Sue E. Myerscough

How Judge Myerscough rules, drawn from 27 signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.

Court
United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois
Position
District judge
Status
Senior status
Appointed by
Barack Obama (Democratic)
Commissioned
March 14, 2011
Education
Southern Illinois University, B.A. with honors, 1973; Southern Illinois University School of Law, J.D., 1980
Signed orders read
27

About Judge Myerscough

Sue Ellen Myerscough is a judge of the United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois. Appointed by President Barack Obama, Judge Myerscough received a commission on March 14, 2011. Judge Myerscough assumed senior status on March 9, 2023.

Judge Myerscough's practices and standing orders

Rules for cases before Judge Myerscough, as published on the court's website (checked October 9, 2026). Judges revise these often, so confirm the current version on the court's site before you file.

Key rules

Contacting chambers

Copy opposing counsel on written correspondence with the court or court staff unless the court directs otherwise.

“Unless otherwise directed by the Court, all written correspondence with the Court or Court staff by counsel or counsel’s staff shall include the opposing counsel as a recipient of the correspondence.”

Filing

When courtesy copies are required, print copies for Judge Myerscough on both sides.

“Courtesy copies provided to the chambers of Judge Sue E. Myerscough and Judge Tom Schanzle-Haskins shall be printed on both sides of the paper or double-sided.”

Filing

Use 14-point Bookman Old Style for proposed orders in both civil and criminal cases.

“All proposed orders submitted to Judge Myerscough, in both civil and criminal cases, should use 14-point Bookman Old Style font.”

Motions

Include a proposed order with every motion for default judgment.

“All motions for default judgment shall include a proposed order.”

Trial

Submit the required pretrial documents and motions at least seven days before the final pretrial conference unless ordered otherwise.

“Unless the Court orders otherwise, the parties shall submit the following documents and motions not less than seven days before the final pretrial conference:”

Standing orders for every case in this court

Orders the court applies to all of its cases, whichever judge has them, as published on the court's website (checked October 9, 2026).

Key rules from these orders · The court's local rules ↗

How Judge Myerscough decides

Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.

What persuades

In Mishaga v. Schmitz, Myerscough found that the plaintiff lacked Article III standing and dismissed the challenge for lack of a live case or controversy.

“Because Mishaga lacks standing, her complaint contains no live case or controversy.”

In Meyer v. St. John’s Hospital, Myerscough denied a partial motion to dismiss after finding that the plaintiff alleged a concrete injury: termination following a request for disability accommodation. Those allegations supported standing and ripeness at the pleading stage.

“has alleged sufficient facts to demonstrate her standing and the ripeness of her failure-to-accommodate claim”

In Southerland v. Escapa, Myerscough applied the then-governing Seventh Circuit two-step framework and upheld the challenged Illinois weapons statute against the plaintiff’s Second Amendment claim.

“720 ILCS 5/24-1.6 is constitutional under the two-step method for analyzing Second Amendment cases set forth by the Seventh Circuit in Ezell v. City of Chicago”

In a retaliatory discharge case, evidence that a supervisor learned of an employee injury could support an inference of corporate knowledge even without proof that the supervisor directly told the termination decision maker.

“The Court holds that a reasonable factfinder could conclude that Wadford’s knowledge was imputed to the company based on the circumstances.”

Procedural preferences

In Leskovisek v. Illinois Department of Transportation, Myerscough dismissed Count V against Central Management Services without prejudice and with leave to replead, while denying the dismissal motion in all other respects.

“Count V is dismissed without prejudice as to CMS with leave to replead. The Motion is denied in all other respects.”

In E.O.R. Energy L.L.C. v. Messina, Myerscough dismissed the complaint for failing to allege an actual controversy and allowed the plaintiffs to file a second amended complaint by a stated deadline.

“Plaintiffs are granted leave to file a second amended complaint that contains factual allegations sufficient to demonstrate the existence of an actual controversy between the parties on or before April 14, 2017.”

