| Motion for sanctions N = 1 |
Denied: 1 | counts only |
A "1 of 1" is one ruling, not a tendency. Treat small samples as illustrative, not predictive.
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“Based on the foregoing analysis, Defendants' motion to dismiss is granted without prejudice.”
“Based on the foregoing analysis, the motion to dismiss of Defendants Survillas and Woods is denied.”
“Based on the foregoing analysis, Primerica's motion for summary judgment is granted.”
“Carolyn Brown's motion for summary judgment is denied.”
“Local 73's motion for summary judgment is granted. Argonne's motion for summary judgment is denied.”
“Argonne's motion for summary judgment is denied.”
“The Moving Defendants' Rule 12(b)(2) motion to dismiss is granted. Plaintiff's FAC is dismissed as to the Moving Defendants ... for lack of personal jurisdiction.”
“these missteps amount to mere negligence rather than vexatious conduct in bad faith. The Moving Defendants' motion for sanctions is denied.”
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
Median case duration in the sampled dockets: 314 days (N = 2).
Median motion-to-ruling time: 67 days (N = 1).
Senior (since 2006) but long-active; the cases sampled span civil-rights/municipal (Chico), Lanham Act/IP incl. the modern Schedule-A overseas-counterfeiter wave (Full House, Expeditee/Xped), insurance breach-of-contract (Brown v. Primerica), and labor/arbitration (Local 73 v. Argonne; he handled multiple SEIU/union-vs-Argonne matters). Notable career cases (from bio): e360 Insight v. Spamhaus default judgment; United States v. Ty Warner tax sentencing. Nature-of-suit only partially reported in docket case-level metadata.