Sue E. Myerscough

How Judge Myerscough rules, drawn from 21 signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.

Court
United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois
Position
district
Appointed by
Barack Obama (Democratic)
Commissioned
2011-03-14
Education
Southern Illinois University, B.A. with honors, 1973; Southern Illinois University School of Law, J.D., 1980
Signed orders read
21

How Judge Myerscough decides

Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.

What persuades

She treats Article III standing as a threshold that disposes of a case outright rather than a defect to be worked around. Where a plaintiff could not show a concrete injury, the absence of a live controversy ended the matter on jurisdictional grounds even though the parties had briefed the merits.

“Because Mishaga lacks standing, her complaint contains no live case or controversy.”

The same threshold cuts the other way when the pleading does its work: a plaintiff who pleads concrete facts showing injury and ripeness defeats a jurisdictional attack, and the court will not demand more at the pleading stage.

“has alleged sufficient facts to demonstrate her standing and the ripeness of her failure-to-accommodate claim”

On constitutional challenges she applies the governing circuit framework step by step and resolves the case within it rather than reaching for a broader rule, grounding the analysis in controlling precedent.

“720 ILCS 5/24-1.6 is constitutional under the two-step method for analyzing Second Amendment cases set forth by the Seventh Circuit in Ezell v. City of Chicago”

Procedural preferences

Her dismissals are surgical. Rather than dismissing a complaint wholesale, she identifies the single count or single defendant that fails and expressly leaves the rest of the case intact.

“Count V is dismissed without prejudice as to CMS with leave to replead. The Motion is denied in all other respects.”

When she dismisses without prejudice she typically pairs the dismissal with leave to replead and a date-certain deadline, and tells the party exactly which defect the new pleading must cure.

“Plaintiffs are granted leave to file a second amended complaint that contains factual allegations sufficient to demonstrate the existence of an actual controversy between the parties on or before April 14, 2017.”

The preference for curable dismissal is not limited to plaintiffs: a defendant's counterclaim that failed the pleading standard was dismissed without prejudice and with leave to amend rather than terminated.

“DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE and with leave to amend”

Cautions

She will decide a discrete legal question and expressly defer the rest. A party should not read a ruling in its favor on one issue as a disposition of the motion, which may be held pending further proceedings.

“Because additional issues remain to be determined, however, the Motions for Summary Judgment are taken under advisement.”

Superseding an earlier filing with an amended version moots the original. Where a party filed both an original and an amended post-trial motion, the originals were denied as moot and only the amended versions were decided on their merits.

“are DENIED AS MOOT because they are duplicative of the amended motions”

Failure to exhaust administrative remedies is enforced at the pleading stage. Discrimination theories that were not first presented to the administrative agency were dismissed even though related claims in the same complaint survived.

“dismissed without prejudice for failure to exhaust administrative remedies”

Signed rulings

A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.

Finfrock v. United States
11-3052 · 2012-03-20
Summary judgment (cross-motions) Unclear

“For the reasons that follow, this Court finds that the regulation is invalid. Because additional issues remain to be determined, however, the Motions for Summary Judgment are taken under advisement.”

United States ex rel. Price v. Peters
12-3107 · 2013-12-18
Summary judgment (plaintiff) Granted

“The Court DENIES Defendant’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment and GRANTS Relator’s Motion for Summary Judgment.”

Summary judgment (defendant) Denied
Smego v. Aramark Food Services Corp.
10-CV-3334 · 2014-01-10
Summary judgment (unspecified) Denied

“The rest of the pending summary judgment motions are denied (d/e’s 470, 475, 476).”

Summary judgment (defendant) Granted in part

“Aramark Food Services Corporation’s second motion for summary judgment is granted in part and denied in part (d/e’s 471). The motion is granted as to the dispute over 9 C.F.R. 319.6. Section 319.6 is irrelevant. This regulation does not prohibit the serving of mechanically separated chicken as the sole protein source in meals. The motion is otherwise denied.”

