Andrea Robin Wood
How Judge Wood decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
She decides statutory questions on text first -- ordinary/dictionary meaning plus verb tense. In a VAWA self-petition she held that the present-tense statutory definition of 'child' (a person who 'is' a stepchild) plus the dictionary meaning of 'stepchild' means a former stepchild ceases to qualify once the marriage ends, deferring to the agency's reasonable interpretation under the narrow APA arbitrary-and-capricious standard.
“Reading the ordinary meaning of stepchild in conjunction with the use of the present tense in the statutory definition of 'child,' CIS reasonably concluded that child does not include a former stepchild.”
She enforces the Erie line sharply in diversity cases: state procedural rules (e.g. Illinois Supreme Court foreclosure Rules 114 and 191(a)) do not govern a federal summary-judgment motion, which is controlled by the Federal Rules; and a consent judgment such as a divorce decree binds only its parties, not a non-party creditor.
“First Merit's purported failure to comply with Illinois Supreme Court Rules 191(a) and 114, even if true, provides no basis to deny the Motion.”
On a fabrication-of-evidence due process claim she demands the plaintiff plead the mechanism -- what evidence was fabricated, how, and that it was actually used at trial to cause the conviction/detention; allegations that merely sound in false arrest or malicious prosecution must be brought under state law (Newsome/Avery distinction).
“the Complaint leaves completely to the speculation of the reader what evidence was fabricated, how the evidence was fabricated, and the manner in which any such fabricated evidence was used at trial.”
Procedural preferences
She treats arbitration agreements as forum-selection clauses brought under Rule 12(b)(3), applies the Tinder summary-judgment-like standard, and construes pro se filings liberally (even re-characterizing a pro se 'motion' as a response brief). Federal policy favors arbitration, and a party resisting it must point to specific record evidence -- not unsworn, undetailed assertions -- of a genuine dispute over the agreement's validity.
“Carter has not supported these statements with an affidavit or declaration. Even if he had, those claims do not contain enough detail ... to show that Carter was under undue influence or duress to sign the Agreement.”
On a Rule 12(b)(6) motion she will not resolve fact-laden affirmative defenses: a public-employee First Amendment patronage-dismissal defendant's policy-maker/qualified-immunity defense is a 'difficult question of fact' for which the defendant bears the burden, and Rule 12(b)(6) is 'a mismatch for immunity.' She also permits inconsistent legal theories at the pleading stage.
“Perhaps discovery will provide Hamm with the evidence required to support a qualified immunity defense, but at the motion-to-dismiss stage, her argument fails.”
Cautions
A Sec. 1983 equal-protection count that merely restates a First Amendment retaliation theory will be dismissed -- the right to be free from retaliation is vindicated under the First Amendment (or Title VII), not the Equal Protection Clause. Plead a distinct discriminatory basis or the duplicative count falls.
“Plaintiffs' equal protection claim in this case constitutes no more than a mere rewording of their First Amendment retaliation claim. Therefore, the Court dismisses Count IV against all Defendants.”
Where a federal due process theory overlaps with a tort that has a state-law remedy (false arrest, malicious prosecution), she will hold the federal claim to its precise constitutional footing -- a deprivation of liberty based on fabricated evidence actually used at trial -- and route the rest to state court rather than letting it proceed as a repackaged constitutional tort.
“Newsome does not stand for the proposition that fabricating evidence does not violate a defendant's due process. Instead, it merely establish[es] that allegations that sound in malicious prosecution must be brought pursuant to state law.”
Motion outcomes
Counted from classified signed orders only. Percentages are shown only where the sample is large enough to be meaningful; smaller samples are reported as raw counts.
| Summary judgment N = 3 |
Granted: 2Denied: 1 | counts only |
| Motions to dismiss N = 2 |
Granted: 1Granted in part: 1 | counts only |
| Motion to compel arbitration N = 1 |
Granted: 1 | counts only |
A "1 of 1" is one ruling, not a tendency. Treat small samples as illustrative, not predictive.
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“For the reasons stated above, First Merit's Motion is granted with respect to Counts III and V of the Complaint. The Motion is denied as moot with respect to Counts I, II, VIII, and IX.”
“For the foregoing reasons, Defendants' motion to dismiss the Complaint is granted. The Complaint is dismissed without prejudice. Green will be granted an opportunity to amend his Complaint to remedy its deficiencies.”
“Defendants' motions to dismiss (Dkt. Nos. 25, 29) are both granted in part and denied in part. Specifically, Count IV is dismissed without prejudice as to all Defendants. Count I is dismissed as to the Clerk's Office and Cartwright Weinstein, acting in her official capacity, to the extent Plaintiffs seek damages; Plaintiffs may proceed on their claim for injunctive relief against the Clerk's Office and on their claim for damages against Cartwright Weinstein in her individual capacity.”
“Because Carter has not presented sufficient evidence that the doctrine of impossibility excuses his performance under the Agreement or that he did not validly assent to the Agreement, the Court grants CVS's motion to compel arbitration of his claims. ... Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(3), Carter's claims are dismissed without prejudice to him pursuing those claims in the appropriate forum.”
“For the foregoing reasons, Arguijo's motion for summary judgment (Dkt. No. 94) is denied while CIS's motion for summary judgment (Dkt. No. 99) is granted.”
“For the foregoing reasons, Arguijo's motion for summary judgment (Dkt. No. 94) is denied while CIS's motion for summary judgment (Dkt. No. 99) is granted. The Clerk will enter Judgment in favor of CIS.”
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
Recent (2026) docket shows a mix typical of an active N.D. Ill. judge: 'Schedule A' IP cases (Corrigan v. Partnerships/Unincorporated Assns), consumer/FDCPA & consumer-product (Smith v. Westlake Services, Wilson v. GreatMats.Com, Moore v. Flex Home & Auto, Walker v. George's Music), employment (Crayton v. Motorola Solutions), civil rights (Robins v. Cook County, Jackson v. Holland, Simms v. Yuhas), and banking/commercial (Northern Trust v. Dharod Family). Her written-opinion docket sampled here spans mortgage foreclosure, Sec. 1983 (police fabrication + First Amendment patronage), employment-arbitration, and APA/immigration. Nature-of-suit is only partially reported in docket case-level metadata.