In Whitchurch v. Canton Marine Towing Co., Myerscough dismissed the employer’s fraud counterclaim without prejudice and allowed it to amend the pleading.

“DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE and with leave to amend”

Cautions

In Finfrock v. United States, Myerscough found a Treasury regulation invalid but took both summary-judgment motions under advisement because an alternative argument about participation in the farm business and the refund amount still needed resolution.

“Because additional issues remain to be determined, however, the Motions for Summary Judgment are taken under advisement.”

Superseding an earlier filing with an amended version moots the original. Where a party filed both an original and an amended post-trial motion, the originals were denied as moot and only the amended versions were decided on their merits.

“are DENIED AS MOOT because they are duplicative of the amended motions”

Failure to exhaust administrative remedies is enforced at the pleading stage. Discrimination theories that were not first presented to the administrative agency were dismissed even though related claims in the same complaint survived.

“dismissed without prejudice for failure to exhaust administrative remedies”

In a patent case, the court excluded an infringement expert after his report and testimony failed to apply the court’s construction of the disputed claim term.

“The Court holds that it is not and holds that Halstead is excluded from testifying that the F7 has a ‘second shell.’”

Signed rulings

A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.

Finfrock v. United States
11-3052 · 2012-03-20

In this estate-tax refund suit, the court found a Treasury regulation invalid but expressly took both summary judgment motions under advisement. The opinion supplies reasoning on a legal issue without a disposition of either motion. A later public disposition was not located in the previously checked docket, so no motion outcome is counted.

United States ex rel. Price v. Peters
12-3107 · 2013-12-18
Summary judgment (plaintiff) Granted

“The Court DENIES Defendant’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment and GRANTS Relator’s Motion for Summary Judgment.”

Summary judgment (defendant) Denied
Smego v. Aramark Food Services Corp.
10-CV-3334 · 2014-01-10
Summary judgment (unspecified) Denied

“The rest of the pending summary judgment motions are denied (d/e’s 470, 475, 476).”

Summary judgment (defendant) Granted in part

“Aramark Food Services Corporation’s second motion for summary judgment is granted in part and denied in part (d/e’s 471). The motion is granted as to the dispute over 9 C.F.R. 319.6. Section 319.6 is irrelevant. This regulation does not prohibit the serving of mechanically separated chicken as the sole protein source in meals. The motion is otherwise denied.”

Summary judgment (unspecified) Denied
Summary judgment (unspecified) Denied
Hilderbrand v. National Electrical Benefit Fund
13-3170 · 2014-12-30
Summary judgment (plaintiff) Granted in part

“Because the NEBF Trustees failed to consider reliable, contrary evidence submitted by Hil-derbrand, Hilderbrand’s Motion for Summary Judgment (d/e 12) is GRANTED IN PART and the cause is remanded to the NEBF Trustees for a de novo benefits *802determination. The NEBF’s Motion for Summary Judgment (d/e 13) is DENIED.”

Summary judgment (defendant) Denied
United States v. Dish Network, LLC
09-3073 · 2015-02-17
Motion to intervene (third_party) Granted in part

“For the reasons set forth below, the Motion is ALLOWED and PossibleNOW’s request for reconsideration is ALLOWED in part.”

United States v. Stanbridge
3:14-cr-30020 · 2015-02-18
Motion to suppress (defendant) Denied

“Because Stanbridge’s improperly signaled turns gave police officers probable cause to initiate the traffic stop and because the officers did not unreasonably prolong the stop when they called in investigative drug-sniffing dogs, Stan-bridge’s Motion is DENIED.”

Mishaga v. Schmitz
10-cv-03187 · 2015-09-30
Summary judgment (defendant) Granted

“Because Mishaga lacks standing, her complaint contains no live case or controversy. Accordingly, this Court lacks jurisdiction under Article III of the Constitution, and so Mi-shaga’s Complaint must be dismissed, and Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment granted.”

