Andrea Robin Wood
How Judge Wood rules, drawn from 26 signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
About Judge Wood
Andrea Robin Wood is a judge of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. Appointed by President Barack Obama, Judge Wood received a commission on October 15, 2013.
Judge Wood's practices and standing orders
Rules for cases before Judge Wood, as published on the court's website (checked October 8, 2026). Judges revise these often, so confirm the current version on the court's site before you file.
- Case Procedures ↗
- Standing Order Regarding Final Pretrial Orders for Civil Trials ↗
- Initial Status Report For Reassigned Case ↗
Key rules
Motions
Jointly email a proposed briefing schedule within two business days after filing a motion that needs briefing.
“For any motion the parties believe would benefit from briefing, the parties should jointly e-mail the Courtroom Deputy within 2 business days of the filing of the motion to submit a joint proposed briefing schedule.”
Conferences
File a joint initial status report of no more than five pages seven calendar days before the hearing.
“No later than seven calendar days before the initial status hearing, the parties shall file a Joint Initial Status Report, not to exceed five (5) pages in length.”
Conferences
In reassigned cases, file a joint reassignment status report of no more than five pages within 14 days.
“Counsel for the parties shall confer and then prepare and file a joint Reassignment Status Report, not to exceed 5 pages, within 14 days of the order reassigning the case.”
Standing orders for every case in this court
Orders the court applies to all of its cases, whichever judge has them, as published on the court's website (checked October 8, 2026).
How Judge Wood decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
In Arguijo v. U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, Wood read the statutory definition of “child” and ordinary meaning of “stepchild” to uphold the agency’s denial of a former stepchild’s self-petition. She denied the petitioner summary judgment and granted the agency’s cross-motion.
“Reading the ordinary meaning of stepchild in conjunction with the use of the present tense in the statutory definition of 'child,' CIS reasonably concluded that child does not include a former stepchild.”
In First Merit Bank v. Dziedzic, Wood granted the bank summary judgment on the remaining contested claims, holding that Illinois procedural rules did not govern the federal motion and that a divorce decree did not bind the bank as a nonparty.
“First Merit's purported failure to comply with Illinois Supreme Court Rules 191(a) and 114, even if true, provides no basis to deny the Motion.”
In Green v. Florez, Wood dismissed a fabrication-of-evidence due process claim without prejudice because the complaint did not identify the alleged fabrication or explain how it was used at trial.
“the Complaint leaves completely to the speculation of the reader what evidence was fabricated, how the evidence was fabricated, and the manner in which any such fabricated evidence was used at trial.”
A false-advertising pleading survived because the rival brokerage identified concrete sales figures alleged to be literally false and pleaded that the statements mattered to customers and caused injury.
“@properties has adequately pleaded facts showing B&W made a literally false statement in its advertisements that was material and caused injury to @properties”
Procedural preferences
In Carter v. CVS Pharmacy, Wood compelled arbitration and dismissed the employee’s claims without prejudice after finding that his unsworn, sparse account of duress did not create a genuine dispute over the signed agreement’s validity.
“Carter has not supported these statements with an affidavit or declaration. Even if he had, those claims do not contain enough detail ... to show that Carter was under undue influence or duress to sign the Agreement.”
In Higgins v. Lake County Circuit Court Clerk’s Office, Wood rejected Hamm’s policymaker and qualified-immunity arguments at the pleading stage because job titles alone did not establish that the employees held policymaking positions.
“Perhaps discovery will provide Hamm with the evidence required to support a qualified immunity defense, but at the motion-to-dismiss stage, her argument fails.”
Cautions
In Higgins, Wood dismissed the plaintiffs’ equal-protection count without prejudice because it merely repeated their First Amendment retaliation theory, while allowing parts of the First Amendment claim to proceed.
“Plaintiffs’ equal protection claim in this case constitutes no more than a mere rewording of their First Amendment retaliation claim.”
In Green v. Florez, Wood distinguished a fabrication-based due process claim from allegations sounding in malicious prosecution. Because the plaintiff did not plead how fabricated evidence was used at trial, she dismissed the federal claim without prejudice.
“Newsome does not stand for the proposition that fabricating evidence does not violate a defendant's due process. Instead, it merely establish[es] that allegations that sound in malicious prosecution must be brought pursuant to state law.”
In a restaurant negligence claim after an elevator malfunction, the court classified lost business income and spoiled inventory from the temporary closure as economic loss barred from tort recovery. It allowed an amended complaint.
“the damage sustained by Plaintiffs constitutes economic loss and is barred from recovery in tort by the economic loss rule.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“For the reasons stated above, First Merit's Motion is granted with respect to Counts III and V of the Complaint. The Motion is denied as moot with respect to Counts I, II, VIII, and IX.”
“For the foregoing reasons, Defendants' motion to dismiss the Complaint is granted. The Complaint is dismissed without prejudice. Green will be granted an opportunity to amend his Complaint to remedy its deficiencies.”
“Defendants' motions to dismiss (Dkt. Nos. 25, 29) are both granted in part and denied in part. Specifically, Count IV is dismissed without prejudice as to all Defendants. Count I is dismissed as to the Clerk's Office and Cartwright Weinstein, acting in her official capacity, to the extent Plaintiffs seek damages; Plaintiffs may proceed on their claim for injunctive relief against the Clerk's Office and on their claim for damages against Cartwright Weinstein in her individual capacity.”