Summary judgment (unspecified) Denied
Summary judgment (unspecified) Denied
Hilderbrand v. National Electrical Benefit Fund
13-3170 · 2014-12-30
Summary judgment (plaintiff) Granted in part

“Because the NEBF Trustees failed to consider reliable, contrary evidence submitted by Hil-derbrand, Hilderbrand’s Motion for Summary Judgment (d/e 12) is GRANTED IN PART and the cause is remanded to the NEBF Trustees for a de novo benefits *802determination. The NEBF’s Motion for Summary Judgment (d/e 13) is DENIED.”

Summary judgment (defendant) Denied
United States v. Dish Network, LLC
09-3073 · 2015-02-17
Motion to intervene (third_party) Granted in part

“For the reasons set forth below, the Motion is ALLOWED and PossibleNOW’s request for reconsideration is ALLOWED in part.”

United States v. Stanbridge
3:14-cr-30020 · 2015-02-18
Motion to suppress (defendant) Denied

“Because Stanbridge’s improperly signaled turns gave police officers probable cause to initiate the traffic stop and because the officers did not unreasonably prolong the stop when they called in investigative drug-sniffing dogs, Stan-bridge’s Motion is DENIED.”

Mishaga v. Schmitz
10-cv-03187 · 2015-09-30
Summary judgment (defendant) Granted

“Because Mishaga lacks standing, her complaint contains no live case or controversy. Accordingly, this Court lacks jurisdiction under Article III of the Constitution, and so Mi-shaga’s Complaint must be dismissed, and Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment granted.”

Lohrasbi v. Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois
13-3105 · 2015-11-29
Summary judgment (defendant) Granted

“Before the Court is Defendant Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois’s Renewed and Revised Motion for Summary Judgment (d/e 37), pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 56. The MOTION is GRANTED because Plaintiff Ardeshir Lohrasbi’s claim is time-barred and the doctrine of equitable tolling does not apply.”

Meyer v. St. John's Hospital of the Hospital Sisters of the Third Order of St. Francis
15-3313 · 2016-02-17
Motions to dismiss (defendant) Denied

“Because Plaintiff Tiffany Meyer, f/k/a Tiffany Cavoretto, has alleged sufficient facts to demonstrate her standing and the ripeness of her failure-to-accommodate claim, the Motion is DENIED.”

Southerland v. Escapa
14-3094 · 2016-03-31
Motions to dismiss (defendant) Granted

“Defendant’s motion is GRANTED because 720 ILCS 5/24-1.6 is constitutional under the two-step method for analyzing Second Amendment cases set forth by the Seventh Circuit in Ezell v. City of Chicago, as applied in Friedman v. City of Highland Park, Illinois.”

Hoffman v. DeWitt County
15-3026 · 2016-03-31
Motions to dismiss (defendant) Granted in part

“For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s Motion to .Dismiss is now GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.”

Rogers v. United States
15-cv-02172 · 2016-04-05
Motion to vacate sentence (defendant) Denied

“The'Motion is DENIED. Petitioner’s claim is barred by the waiver in his Plea Agreement. Even if the claim were not barred, Petitioner is not entitled to relief on the merits because none of Petitioner’s qualifying convictions were based on the residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act.”

Caseload & timing

From public federal docket records for this judge.

Median case duration in the sampled dockets: 992.0 days (N = 10).

  • This cohort describes ten cases filed in a seven-week window at the very start of her federal service, not a census of her caseload, and the mix of a new district judge's first assignments need not resemble her docket in later years.
  • Recorded case outcomes in the group were mixed: some ended on a pretrial motion, one went to a jury verdict, and several were voluntarily dismissed or closed on other grounds.
  • The sample is far too small and too narrowly drawn to support a settlement rate or any comparison between case types.

Draft for Judge Myerscough with the record in hand

Ezel grounds your drafting and research in this profile: what has persuaded Judge Myerscough, and what has not, cited to the signed orders.

Opens in Ezel Pro.

  • Grounded in Judge Myerscough's own signed orders
  • Cites every source it relies on, so you can verify it
  • Chat, drafting and research in one workspace