Richard Henry Mills
How Judge Mills rules, drawn from 28 signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
Judge Mills no longer hears cases. This profile is preserved as a historical record of how they ruled here.
About Judge Mills
Richard Henry Mills was a judge of the United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois. Appointed by President Ronald Reagan, Judge Mills received a commission on July 22, 1985. Judge Mills assumed senior status on October 7, 1997 and served until death on July 16, 2023.
How Judge Mills decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
In Glemser v. Sugar Creek Realty, Mills identified the summary judgment motion by docket number and allowed it on the hostile-work-environment and constructive-discharge counts.
“Ergo, the Motion of Defendant Sugar Creek Realty, LLC d/b/a/ as Pine Woods Apartments for Summary Judgment [d/e 15] is ALLOWED as to the Counts asserting Hostile Work Environment and Constructive Discharge.”
In EEI Holding Corp. v. Bragg, Mills denied the dismissal motion on personal jurisdiction but granted it on failure to state a claim.
“Ergo, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss [d/e 6] is DENIED on the issue of personal jurisdiction, but GRANTED on the issue of failure to state a claim.”
In PNC Bank’s declaratory action against Sullivan, Mills granted the bank’s summary-judgment motion and held that Sullivan’s consumer-fraud arbitration demand was not arbitrable because the parties had no arbitration agreement.
“Ergo, the Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment [d/e 11] is ALLOWED.”
Procedural preferences
In Lynch v. Nolan, Mills granted a stay, denied dismissal while preserving those arguments for after the stay, and denied a motion to strike.
“Defendants’ motions [d/e 9,17] are GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. In particular, the motion for a stay is GRANTED. The motions to dismiss are DENIED, though those arguments may be resurrected after the stay is lifted. Lynch’s motion to strike various documents [d/e 19] is DENIED.”
In Iles v. White, Mills dismissed the action on a threshold ground and denied all remaining motions as moot.
“All pending motions are DENIED AS MOOT.”
In Mohr v. Targeted Genetics, Mills addressed the related threshold motions in one order, denying dismissal and allowing remand to state court.
“In sum: motion to dismiss denied; motion to remand allowed.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“Because the doctrine of judicial estoppel bars Smith’s claims, Franklin Life’s motions for summary judgment and entry of judgment are GRANTED.”
“After investing an unwarranted amount of time in this case, the Court now grants summary judgment for all defendants.”
“The Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment is DENIED.”
“Alternatively, the Defendants’ motion to dismiss is ALLOWED.”
“The Plaintiffs motion for partial summary judgment [d/e 45] is DENIED.”
“the Defendants’ motion for summary judgment [d/e 42] is ALLOWED.”
“Defendants’ motions [d/e 9,17] are GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. In particular, the motion for a stay is GRANTED. The motions to dismiss are DENIED, though those arguments may be resurrected after the stay is lifted. Lynch’s motion to strike various documents [d/e 19] is DENIED.”
“the Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.”
“In sum: motion to dismiss denied; motion to remand allowed.”
“The Defendants are granted summary judgment on all claims, except the Section 1983 due process claims against Mayor Timothy Davlin and Todd Renfrew.”
“the Plaintiffs’ Motion for Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis is ALLOWED.”
“the Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment is ALLOWED.”
“The Plaintiffs Motion for Attorney’s Fees and Costs is ALLOWED.”
“The Defendant’s Motion to dismiss is ALLOWED.”
“Ergo, the Government’s Motion to Dismiss Third-Party Claim of Dianna L. Burge is ALLOWED.”
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
- Sampled assignments run from 1979 to 2022.
- The earliest rows predate his 1985 commission and are inherited reassignments; the 1985-86 cohort is a general civil docket (railroad and towing matters, bank and FDIC collection, Social Security, tax, product liability, environmental and RICO), with nine of twenty carrying Magistrate Judge Charles H.
- Evans as the referral judge. By 1998 the docket is dominated by prisoner petitions, habeas, motions to vacate sentence and prison-conditions cases, alongside employment civil rights, ERISA collection and United States student-loan recovery suits.
- The 2008 window, which overlaps the published opinions in this record, is heavier on ERISA and benefit-fund collection, employment and FMLA claims, natural-gas pipeline condemnation, and contract and insurance disputes.
- He was still being assigned newly filed civil cases in 2021-2022, including consumer credit, ADA employment and telephone-consumer-protection matters, in the last full year of his life.
Pending matters in the official report
Judge Mills was last listed in the Civil Justice Reform Act report as of March 31, 2022.
| Motions pending more than six months | 7 |
| Bench trials submitted more than six months | 0 |
| Bankruptcy appeals pending more than six months | 0 |
| Social Security appeals pending more than six months | 6 |
| Civil cases pending more than three years | 1 |
| Report | Motions over six months | Cases over three years |
|---|---|---|
| Mar 2022 | 7 | 1 |
| Sep 2021 | 2 | 1 |
| Mar 2021 | 4 | 6 |
| Sep 2020 | 8 | 4 |
A snapshot on that date: matters listed may since have been decided or reassigned. A motion referred to a magistrate judge is counted for both judges. Motions in multidistrict litigation, section 2255 cases and Social Security appeals are not counted, and a very large three-year count is generally a multidistrict docket. Source: Appendix A of the report (PDF); about the report.
A historical record
Judge Mills no longer hears cases. This profile stays available as a record of how they ruled here. If you're preparing for a matter, start from the court's current bench.