“Because Carter has not presented sufficient evidence that the doctrine of impossibility excuses his performance under the Agreement or that he did not validly assent to the Agreement, the Court grants CVS's motion to compel arbitration of his claims. ... Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(3), Carter's claims are dismissed without prejudice to him pursuing those claims in the appropriate forum.”
“For the foregoing reasons, Arguijo's motion for summary judgment (Dkt. No. 94) is denied while CIS's motion for summary judgment (Dkt. No. 99) is granted.”
“For the foregoing reasons, Arguijo's motion for summary judgment (Dkt. No. 94) is denied while CIS's motion for summary judgment (Dkt. No. 99) is granted. The Clerk will enter Judgment in favor of CIS.”
“For the reasons stated above, Plaintiff Merz’s motion for summary judgment against Defendant Kindybalyk (Dkt. No. 43) is granted.”
“Defendant Kindybalyk’s motion to strike Wimmer’s affidavit (Dkt. No. 47) is denied as moot.”
“For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ Rule 12(b)(1) and Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss (Dkt. No. 92) is granted in part and denied in part. The ACAC’s Tennessee antitrust and consumer protection law claims, the KCPA claim, and Count I’s claim seeking injunctive relief for violations of § 1 of the Sherman Act are all dismissed without prejudice.”
“HomeServices Defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction (Dkt. No. 93) is granted and HomeServices Defendants are dismissed without prejudice.”
“Her motion to dismiss the claim against her in Count I of the SAC is therefore granted.”
“BANA’s motion to dismiss the 4AC (Dkt. No. 98) is granted in part and denied in part. Specifically, the motion is granted as to all counts with the exception of Walker’s claim for negligence in Count 8.”
“Stauffer’s motion to transfer venue (Dkt. No. 11) is denied”
“its motion to dismiss (Dkt. No. 9) is granted.”
“For the foregoing reasons, B&W’s motion to dismiss (Dkt. No. 77) is denied.”
“Defendants’ motion to dismiss (Dkt. No. 34) is granted in part and denied in part. Counts II and VIII are dismissed without prejudice.”
“Defendants’ motion to strike (Dkt. No. 35) is denied.”
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
- The reviewed docket includes intellectual-property enforcement, consumer-credit and consumer-product disputes, employment cases, civil-rights actions, and banking and commercial matters.
- The written decisions sampled here also address mortgage foreclosure, police-fabrication and First Amendment claims, employment arbitration, and immigration-related administrative review.
- Case-type information was unavailable for some matters.
Pending matters in the official report
Reported by the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts under the Civil Justice Reform Act, as of March 31, 2026.
| Motions pending more than six months | 73 |
| Bench trials submitted more than six months | 0 |
| Bankruptcy appeals pending more than six months | 0 |
| Social Security appeals pending more than six months | 3 |
| Civil cases pending more than three years | 50 |
| Report | Motions over six months | Cases over three years |
|---|---|---|
| Mar 2026 | 73 | 50 |
| Sep 2025 | 69 | 58 |
| Mar 2025 | 83 | 58 |
| Sep 2024 | 75 | 66 |
| Mar 2024 | 62 | 61 |
| Sep 2023 | 67 | 63 |
| Mar 2023 | 59 | 67 |
| Sep 2022 | 49 | 57 |
| Mar 2022 | 34 | 54 |
| Sep 2021 | 35 | 55 |
| Mar 2021 | 52 | 55 |
| Sep 2020 | 36 | 52 |
A snapshot on that date: matters listed may since have been decided or reassigned. A motion referred to a magistrate judge is counted for both judges. Motions in multidistrict litigation, section 2255 cases and Social Security appeals are not counted, and a very large three-year count is generally a multidistrict docket. Source: Appendix A of the report (PDF); about the report.
How long civil cases take in this court
For the whole of U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, not for Judge Wood: median time from filing to disposition of the civil cases the court closed in the 12 months ending September 30, 2025, as reported by the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts.
| Cases | Median time | |
|---|---|---|
| All civil cases closed | 12,205 | 5.9 months |
| Closed with no court action | 4,300 | 7 months |
| Closed before pretrial | 7,558 | 5.4 months |
| Closed during or after pretrial | 305 | 12.6 months |
| Closed during trial | 42 | 49.5 months |
| 12 months ending | Cases closed | Median time |
|---|---|---|
| Sep 2025 | 12,205 | 5.9 months |
| Sep 2024 | 9,700 | 6.8 months |
| Sep 2023 | 7,093 | 6 months |
| Sep 2022 | 6,841 | 7.3 months |
| Sep 2021 | 9,703 | 15.1 months |
| Sep 2020 | 8,046 | 10.6 months |
| Sep 2019 | 8,134 | 7.4 months |
The table leaves out prisoner petitions, land condemnations, deportation reviews, recovery of overpayments and enforcement of judgments, and reports no median for fewer than 10 cases. A district that closed a large multidistrict litigation in the period shows very large counts and long medians for that year. Source: Table C-5, U.S. District Courts (spreadsheet).
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