Lohrasbi v. Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois
13-3105 · 2015-11-29
Summary judgment (defendant) Granted

“Before the Court is Defendant Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois’s Renewed and Revised Motion for Summary Judgment (d/e 37), pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 56. The MOTION is GRANTED because Plaintiff Ardeshir Lohrasbi’s claim is time-barred and the doctrine of equitable tolling does not apply.”

Meyer v. St. John's Hospital of the Hospital Sisters of the Third Order of St. Francis
15-3313 · 2016-02-17
Motions to dismiss (defendant) Denied

“Because Plaintiff Tiffany Meyer, f/k/a Tiffany Cavoretto, has alleged sufficient facts to demonstrate her standing and the ripeness of her failure-to-accommodate claim, the Motion is DENIED.”

Southerland v. Escapa
14-3094 · 2016-03-31
Motions to dismiss (defendant) Granted

“Defendant’s motion is GRANTED because 720 ILCS 5/24-1.6 is constitutional under the two-step method for analyzing Second Amendment cases set forth by the Seventh Circuit in Ezell v. City of Chicago, as applied in Friedman v. City of Highland Park, Illinois.”

Hoffman v. DeWitt County
15-3026 · 2016-03-31
Motions to dismiss (defendant) Granted in part

“For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s Motion to .Dismiss is now GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.”

Rogers v. United States
15-cv-02172 · 2016-04-05
Motion to vacate sentence (defendant) Denied

“The'Motion is DENIED. Petitioner’s claim is barred by the waiver in his Plea Agreement. Even if the claim were not barred, Petitioner is not entitled to relief on the merits because none of Petitioner’s qualifying convictions were based on the residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act.”

Caseload & timing

From public federal docket records for this judge.

Median case duration in the sampled dockets: 992.0 days (N = 10).

  • This cohort describes ten cases filed in a seven-week window at the very start of her federal service, not a census of her caseload, and the mix of a new district judge's first assignments need not resemble her docket in later years.
  • Recorded case outcomes in the group were mixed: some ended on a pretrial motion, one went to a jury verdict, and several were voluntarily dismissed or closed on other grounds.
  • The sample is far too small and too narrowly drawn to support a settlement rate or any comparison between case types.

Pending matters in the official report

Reported by the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts under the Civil Justice Reform Act, as of March 31, 2026.

Motions pending more than six months0
Bench trials submitted more than six months0
Bankruptcy appeals pending more than six months0
Social Security appeals pending more than six months0
Civil cases pending more than three years13
ReportMotions over six monthsCases over three years
Mar 2026013
Sep 2025211
Mar 2025314
Sep 2024118
Mar 2024928
Sep 20232020
Mar 20232420
Sep 20221737
Mar 20222132
Sep 20212337
Mar 20211821
Sep 20201512

A snapshot on that date: matters listed may since have been decided or reassigned. A motion referred to a magistrate judge is counted for both judges. Motions in multidistrict litigation, section 2255 cases and Social Security appeals are not counted, and a very large three-year count is generally a multidistrict docket. Source: Appendix A of the report (PDF); about the report.

How long civil cases take in this court

For the whole of United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois, not for Judge Myerscough: median time from filing to disposition of the civil cases the court closed in the 12 months ending September 30, 2025, as reported by the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts.

CasesMedian time
All civil cases closed7607.3 months
Closed with no court action3156.2 months
Closed before pretrial4388.4 months
Closed during trial7not reported
12 months endingCases closedMedian time
Sep 20257607.3 months
Sep 20247048 months
Sep 202362510.8 months
Sep 202263711.7 months
Sep 20216849.9 months
Sep 202062910.4 months
Sep 201965310.1 months

The table leaves out prisoner petitions, land condemnations, deportation reviews, recovery of overpayments and enforcement of judgments, and reports no median for fewer than 10 cases. A district that closed a large multidistrict litigation in the period shows very large counts and long medians for that year. Source: Table C-5, U.S. District Courts (spreadsheet).

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